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Abstract
This thesis explores the connection between Philip Kerr (1882-1940) and the Irish 
Question in the early twentieth century. To date there has been no substantial survey of 
his Irish policy. Through consultation o f new sources the study explores the evolution of 
Kerr’s thought on Ireland in light of his family, his faith, and his political background. 
Kerr’s work on Ireland is particularly interesting as an imperialist, keen federalist, an 
admirer of the United States and not least as a Catholic who converted to Christian 
Science. The core of this piece explores Kerr’s role in Irish affairs as Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George’s secretary between 1916 and 1921, and the potentially influential 
role that he held at Downing Street. Although his biographers and historians have 
alluded to his involvement in the drafting o f the 1920 Government of Ireland Bill, none 
have considered in detail the extent o f the work that Kerr carried out in relation to Ireland 
between 1919 and 1921. The study addresses this by exploring Kerr’s position as an 
individual who was not a statesman, but an influential figure close to the centre o f power, 
who was closely involved with the various forces working to shape an Irish settlement. 
The thesis adds to the existing biographical literature on Kerr by anchoring him within 
the Anglo-Irish story. The fact that the Bill he drafted remained as the basis for the 
Government o f Northern Ireland until 1972, and was not repealed until 1998, points to 
Kerr’s modem relevance, and to the importance of recognising the work that he carried 
out behind the scenes during one o f the most crucial periods in Anglo-Irish history.
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Chapter 1
Philip Kerr and the Historiography of Modern Ireland
Philip Kerr (later the Eleventh Marquess o f Lothian) was closely involved in the 
Irish question and worked on it between 1916 and 1921, some o f the most turbulent 
years in Anglo-Irish political history.1 Although scholarly works have explored 
Kerr’s life and career, and there is an extensive body o f literature on Anglo-Irish 
relations, there has been no detailed study linking Kerr to Ireland and an exploration 
o f the work that he did. As private secretary to the Prime Minister, David Lloyd 
George, Kerr drafted the 1920 Government o f Ireland Bill and exercised a great deal 
o f influence in Irish policy. He therefore has a significant place within the history of 
Irish Home Rule and Anglo-Irish relations. This chapter will consider the existing 
literature, highlighting the current gaps and the need for this thesis to fill them.
The Irish problem has fascinated historians and enthusiasts alike as the story has 
continued to unfold and to develop throughout the twentieth and into the twenty-first 
century. It has inspired a popular culture and folklore as the Easter rebels have 
remained in the public consciousness in a cult and almost saint-like way. Films such 
as Neil Jordan’s Michael Collins have ensured that revolutionaries such as Collins 
remain heroic, iconic figures. This culture is clearly not diminishing as Ken Loach’s 
film The Wind That Shakes the Barley won ‘Best Film’ at Cannes in 2006.2 
Inspiration for this thesis developed from recognition o f  the fact that Kerr drafted the 
1920 Government o f Ireland Bill that partitioned the country and in effect created
1 As Kerr did not become the Eleventh Lord Lothian until 1930, after the period that this study is 
chiefly concerned with, he will be referred to as Philip Kerr throughout.
2 Neil Jordan (Director), Michael Collins (Warner Bros., 1996); Ken Loach (Director), The Wind That 
Shakes the Barley (BIM, 2006).
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Northern Ireland as we know it today. He did this as private secretary to Lloyd 
George in 1916-21. Historically Lloyd George is closely linked to both the Irish 
settlement o f 1920 and to the deal that was reached in the form o f the 1921 Anglo- 
Irish Treaty. During this time Kerr was one o f his closest aides and advisors, and yet 
he has been largely ignored by historians o f Anglo-Irish history.
During the 1980s numerous works appeared that examined the British 
administration o f Ireland during the last stages o f the union. These included Sheila 
Lawlor’s Britain and Ireland 1914-23, John M cColgan’s British Policy and the Irish 
Administration, 1920-22 and Eunan O ’Halpin’s Decline o f  the Union: British 
Government in Ireland 1892-1920 . 3  Each o f these explored different aspects o f the 
union’s decline. Whilst Lawlor provided a detailed account o f the events and actions 
o f the leading political players, McColgan analysed the practical elements o f the 
settlement including the provisions o f the Government o f Ireland Bill, the financial 
and administrative aspects, and the transfer o f services to Northern Ireland. O ’Halpin 
focused on the role played by the Crown Officials at Dublin Castle in the Irish 
administration, and the relationship between government departments in Ireland and 
parliament. In doing so he aimed to illustrate the administrative legacy inherited by 
independent Ireland. None o f these works made any reference to Kerr and the role 
that he played, despite the fact that (as this thesis will argue) he was a central figure in 
the development o f the 1920 Act and its implementation.
In 1991 Nicholas Mansergh published The Unresolved Question: the Anglo-Irish 
Settlement and its Undoing ,4 He gave a detailed account o f the making o f the 
settlement, its aftermath and the way in which it fell apart with the suspension o f
3 Sheila Lawlor, Britain and Ireland 1914-23 (Dublin, 1983); John McColgan, British Policy and the 
Irish Administration, 1920-22 (London, 1983); Eunan O ’Halpin, Decline o f  the Union: British 
Government in Ireland 1892-1920 (Dublin, 1987).
4 Nicholas Mansergh, The Unresolved Question: the Anglo-Irish Settlement and its Undoing 1912-72 
(London, 1991).
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Stormont in 1972. Like the works produced in the 1980s, Mansergh failed to 
acknowledge Kerr’s involvement. Further works by Michael Laffan and Francis 
Costello, published in 1999 and 2003 respectively, provide valuable information on 
Irish politics during the period that Kerr was at Downing Street, yet once again he is 
not included in either analysis. Costello’s The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath
1916-1923, Years o f  Revolt provides a fresh approach to the events o f 1916-23 
through wider consideration o f the social and economic factors that contributed to the 
political developments, hence presenting a broader study o f the period.5 Laffan’s The 
Resurrection o f  Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916-1923 explores the rise o f Sinn 
Féin from its earliest beginnings, to the strength the party gathered post 1916.6 Kerr 
would be concerned by Sinn Féin’s growing strength while working on Irish matters 
and therefore Laffan’s work provides a valuable context. While it is clear that 
historians continue to search for fresh interpretations o f the Anglo-Irish relationship, 
there is a historical paradox in the sense that Kerr’s involvement has not been 
explored.
The first decade o f the twenty-first century has seen a number o f works refer to 
Kerr in an Irish context, hinting at his potential importance but not exploring it in 
detail. In Home Ride, An Irish History 1800-2000 Alvin Jackson refers to Kerr’s 
possible influence on the making o f the 1920 Government o f Ireland Bill.7 He 
explains that the federalist agitation was an important context for the legislation that 
was being drafted in 1919-20, stating that:
Philip Kerr, Private Secretary to Lloyd George, was an imperialist in the style
o f Milner, and a federalist, and while he was a relatively early convert to the
5 Francis Costello, The Irish Revolution and its Aftermath 1916-1923, Years o f  Revolt (Dublin, 2003).
6 Michael Laffan, The Resurrection o f  Ireland: The Sinn Féin Party, 1916-1923 (Cambridge, 1999).
7 Alvin Jackson, Home Rule, An Irish History 1800-2000 (London, 2004).
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notion o f dominion status for Ireland, he also influenced and sponsored the 
deal that was being honed in 1919-20.8
Jackson points to a need to examine Kerr’s role in depth and to determine exactly 
what his position and involvement were in relation to Ireland during these years. The 
work itself provides important background material for this study as it charts the 
history o f the Home Rule idea in Ireland over a two hundred year period and the 
development o f schemes for devolution.
The only piece to date that has attempted to highlight Kerr’s involvement with the 
Irish question in any substantial way is Gary Peatling’s British Opinion and Irish Self- 
Government 1865-1925.9 Peatling defines three distinct ideological groups in 
exploring British attitudes to Ireland: the Comtean Positivists, the New Liberals and 
the Imperialists. He explores Kerr’s role under the imperialist heading, explaining 
that he assisted in the drafting o f  the Government o f Ireland Act. Peatling links Kerr 
to the search for a settlement in Ireland and goes further than previous scholars in 
attempting to define his thought, demonstrating that he gave advice to Lloyd George 
and the fact that Kerr listened to advice from the Protestant Irish Nationalist Stephen 
Gwynn. Despite this there are some problems with his work. He argues that 
Catholics in the United Kingdom were often unsympathetic to imperial goals and that 
families such as Philip Kerr’s were troubled by this association. This was not 
necessarily the case, as Chapter 2 will explore, and certainly Kerr’s family did not fall 
into this category. Peatling’s work is important in linking Kerr to Anglo-Irish 
politics, although his involvement requires more wide-ranging investigation.
8 Ibid., p. 228.
9 G.K. Peatling, British Opinion and Irish Self-Government 1865-1925 (Dublin, 2001).
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The most up to date work that has made reference to Kerr’s role in the wider 
context o f Anglo-Irish history is Paul Bew’s Ireland: The Politics o f  Enmity 1789- 
2006.10 Bew refers to the fact that civil servants at Dublin Castle, such as Sir John 
Anderson and Andy Cope, worked closely with Kerr in 1920. This will be discussed 
in further detail in Chapter 6. Considering the fact that many historians writing about 
the 1920 Government o f Ireland Bill have omitted Kerr as a significant figure, it is all 
the more important that Bew has included him. As his work explores a wider context, 
it suggests that historians are beginning to recognise Kerr as someone who belongs in 
the Anglo-Irish narrative. Bew has also referred to Kerr in articles discussing the 
involvement o f American journalist, Carl W. Ackerman, in the Irish problem 1920-21 
and the role o f moderate Irish nationalism between 1916 and 1923.”
There is thus a strong case for undertaking a full and detailed study o f Kerr’s 
connection with Ireland. Indeed his involvement is important for a number o f 
reasons. His papers housed in the National Archives o f Scotland reveal that he was 
handling a vast amount o f Irish related material between 1917 and 1921, as do the 
papers o f Lloyd George in the Parliamentary Archives.12 Despite this, his 
involvement and influence have not been fully apparent. This can be partly explained 
by the fact that Kerr maintained a physical, daily presence at Downing Street in 1917- 
21; therefore there is a lack o f correspondence between him and his contemporaries as 
he would have seen the Prime Minister, government ministers and fellow civil 
servants regularly.13 One o f the few contemporary sources that points to Kerr’s
10 Paul Bew, Ireland: The Politics o f  Enmity 1789-2006 (Oxford, 2007).
11 Paul Bew, ‘Moderate Irish Nationalism and the Irish Revolution, 1916-1923’ in The Historical 
Journal Vol. 42, No. 3, (Sept, 1999); Paul Bew ‘Collins and Adams, LG and Blair’ in The Spectator,
31 May 1997.
12 Private and Political Papers of Philip Kerr, the Eleventh Marquess of Lothian, GD40/17; The Lloyd 
George Papers, First Earl Lloyd George of Dwyfor, LG.
13 Kerr was appointed as one of Lloyd George’s private secretaries in 1916. He was handling Irish 
material from January 1917.
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influence in Irish policy is the published volume o f the Mark Sturgis diaries, edited by 
Michael Hopkinson.14 This will be explored in more detail in Chapter 6. As a 
member o f the Dublin Castle administration in 1920-22, Sturgis noted Kerr’s 
influence with Lloyd George and also with the Chief Secretary for Ireland, Sir Hamar 
Greenwood.
The papers reveal that Kerr was corresponding with a wide range o f individuals 
linked to the Irish question, particularly between 1919 and 1921. These included 
figures such as Stephen Gwynn, Horace Plunkett and G.W. Russell. Gwynn 
published extensively during his life, as did his son Denis. Both produced 
biographies o f the Irish Parliamentary Party leader, John Redmond.15 Neither 
mentioned Kerr in their work. This may have been difficult while Kerr was still alive 
as he met Gwynn in secret in 1919-21. Stephen Gwynn has not been the subject of 
substantial historical work, although a recent PhD on him has been completed by 
Colin Reid, shortly to be published by Manchester University Press. There are 
numerous biographies o f Plunkett and Russell, but again Kerr is omitted.16 Equally, 
the biographies o f Sir Edward Carson do not connect him with Kerr, although the 
Round Table tried to convince Carson o f a federal solution to the Irish problem during 
the Ulster Crisis in 1912-14.17
14 Michael Hopkinson (ed.), Last Days o f  Dublin Castle: The Mark Sturgis Diaries (Dublin, 1999).
15 Stephen Gwynn, John Redmond’s Last Years (London, 1919); Denis Gwynn, The Life o f  John 
Redmond (London, 1932).
16 Margaret Digby, Horace Plunkett. An Anglo-American Irishman (Oxford, 1949); Trevor West, 
Horace Plunkett Co-operation and Politics an Irish Biography (Gerrards Cross, 1986).
16 H. Summerfield, That myriad-minded man a biography o f  George William Russell ’A.E. 1867-1935 
(Gerrards Cross, 1975). Further works include Robert Bernard Davis, George William Russell ( ‘A E )  
(London, 1977); Alan Denson, Letters from AE  (London, 1961); Darrell Figgis, AE Russell, A Study o f  
a Man and a Nation (Dublin, 2006).
17 Works on Carson include: H.M. Hyde, Carson, the Life o f  Sir Edward Carson (London, 1974); Alvin 
Jackson, Sir Edward Carson (Dundalk, 1993); Geoffrey Lewis, Carson: the Man who Divided Ireland 
(London, 2005); S.E. Long, Man For Ulster, Carson (Dromera, 1969); A.T.Q. Stewart, Edward 
Carson (Belfast, 1997). Works on Wilson include: C.E. Callwell, Field-Marshall Sir Henry Wilson,
His Life and Diaries (London, 1927); Keith Jeffery (ed.), The military correspondence o f Field 
Marshal Sir Henry Wilson 1918-1922 (London, 1985); Keith Jeffery, Field Marshal Sir Hemy Wilson: 
a Political Soldier (Oxford, 2006).
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Although various notable works describe the British government’s handling o f 
Ireland while Kerr was secretary to Lloyd George, they often do not refer to him or 
link him to Irish matters. Volumes such as R.B. McDowell’s The Irish Convention, or 
D.George Boyce’s Englishmen and Irish Troubles: British Public Opinion and the 
Making o f  Irish Policy 1918-22, describe matters on which Kerr worked. He was not 
directly involved with the Irish Convention o f 1917-18, but he did help to arrange it. 
Kerr was also aware o f the power o f press opinion. Despite this, these works do not 
make any reference to him. Occasionally there are references to Kerr in the earlier 
literature that suggest his work on Ireland requires further investigation. In his 
biography o f  Erskine Childers, Andrew Boyle wrote that Childers received an
i o
introduction to Kerr through the social reformer Mrs Beatrice Webb. Childers was 
an Englishman with Irish roots. He was director o f Sinn Fein propaganda 1919-21, 
secretary to the Irish delegation during the Anglo-Irish negotiations, and executed in 
1922 as a traitor by the Irish Free State. Meanwhile, W ebb’s journals have been 
edited with consequent biographies.19 She met Kerr when Lloyd George invited her 
to join a reconstruction committee in 1917 addressing social problems in the United 
Kingdom. Webb recorded in her diary: ‘there is the attractive young leader o f the 
Round Table group -  Philip Kerr -  one o f the Prime Minister’s secretaries’.20 She 
went on to make scathing remarks about each member o f the committee, declaring 
that ‘The Committee itself is not promising’ and attacking Kerr saying ‘Philip Kerr, 
an ultra-refmed aristocratic dreamer, with sentimentally revolutionary views, spends 
what little time and thought he has over from secretarial work for the Prime Minister
18 Andrew Boyle, The Riddle o f  Erskine Childers (London, 1977) p. 252.
19 Margaret Cole, Beatrice Webb (London, 1945); Kitty Muggeridge and Ruth Adam, Beatrice Webb, A 
Life 1858-1943 (London, 1967).
■° Margaret I. Cole (ed.), Beatrice Webb’s Diaries 1912-1924 (London, 1952) p. 81.
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in devising phrases and formulas to express standards o f perfection’.21 As a Fabian it 
is possible that she was able to introduce Childers to Kerr through the wife o f 
Desmond FitzGerald, Mabel FitzGerald, who had been a secretary to George Bernard 
Shaw (another prominent Fabian). Desmond FitzGerald, along with Childers, was 
responsible for the Irish side o f the propaganda war during the fight for 
independence.22
Kerr was involved in many political issues during his time at Downing Street, 
especially matters relating to the war and, later, the Versailles peace talks. As a result 
the accounts and memoirs o f contemporaries have not linked him firmly with Irish 
policy. There is a body o f literature on the Chairman o f the Cabinet Committee on 
Ireland, Walter Long. Kerr was secretary to the Committee, which also devised the 
1920 Government o f Ireland Bill. Long had developed interests in a federal 
settlement for Ireland from around 1918. He published his memoirs in 1923, but 
again there is no suggestion o f Kerr’s role in the Irish question.23 Nor is there much 
insight on him in Charles Petrie’s biography o f Long, published in 1936, or in John 
Kendle’s later work on his involvement in the Irish settlement.24 The memoirs o f 
Winston Churchill, the diaries o f both Christopher Addison and Maurice Hankey, and 
the most recent biography o f F.E. Smith, all provide vital background information to a 
turbulent political time.25 They do not, however, inform us o f Kerr’s daily presence at 
Downing Street in 1917-21, and his involvement with Ireland. The diaries o f Thomas
21 Ibid., p. 85.
22 •Fitzgerald’s memoirs were published by his son Fergus: Fergus Fitzgerald (ed.), The Memoirs o f  
Desmond Fitzgerald 1913-1916 (London, 1968).
23 Walter Long, Memories (London, 1923).
24 Charles Petrie, Walter Long and his Times (London 1936); John Kendle, Walter Long, Ireland and 
the Union, 1905-1920 (Montreal 1992). See also Alvin Jackson, ‘Long, Walter Hume, first Viscount 
Long (1854—1924)’, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; 
online edn, May 2009.
25 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1918 (London, 1968); Christopher Addison, Four and 
a half years. A personal diary from  June 1914 to January 1919 (London, 1934); Stephen Roskill, 
Hankey: Man o f  Secrets 1877-1918 (London, 1970); Stephen Roskill, Hankey: Man o f  Secrets 1919- 
1931 (London, 1972); John Campbell, F.E. Smith, first Earl o f  Birkenhead (London, 1983).
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Jones are a more accurate illustration o f Kerr’s position, as he made various 
references to Kerr in his entries. Jones’ diaries are a particularly useful source for 
historians o f  the period as he kept detailed accounts o f  events at Whitehall between 
1916 and 1930, published in three volumes.26 The third dealt purely with Ireland.
The diaries provide a remarkable insight into happenings within government during 
this period. Although Jones’s Irish volume is largely concerned with the Anglo-Irish 
negotiations that took place when Kerr had left Downing Street to edit The Daily 
Chronicle, it is clear that the latter still maintained a presence after his departure.
Kerr joined Lloyd George’s service as a member o f the new wartime 
administration set up by the Prime Minister to handle the expanding workload o f the 
government. John Turner’s Lloyd George’s Secretariat examines the machinery set 
up by Lloyd George in 1916 in order to explore what the author describes as ‘the 
curious and neglected world where politics and administration intersect’.2' This body 
was described as the ‘Garden Suburb’ in reference to the secretariat’s temporary 
offices in the Downing Street Garden. Turner attempts to explore what the aims of 
establishing the Garden Suburb were, how innovative it was and how far these aims 
were actually carried out. He recognises the importance o f the secretariat in the 
formation o f policy in areas such as Ireland. He explains that, until the secretariat 
disbanded, it was W.G.S. Adams who was most closely involved with the Irish issue. 
Turner does, however, try to define Kerr’s position on the Irish question, although it 
should be emphasised that this only relates to the years up to the end o f the war.
Turner makes it clear that Kerr’s opinions on Ireland were shaped by his imperial 
philosophy and belief in federal devolution, and argues that he was preoccupied with
26 Keith Middlemass (ed.), Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol. I, 1916-1925 (London, 1969); Thomas 
Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol. II, 1926-1930 {London, 1969); Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, Vol. Ill, 
Ireland 1918-1925 (London, 1971).
27 John Turner, Lloyd George's Secretariat (Cambridge, 1980), p. 1.
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moral analysis, while his rejection o f the Catholic Church made him incapable o f 
dispassionate judgement in Irish matters. He suggests that although Kerr’s 
detachment from Ireland lent certain clarity to his thoughts, he failed to recognise the 
frustration felt within Ireland towards the British government’s slow response to the 
situation. These ideas will be explored further in due course. Clearly Turner’s work 
is concerned primarily with the secretariat throughout the duration o f the war. 
Nonetheless his volume is a valuable piece that contextualises Kerr’s role with regard 
to Ireland in the years 1916 to 1918.
Lloyd George’s coalition government has been the subject o f a comprehensive 
study by Kenneth O. Morgan.28 In Consensus and Disunity Morgan explores the 
coalition’s place in British history and the implications that it had for the development 
o f British politics. He explores the developments in the Irish question within this 
context, arguing that the approach o f the coalition to Ireland in this period ‘was highly 
ambiguous’.29 He states that ‘Fisher [H.A.L. Fisher] and Kerr formally drafted a 
Home Rule Bill’. There are no further details, however, o f Kerr’s role. Morgan 
argues that Edward Grigg, ‘free from Kerr’s brand o f exotic mysticism, enjoyed less 
scope than had his predecessor’ when describing his replacement o f Kerr as Lloyd 
George’s private secretary.30 Indeed Morgan seems to suggest that it was due to the 
nature o f the wartime coalition that Kerr had enjoyed greater latitude in serving Lloyd 
George. He states that later members o f Lloyd George’s entourage were 
‘functionaries on a lower level from the body o f  advisors such as Adams, Kerr, and
28 Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-1922 
(Oxford, 1979).
29 Ibid., p. 127.
30 Ibid., p. 260.
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Astor who surrounded the leader in 1917-18’, suggesting that Kerr’s role is in need o f 
further attention by historians.31
Kerr’s relationship with Lloyd George is important in any attempt to understand 
his potential influence in Irish policy. The literature surrounding the Prime Minister 
is vast. As a historical figure, he has remained a fascinating and highly complex 
character. Aside from his own writings on the war and subsequent peace talks, there 
are countless biographies, as well as memoirs by those who knew and worked with 
him.32 His role in the Irish settlement o f 1921, and the events leading up to it, has 
been widely documented. Yet the current literature does not adequately convey the 
full importance o f Kerr’s presence at Downing Street during these years and his 
relationship with the Prime Minister. Biographers and contemporaries have certainly 
made reference to Kerr’s relationship with Lloyd George. Frank Owen wrote that 
Kerr was ‘one o f the few outstanding men in British public life who worked with 
Lloyd George and never quarrelled with him right up till the end’.33 He did, however, 
acknowledge the controversy surrounding their working relationship. Owen referred 
to the resentment o f Kerr by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, as he would often 
have to discuss foreign policy through Kerr rather than directly with the Prime 
Minister. Owen argued that Curzon had genuine grounds for complaint as Kerr’s role
31 Ibid.
32 Lloyd George published his War Memoirs o f  David Lloyd George (London, 1933-1936). The 
comprehensive biographies include Bentley Gilbert, David Lloyd George: A Political Life: The 
Architect o f  Change, 1863-1912 (London, 1987); David Lloyd George: A Political Life: The Organizer 
o f  Victory, 1912-1916 (London, 1987); John Grigg’s volumes cover Lloyd George’s career up until the 
1918 Armistice, these include The Young Lloyd George (London, 1973); Lloyd George: The People’s 
Champion 1902-1911 (London 1978); Lloyd George: From Peace to War 1912-1916 (London, 1985); 
Lloyd George: War Leader 1916-1918 (London, 2002). Frank Owen’s Tempestuous Journey, Lloyd 
George His Life and Times (London, 1954) is a classic narrative of Lloyd George’s career. Among 
those individuals who were close to Lloyd George, the memoirs of Frances Stevenson and A. J. 
Sylvester are particularly useful in providing an insight into his complex character. See Frances 
Louise, Countess Lloyd George, The Years That Are Past (London, 1967); A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd 
George, A Diary by Frances Stevenson (London, 1971); A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), My Darling Pussy: The 
Letters o f  Lloyd George and Frances Stevenson 1913-41 (London, 1975); A.J. Sylvester, The Real 
Lloyd George (London, 1947). Sylvester’s diary was published later, edited by Colin Cross, Life with 
Lloyd George the diary o f  A.J. Sylvester, 1931-45 (London, 1975).
33 Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey p. 407.
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as a ‘liaison’ officer at the Foreign Office would have been humiliating to the Foreign 
Secretary.34 Kerr’s friend, Edward Grigg, also pointed to some o f the controversy 
surrounding the former’s position, referring to him as ‘one o f the most influential 
figures in his [Lloyd George’s] entourage’.35 Describing Kerr’s natural ease with 
people o f all backgrounds Grigg argued that ‘Such a man was naturally attractive to, 
and attracted by, Lloyd George. Before entering Lloyd George’s service he was, if 
anything, a Conservative; thereafter he was a Liberal for the rest o f his life’.36 It is 
difficult, however, to determine which man had the greater influence on the other. On 
the news o f Kerr’s death Lloyd George paid tribute to him in the Commons saying 
that he had been his constant comrade during the darkest periods o f the war. He said 
that:
He was a man o f remarkable abilities.. .the depth and breadth o f his 
intellectual capacity impressed some o f the greatest men o f that day -  
Clemenceau, President Wilson, Veniselos -  that galaxy o f great men. They 
were very impressed with Philip Kerr and treated him, not as the Prime 
Minister’s secretary, but as if he were an emissary to the Conference, and a 
very important one.37
Regardless o f the controversy surrounding their relationship, the two men worked 
closely together during a critical period in history and Lloyd George relied heavily on 
Kerr as his private secretary. The study will draw on this relationship in assessing the 
latter’s influence on Irish policy.
34 Ibid., p. 406.
35 John Grigg, Lloyd George, War Leader 1916-1918 p. 231.
36 Ibid.
37 Edward Grigg, ‘Philip Kerr, Marquess of Lothian’ in The Round Table (March, 1941) no. 122 pp. 
197-220; The Times 20 December 1940, p. 2, column 3-4.
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So far this review has concentrated on the literature surrounding Kerr’s time at 
Downing Street as this is the main focus o f this study. Yet his life and career are a 
crucial element in determining his attitude and approach to Ireland. Kerr was an 
interesting figure in his own right and in recent decades he has been the subject o f 
scholarly work. Much o f the focus o f this rests on his membership o f the ‘Round 
Table Movement for Imperial Federation’, his drafting o f the ‘war guilt clause’ in the 
Treaty o f Versailles, his interviews with Hitler in the 1930s, and his position as the 
British Ambassador to the United States in 1939-40. He was an intriguing individual: 
his father, Lord Ralph Kerr, was the third son o f the Seventh Marquess o f Lothian and 
his mother, Lady Anne Fitzalan-Howard, was the daughter o f the Fourteenth Duke of 
Norfolk. The Kerrs were a prominent landed Scottish family, while the Howards 
were perhaps the most powerful landed family in England. Both the Kerrs and the 
Howards were Catholics and traditionally Unionists. Yet Philip would later break 
with the family expectations by converting to Christian Science in 1923, and by
io
eventually claiming to be a Lloyd George Liberal. Kerr was a firm imperialist with 
federal interests and he maintained a life-long interest in the United States and in 
forging strong transatlantic relations. These characteristics would bring an interesting 
dimension to his work on Ireland and make him an asset to Lloyd George.
To date there are only two significant biographies o f Kerr. The first, published in 
1960, was J.R.M. Butler’s Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940, and the more recent 
work, Lothian: Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order by David P. Billington, 
was published in 2006.39 Butler’s work was produced as the official biography o f 
Kerr, as requested by the Lothian trustees. His volume presents his subject in a 
favourable light. The author wrote in his introduction that he admired Kerr greatly,
38 Christian Science was founded by Mrs Mary Baker Eddy in 1879.
315 J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940 (London, 1960); David P. Billington, Lothian: 
Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order (Westport, 2006).
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although he did not know him well. He attempted to provide an overview o f Kerr’s 
life and work rather than a critical assessment o f his contribution to political affairs. 
The biography is arranged thematically, rather than in strict chronological order, 
discussing Kerr’s family background, imperial philosophy and political career. In 
describing Kerr’s time as private secretary to the Prime Minister, Butler provides a 
useful overview o f his involvement in government affairs during this time. But he 
went into very little detail regarding Kerr’s involvement in the Irish question, 
referring to it within two short paragraphs. He noted that his subject did not believe 
that dominion Status would solve the problem in Ireland and that ‘Kerr had been 
commissioned by his chief in April [1921] to restate “the whole government policy” 
in a reply to the Irish Bishops’. These statements only highlight the necessity for 
further exploration o f  Kerr’s role.
The biography by David P. Billington is a much more thorough and critical 
account o f Kerr’s life and work and is perhaps the most important piece o f literature 
on him to date. Billington has made extensive use o f the archives in order to present a 
detailed study o f Kerr and his influence in world politics. In particular he addresses 
the ‘problem o f national sovereignty’, with which his subject was concerned, 
especially in the latter part o f his career. Kerr believed that state sovereignty 
ultimately led to war, and a ‘World Commonwealth o f  Nations’ was a possible 
solution to this, although he never defined how this vision would come into being. 
Kerr looked to the United States and to the United Kingdom to join forces in leading 
the way. The author uses these themes as the basis for his study. Billington addresses 
Kerr’s role in Irish affairs, first as a member o f ‘The Round Table’, and later as 
secretary to Lloyd George, but there is a great deal more to be said in relation to 
Kerr’s approach to the Irish question, and some o f the judgements are open to debate.
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The author argues that ‘Kerr almost to the end saw Ireland through a Round Table 
lens’ which does not adequately summarise the work that he did in relation to Ireland 
and the influence that he potentially had.40 This study aims to build on this in a much 
more thorough way, exploring not only Kerr’s involvement but also broader thematic 
areas such as the influence o f American connections to the Irish problem and the role 
o f  religion in Kerr’s approach. Scholars to date have failed fully to acknowledge the 
range o f contacts that Kerr had and the various ways in which he worked on the Irish 
problem.
Until the publication o f Billington’s biography in 2006 the most valuable study o f 
Kerr’s role in British and world politics was The Larger Idea, Lord Lothian and the 
Problem o f  National Sovereignty, edited by John Turner.41 It remains an extremely 
useful volume as the contributors, individually and as a whole, help to build a picture 
o f his varied career and his contribution to world politics through specific essays 
relating to his work. The volume highlights Kerr’s historical importance in a number 
o f areas. As the inside cover notes, ‘Though never a statesman o f rank, he [Kerr] was 
never far from the centre o f power’, underlining the need to explore his influence in 
more detail. Published in 1988, the contributors assess Kerr in his various roles 
during his career, including his time at 10 Downing Street, his involvement with 
India, as British Ambassador in America, and his contribution to federalist thought. 
Kerr and Ireland are discussed briefly within the chapter assessing his time at 
Downing Street but there is little detail provided. The few pages dealing with this 
aspect are useful nonetheless: John Turner and Michael Dockrill discuss his 
involvement in a very concise and clear way. They consider Kerr’s opinions on 
Ireland in roughly two periods: before and after the war. Kerr’s support for
40 David P. Billington, Lothian: Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order (Westport, 2006) p. 68.
41 John Turner, The Larger Idea, Lord Lothian and the Problem o f  National Sovereignty (London, 
1988).
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conscription in Ireland, his mistrust o f the extreme nationalists and his belief in 
federalism as a solution to Ireland’s problems are all considered. Dockrill and Turner 
describe Kerr’s attitude after the war as having been more concerned with how the 
Irish problem appeared to the wider world, rather than specific Irish policy. It is clear 
from this that Kerr played an important role during the post-war years, advising Lloyd 
George and conducting interviews for him with intermediaries such as Colonel E.M. 
House and Archbishop Patrick Clune. Above all else, Kerr is described as having 
been influential in the committee that drafted the 1920 Government o f Ireland Act. 
This points to his importance in driving Irish policy.
A more personal view o f Kerr can be obtained from the memoirs by Edward Grigg 
and Robert Brand written for the Round Table Journal in the years following his death 
in 1940. In the March 1941 edition Grigg gave an account o f Kerr’s life and an 
affectionate presentation o f his character. He described a typical first impression o f 
Kerr as ‘one o f natural friendliness and ease’ and wrote that he had not the slightest 
touch o f aloofness or constraint with anyone he met, regardless o f their race, language 
or colour.42 Grigg described Kerr’s reputation for untidiness, observing that this 
attitude towards his dress and his unconventionality added to his attractiveness. The 
article provides an insight into the man as his friends knew him, his love o f  cars, o f air 
travel, scenery, skill at golf and interest in people. Written only a few months after 
Kerr’s death Grigg attempted to provide a detailed sketch o f the former’s life, career 
and personality. Brand’s article, written some years later in 1960 shortly after the 
publication o f Butler’s Lord Lothian, aimed simply to provide some further personal 
memories o f Kerr as his friend and colleague.43 He however attempted to address
42 Edward Grigg, ‘Philip Kerr, Marquess of Lothian’ in The Round Table (March, 1941) no. 122, pp. 
207-208.
43 R.H. Brand, ‘Philip Kerr, Some Personal Memories’ in The Round Table (June, 1960) Vol. 50, pp. 
234-243.
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some o f the criticism aimed at Kerr following the publication o f Butler’s biography 
and to explain some o f the mysteries that appeared to surround him, namely Kerr’s 
power behind the scenes o f government and his conversion to Christian Science.
In particular Brand disagreed with Winston Churchill’s claims in his speech 
following Kerr’s death in 1940 that he was ‘dignified’, ‘censorious’ or ever gave the 
impression o f ‘aristocratic detachment’.44 Rather, he confirmed Grigg’s view that 
Kerr was charming and natural with everyone he met, regardless o f the class or 
society to which they belonged. Brand believed Kerr to have been frank and open 
without a trace o f cynicism. He insisted that the prospect o f inheriting the Lothian 
title and the great estates that came with it were distasteful to him, although when he 
did succeed to the Marquessate he was concerned with the welfare o f his tenants and 
was very proud o f the houses and parks he owned. Disputing Churchill’s claim that 
Kerr was ‘censorious’, Brand claimed that he was extremely open-minded and 
generous towards others. The author presented an attractive character, recalling a 
letter that he (Brand) had written to his mother from South Africa in 1906, 
commenting o f Philip that ‘Most women fall in love with him sooner or later, as far as 
my experience goes’.45
In reference to Raymond Mortimer’s claim that Kerr possessed a power behind the 
scenes that no person should be allowed to possess, Brand opined that Mortimer could 
have only been referring to Kerr’s years as Lloyd George’s secretary, and if this was 
true then it was the fault o f Lloyd George and not Kerr. Clearly, years after Kerr’s 
time at Downing Street there was a still a sense that he had been highly influential 
despite not having been part o f the government. Brand did not shy away from these 
issues in his tribute, also addressing the criticism o f Kerr regarding his drafting o f  the
44 Ibid., p. 234-235.
45 Ibid., p. 236.
17
war guilt clause in the Treaty o f  Versailles and his appeasing attitude towards Hitler. 
Brand acknowledged that he had disagreed with Kerr’s views on Germany in the run­
up to the Second World War. Kerr had argued that Germany was encircled and must 
have colonies in order to live. Brand, on the other hand, had spent time in Germany 
during Hitler’s rise to power and saw the country in a different light. He also 
understood that Kerr may have felt remorse, having drafted the harsh terms directed at 
Germany in the Treaty o f Versailles. Brand believed that Kerr may have wished to 
make amends.46
Brand admitted that religion was one area o f Kerr’s life that did evoke a sense o f 
mystery. He argued that it was due to the teachings instilled in him at the Roman 
Catholic Oratory School in Birmingham that he never married and maintained a need 
for spirituality throughout his life. Yet had apparently developed doubts about 
Catholicism while studying at Oxford. Brand singled out the works o f George 
Bernard Shaw as having contributed to these doubts. Kerr was introduced to 
Christian Science by Nancy Astor in 1914 while recovering from acute appendicitis 
and followed its teachings until the end o f his life. It seems that he had confided in 
Brand a great deal during his struggles with Catholicism, and although the latter 
acknowledged that he had no understanding o f Kerr’s new faith, and that none o f the 
Round Table group joined Kerr in his conversion, they did not try to dissuade him 
from becoming a Christian Scientist.
The accounts o f Kerr written by both Grigg and Brand are partial in the sense that 
they were among his closest friends. Their tributes however provide valuable insights 
into his personality rather than his role in the affairs o f state. Some o f the issues 
raised by Brand regarding Kerr’s life and career will be areas that this study will
46 Ibid., p. 241.
18
explore in relation to the latter’s connection to the Irish question; for example, the 
personal influence he exerted while he was at Downing Street and the possible role 
that religion may have played in his approach.
Grigg and Brand had been Kerr’s friends and colleagues since his days in South 
Africa between 1905 and 1909. There is a great volume o f literature on both Lord 
Milner’s role in African politics and the group o f young men that surrounded him. 
The young disciples o f Milner were known affectionately as ‘M ilner’s Kindergarten’. 
It was Kerr’s membership o f the ‘Kindergarten’ in the early stages o f his career that 
first accorded him his historical importance. ‘M ilner’s Kindergarten’ refers to an 
informal club o f colonial administrators and political activists in South Africa 
between 1902 and 1910. These were young men recruited by the high commissioner 
Viscount (Alfred) Milner and his successor, William Waldegave Palmer (Lord 
Selbome), to fill various posts in the administration o f the Transvaal and Orange 
River colonies following the South African War o f 1899-1902.47 Although accounts 
o f its membership vary, Kerr was understandably part o f the circle, despite his arrival 
in South Africa just as Milner was leaving his post and returning to England. 
Although this study is chiefly concerned with Kerr’s connection to Irish affairs it is 
still important that he is anchored within the history o f  Milner and the Kindergarten. 
Before Kerr encountered Lloyd George he was a chiefly a disciple o f Milner and his 
imperial philosophy.
The literature on the Kindergarten is complex and it is the main area of 
historiography in which Kerr features. It consists mainly o f  biographies o f Milner, 
many o f which discuss the protégés surrounding him. The Milner Papers were
47 Alex May, ‘Kerr, Philip Henry, Eleventh Marquess of Lothian (1882-1940)’, Oxford Dictionary o f  
National Biography, Oxford University Press, September 2004; online edition, January 2008.
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published in two volumes edited by Cecil Headlam in the 1930s.48 These make 
multiple references to Kerr but give little direct insight into his early political 
thinking. Numerous biographies then appeared in the 1950s. The first major volume 
on his life and work was Alfred Lord Milner: The Man o f no Illusions 1854-1925 by 
John Evelyn Wrench, published in 1958.49 Wrench did not discuss Kerr in any detail, 
but other works on Milner by Vladimir Halperin, A.M. Gollin and John Marlowe 
did.50 Halperin, in particular, devoted pages to Kerr, describing his career and how it 
resembled M ilner’s in the sense that it was varied but focused on the Empire. 
Although he noted Kerr’s role within the Kindergarten, the Round Table, as Lloyd 
George’s secretary, and his work on India in the 1930s, he did not refer to Kerr’s 
work on Ireland. The biography o f Milner by Edward Crankshaw did not make any 
reference to Kerr; rather it focused mainly on M ilner’s brand o f imperialism.51 In 
contrast Walter Nimock’s M ilner’s Young Men: the ‘Kindergarten ’ in Edwardian 
Imperial Affairs was the first detailed study o f the Kindergarten in imperial affairs and 
its later incarnation as the Round Table.52 Nimock’s work covered the period from 
1909 when the young men left South Africa, to the outbreak o f war in 1914. His 
volume was the most important study o f the group before the publication o f John 
Kendle’s research (discussed below). Kerr is discussed frequently in these works, 
anchoring his place in the history o f imperialist thought.
48 Cecil Headlam, (ed.), The Milner Papers Volume I  and 11 (London, 1931-33).
49 John Evelyn Wrench, Alfred Lord Milner, The Man o f  no Illusions 1854-1925 (London, 1958); 
Wrench was also the biographer of Kerr’s friend and colleague, Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times: 
John Evelyn Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times (London, 1955).
50 Vladimir Halpérin, Lord Milner and the Empire, The Evolution o f  British Imperialism (London,
1952); A.M. Gollin, Proconsul in Politics: a study o f  Lord Milner in Opposition and in Power 
(London, 1964); John Marlowe, Milner Apostle o f  Empire: a Life o f  Alfred George, the Right 
Honourable Viscount Milner o f  St Jam es’s and Cape Town, KG, GCB, GCMG, 1854-1925 (London, 
1976).
51 Edward Crankshaw, 77îe Forsaken Idea, A Study o f  Viscount Milner (London, 1952).
52 Walter Nimock, M ilner’s Young Men: the Kindergarten in Edwardian Imperial Affairs (London, 
1970).
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Milner and the Kindergarten continue to be a fruitful area o f historical enquiry. In 
2002 Hugh and Mirabel Cecil produced Imperial Marriage, An Edwardian War and 
Peace recounting the story o f  M ilner’s wife, Violet Maxse, her first husband Lord 
Edward Cecil and her relationship with Milner.53 A more recent volume by J. Lee 
Thompson, published in 2007, attempted to shed new light on Milner’s ideas and the 
role o f the Kindergarten, and o f female imperialists, in cultivating them.54 The author 
makes frequent references to Kerr. He claims that the latter declined to sign the 
Ulster Covenant during the Ulster crisis o f  1912-14. This is slightly misleading as 
Kerr was removed from Round Table activities during these years as a result of 
illness. Chapter 3 will discuss this in further detail. It is important however that 
Thompson does at least link Kerr and his colleagues to the Irish question.
In the mid 1970s John Kendle’s The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union 
explored the development o f the movement from its roots in the Kindergarten to its 
development as an active organisation.55 Kendle explains that while the Round Table 
members advocated imperial union they also believed in the notion o f ‘Home Rule all 
Round’; that is, the federation o f  the United Kingdom into distinct political units.
This was by no means a new concept in British politics at that time; the height o f the 
Home Rule agitation had come during the 1880s. Yet the Round Table members were 
perhaps the most significant champions o f  federalism in terms o f an organisation 
designed to argue the federalist case. Kendle acknowledges that the major goals o f 
the movement were never fully realised and were ‘probably hopeless from the 
beginning’.56 They underestimated the forces with which they were dealing and were 
hindered by their basic assumption that British rule was superior to any other. As a
53 Hugh and Mirabel Cecil, Imperial Marriage : An Edwardian War and Peace (London, 2002).
54 J. Lee Thompson, A Wider Patriotism: Alfred Milner and the British Empire (London, 2007).
55 John Kendle, The Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Toronto, 1975).
56 Ibid., p. 301.
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result the movement could not fully connect with the ideals o f the Irish Nationalists or 
the people o f the dominions. Furthermore the Round Table members were 
businessmen, lawyers, academics, journalists and politicians; hardly a true 
representation o f the population as a whole. Nevertheless, the group was an organised 
political machine with a specific goal to unify the Empire. Kerr’s involvement in the 
organisation would undoubtedly have a direct influence on his involvement in Irish 
affairs as private secretary to Lloyd George.
Kendle’s later work, Ireland and the Federal Solution, charts the development of 
federalism as a potential solution to the Irish problem from the earliest attempts in the 
nineteenth century, through the Home Rule movement, to the federal devolution that
c n
came into being in 1921 with the creation o f Northern Ireland. As in his previous 
work on the Round Table, Kendle describes the role o f its members and its 
significance as an organisation but only in relation to Ireland in this case. He 
concludes that although federalism meant different things to different people, for the 
Unionists it was a means o f ensuring that the British Empire was maintained at any 
cost. It was irrelevant what the feelings o f the Irish were, and what they really wanted 
for their future. The author states that Kerr’s attendance at the ‘Speaker’s Conference 
on Devolution’ was especially interesting because he was named as one o f the 
secretaries o f  the Cabinet Committee on Ireland.58 This however is not sufficient to 
determine how important Kerr was to this issue. Kendle also alludes to Kerr’s support 
for partition o f the six Ulster counties and his admission that the 1920 Ireland Bill had 
defects, although he does not make it clear what the latter thought that these defects 
were.59 His volume places Kerr within the context o f proposed federal solutions to
57 John Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution, The Debate over the United Kingdom Constitution, 
1870-1921 (Kingston, 1989).
58 Ibid., p. 220.
59 Ibid., p. 230-1.
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the Irish problem. Yet his work has meant that subsequent historians have tended to 
define Kerr’s connection with Ireland in relation to his membership o f  the Round 
Table. This is too simple an interpretation given the extent o f his involvement.
The member o f the Kindergarten to whom Kerr was closest was Lionel Curtis.
The two men would remain life-long friends and establish the Round Table together.
It was Curtis who devised the idea o f a monthly journal and persuaded Kerr to 
become its editor. Deborah Lavin has written the only extensive biography o f Curtis 
to date, detailing his life and vision o f a world federation.60 Curtis served as a 
secretary to the British delegation at the Anglo-Irish negotiations o f 1921 and would 
remain as an advisor on Irish affairs at the Colonial Office until 1924. Although Ken- 
had left his position as Lloyd George’s secretary by m id-1921, Curtis was a clear link 
between Kerr and the Anglo-Irish negotiations. Their closeness means that there is 
not a great volume o f correspondence between them during this time: they would have 
seen each other on almost a daily basis. Nevertheless, a selection o f  their 
correspondence was published in 1992, edited by Andrea Bosco, as an introduction to 
the Annals o f  the Lothian Foundation,61 The correspondence between them in both 
the Lothian and Lionel Curtis Papers is concerned primarily with Round Table affairs. 
But there is some interesting material that relates to Ireland in 1910, when the 
Kindergarten had returned from South Africa and was developing its scheme for 
United Kingdom federation. This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 3.
One o f Kerr’s contemporaries who is vital to understanding his personality is 
another close acquaintance, Nancy, Viscountess Astor. Kerr’s friendship with Astor 
reveals a great deal about him. Kerr enjoyed a close friendship with both Nancy and 
her husband, W aldorf Astor, who also worked in Lloyd George’s wartime secretariat.
60 Deborah Lavin, From Empire to International Commonwealth: a Biography o f  Lionel Curtis 
(Oxford, 1995).
61 Andrea Bosco (ed.) in Lothian Foundation, Annals o f  the Lothian Foundation (London, 1992).
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He was particularly close to Nancy, however, and she would remain a life-long friend 
and confidante. It was she who introduced Kerr to Christian Science while he was 
recuperating from appendicitis in 1914. The Astors entertained the young men o f the 
‘Round Table’ during weekend gatherings at their grand home, Cliveden. Prominent 
politicians, writers and newspaper men o f the day would also be invited and it was 
here that Kerr would be exposed to a wide range o f contacts. It was also at Cliveden 
that the ‘Round Table’ members would attempt to influence politicians with their 
federal schemes. Nancy was an important part o f Kerr’s life and in his letters to her 
he talked freely o f  politics, spirituality and his heartbreak over a broken 
engagement.62 Some references to Ireland appear in the letters, mostly between 1914 
and 1916. As Kerr would see a good deal o f the Astors during his years at Downing 
Street, and while working on the Government o f Ireland Bill, there is less 
correspondence during that time. The letters that do contain relevant Irish references 
will be discussed in Chapter 3.
Nancy Witcher Langhome was an American from Virginia who married the 
millionaire William W aldorf Astor. She would become the first female Member o f 
Parliament to take her seat and therefore she has received considerable attention from 
historians.63 There are two classic biographies o f her, John Grigg’s Nancy Astor and 
Christopher Sykes’ Nancy, the Life o f  Lady Astor ,64 Both provide a thorough account 
o f her life and career and refer to her friendship with Kerr in some detail. Notoriety 
attached itself to those in her circle who regularly gathered at Cliveden, especially in 
the 1930s. These were given the title ‘The Cliveden Set’ by the press. This was
62 Philip Kerr to Nancy Astor 3 December 1912, Nancy Astor Papers, MS 16/1 /445. The Lady in 
question was Lady Beatrice Cecil, daughter of the Fourth Marquess of Salisbury.
63 The first to be elected was Constance Georgine, Countess Markievicz, as a Sinn Fein candidate for 
Dublin’s St. Patrick’s division in 1918.
64 John Grigg, Nancy Astor (London, 1980); Christopher Sykes, Nancy, The Life o f  Lady Astor
(London, 1972).
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until his appointment as the British Ambassador to Washington in 1939. A collection 
o f his American speeches were published after his death in 1941.69 Few o f these 
works make significant reference to Ireland. Indeed Kerr was more concerned with 
the development o f an international commonwealth in his later career, including 
Ireland, and with forging a stronger bond between the United Kingdom and the 
United States. He did however draw on his prior experience in Irish affairs in the 
years after 1921. These areas will be explored in a later chapter o f this thesis.
The Irish question remains widely debated and recent work on Kerr’s career 
indicates his importance in this issue. There is still a need to explore his work on the 
Irish question in detail. The thesis will consider this in a chronological and thematic 
way. In doing so extensive use has been made o f the Lothian Papers and the papers o f 
Kerr’s contemporaries, in particular those o f David Lloyd George. Both collections 
contain a wealth o f material that link Kerr closely to the Irish question during the
1917-21 period and have yet to be fully utilised. The Lothian Papers, in particular, 
contain three volumes o f Irish related material along with separate documents relating 
to the Government o f Ireland Bill o f 1920. In addition the thesis draws on materials 
not previously used and certainly not in an Irish context. For example, Manuscripts 
belonging to the present Marquess of Lothian, kept at Monteviot House in Jedburgh, 
bring a new perspective to Kerr’s approach to the Irish problem. In particular they 
provide an insight into Kerr’s upbringing and his Catholicism.
This is not a political biography; it is a study o f Philip Kerr and Ireland. The 
chosen time frame is 1910-1921, with particular emphasis on the revolutionary period. 
There is also much to say pre 1910 and post 1921 that provides valuable context. The 
focus however remains 1910-21. Beginning with an overview o f Kerr’s family
69 Royal Institute of International Affairs, The American speeches o f Lord Lothian: July 1939 to 
December 1940 (London, 1941).
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background, this study will consider his early connections to Ireland and the religious 
influences that may have had a bearing on his later approach to the Irish question. 
There will then be some discussion o f Kerr’s early career in South Africa before 
Chapter 3 considers his work as part o f the Round Table Movement. Chapter 4 
assesses Kerr’s work on Ireland as part o f Lloyd George’s wartime secretariat, while 
Chapter 5 deals more specifically with his work on the Government o f Ireland Bill 
and his attitude towards the Anglo-Irish War between 1919 and 1921. Chapters 6 and 
7 are thematic, relating the American and religious aspects o f Kerr’s work on Ireland 
respectively. Finally some consideration will be given to Kerr’s short spell as editor 
o f the Daily Chronicle while the Epilogue considers any connections that Kerr may 
have had with Ireland beyond 1921.
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Chapter 2
The Kerrs, Catholicism and Ireland
Having surveyed the existing work that relates to this study this chapter will 
consider Philip Kerr’s personal background in greater depth. In particular it aims to 
establish Kerr’s connections to Ireland during his formative years and early career. In 
doing so both his family background and religious beliefs will be considered, along 
with his education, and years working for the British administration in South Africa. 
Kerr’s aristocratic lineage and his family’s Catholicism have already been briefly 
discussed in the literature review. However these factors will be considered in greater 
detail here. The aim is to develop a broader understanding o f  how early influences 
may have affected Kerr’s attitude to Ireland in later years when he worked for Lloyd 
George. The Kerrs, and the Howards on Kerr’s mother’s side, were important 
political families and both had connections to Irish politics. Philip Kerr spent some o f 
his formative years in Ireland while his father, Lord Ralph Drury Kerr, was a major- 
general in command o f the British military base at the Curragh in Ireland between 
1891 and 1896. This would have left Philip with memories and impressions o f 
Ireland that he would carry into adulthood. Equally, Kerr’s experiences at school, 
university and his early career in South Africa would have influenced his attitude 
towards Irish affairs. These will be considered in order to gain a more thorough 
picture o f Kerr and his approach to the Irish question.
The Kerrs had been an important family in the Scottish borders since their arrival 
there circa 1330. In his study o f Sir Robert Kerr, Earl o f Ancram (1578-1654), David 
Laing wrote:
28
the ancient and noble Family o f KERR were o f Anglo-Norman lineage, and 
descended o f two brothers who settled in Scotland in the thirteenth century. 
Their descendants branched off into two separate races o f Border chieftains, 
each asserting their own title as chief o f the name -  the Kerrs o f Femiehirst, 
now represented by the Marquess o f Lothian, and the Kerrs o f Cessford by the 
Duke o f Roxburghe.1
Although they had never been at the forefront o f political affairs, the Kerrs had 
maintained a constant presence in British politics throughout the centuries and had 
been involved in some o f the most famous events in Scottish and British history. 
Members o f the family fought at the Battle ofFlodden Field in 1513 and in Jedburgh 
it is locally said that Sir Thomas Kerr o f Femiehirst was a loyal supporter o f Mary, 
Queen o f  Scots in the 1560s. His son, Robert Kerr, later became a favourite o f King 
James VI and I. and, as such, he was known to hold considerable political influence.2 
The Kerrs later supported the Glorious Revolution o f 1688 and the Union o f the 
parliaments o f Scotland and England in 1707. At the time o f  the Jacobite risings they 
supported the government. Lord William Kerr, later the Fourth Marquess o f Lothian, 
served under the Duke o f Cumberland at the Battle o f Culloden, while his younger 
brother, Lord Robert Kerr, was the person o f highest rank to be killed on the 
government side. The Marquessate was created in 1701 for Robert Kerr, the Fourth 
Earl and subsequently the First Marquess o f Lothian, and the seat o f the Kerrs is 
Ferniehirst Castle, in the border town o f Jedburgh, although the principal seat is 
sometimes considered to be Monteviot House where the family reside today. They
1 David Laing, Correspondence o f  Sir Robert Kerr, First Earl o f  Ancram and his son William, Third 
Earl o f  Lothian, Vol. I. 1 6 1 6 - 1649 (Edinburgh, 1875). p. V.
2 Robert Kerr anglicised his name from the Scottish ‘Kerr’ to ‘Carr’ when he went to court in England.
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remain influential and have maintained an astonishing capacity for hard work. It will 
become apparent that Philip Kerr shared these family traits.
In view o f their colourful past it is surprising that no single volume o f work on the 
family has been produced. References to the Kerrs can however be found in 
numerous works. In particular, George MacDonald Fraser’s The Steel Bonnets 
describes the family’s importance in the history o f  the Anglo-Scottish border 
country.3 Fraser makes multiple references to their active presence in the borders, 
suggesting that ‘The Kerrs were, with the possible exception o f the Scotts, the leading 
tribe o f the Scottish Middle March, which they frequently ruled as Wardens’, adding 
that despite this, ‘no family was more active in reiving’.4 The correspondence 
between Sir Robert Kerr (Carr), First Earl o f Ancram, and his son William, Third Earl 
o f Lothian, published in 1875, provides an insight into these two fascinating figures o f 
the seventeenth century.5 Both were politically active during the English Civil War 
period. Having been the favourite o f James VI and I, Robert Kerr remained loyal to 
James’ son King Charles I, while his own son, William Kerr, opposed the King during 
the civil wars. The latter had signed the National Covenant in 1638, and through him 
we see the first connection to the Kerrs and the Irish question. When rebellion broke 
out in Ireland in October 1641, as a result o f Catholic fears o f suppression by Scottish 
Covenanters and leading English Puritans, William Kerr commanded one o f the 
regiments sent to repress the rebellion. His regiment stayed there until February 
1644.6 This correspondence anchors them within wider British history. In Philip’s 
own time, his uncle Schomberg Henry Kerr, the Ninth Marquess o f Lothian, led a
3 George MacDonald Fraser, The Steel Bonnets, The Story o f  the Anglo-Scottish Border Reivers 
(London, 1971).
4 Ibid., p. 62.
5 David Laing, Correspondence o f  Sir Robert Kerr, First Earl o f  Ancram and his son William, Third 
Earl o f  Lothian, Vol. I. 1616 -  1649 (Edinburgh, 1875).
6 Ibid., pp. lxiv-lxv.
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distinguished diplomatic career and, as a result, has been the subject o f historical 
study. He was the Secretary for Scotland from 1886-1892, and as such was involved 
in attempts to generate economic development in the Highlands. His proposals drew 
parallels with similar schemes used in Ireland, such as railway building and the 
improvement o f agriculture.7 Robert Kerr (c.1578-1654), William Kerr (c.1605- 
1675), Schomberg Kerr (1833-1900) and Philip Kerr (1882-1940), remain the most 
well known members o f the family historically.
Philip’s childhood appears to have been a very happy one and he was adored by 
his parents. His mother, Lady Anne Kerr, kept a journal o f her children, describing 
their traits and noting the development o f their characters.8 She began the journal in 
September 1887 while Ralph Kerr was stationed in York and Philip five years old. 
Although it appears to end in October 1887 it provides a very personal insight into 
Philip Kerr’s family life, his nature as a child and his relationship with his parents.9 
Philip was described as ‘winsome’, and very fair with large blue eyes that had an 
‘absent dreamy look in them’.10 He was a happy child, yet with a melancholy 
expression, and was said to be fond o f quiet amusements unless he was worked up to 
a noisy game. His parents feared he would be ‘rather soft and muffish’ as he had a 
tendency to be clingy, but were relieved to see him becoming ‘more manly’.11 Lady 
Anne Kerr was not afraid to point out the flaws in her children’s characters. She 
noted that her daughter, Cecil, who was four, had a character that would be difficult to 
train as her ‘little failings’ were so prominent. She did not have such concerns about
7 Ewen A. Cameron, Landfor the People? The British Government and the Scottish Highlands, c. 
1880-1925 (East Linton, 1996) p. 74.
8 Lady Anne Kerr retained her own name and was not referred to as ‘Lady Ralph Kerr’ because she 
was the daughter of a duke, Henry Granville Fitzalan-Howard, the fourteenth Duke of Norfolk. In 
marrying Lord Ralph Kerr, the son of a Marquess, she married beneath her own social status.
9 The existing pages may be a fragment of a larger document that is missing. Source forms part of a 
private collection belonging to the 13th Marquess of Lothian, kept at Monteviot House, near Jedburgh.
10 Lady Anne Kerr, Sept 1887, Private Collection, Monteviot House, Brown Envelope labelled ‘Early 
Letters Before Schooldays, Early Letters Pre-School’.
11 Ibid.
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Philip. His father had whipped him on one occasion for telling a lie but his mother 
was confident the lesson had been learnt. Philip’s maternal Grandmother, Minna, 
Duchess o f Norfolk, used to say o f him ‘who could help falling victim to Ippy Kerr’, a 
name Philip used for himself.12 Kerr was an attractive figure both as a child and as an 
adult. His mother considered him special, commenting that ‘sometimes 1 think God 
has given us that child just as he is because he took the first to h im se lf .13 The Kerrs’ 
baby daughter, Mary Cecil, had died at only two weeks old while Ralph Kerr was 
stationed in India in 1880. The sergeants o f the Tenth Hussars had carried her coffin 
in a touching ceremony described by Lady Anne in her journal. When Philip was 
born exactly two years later in 1882 he was treasured by his bereaved parents.
The family was a close one and the Kerrs often took part in leisure activities 
together, such as fishing and cycling. Philip Kerr’s biographers have stated that he 
was closer to his mother, yet the private papers reveal that he spent a great deal o f 
time with his father and they would often go walking together. Kerr’s mother 
observed that he and his father had ‘a perfect understanding together.’14 When Ralph 
Kerr officially retired in 1898 both he and Philip would regularly cycle from the 
family home o f Woodbum, near Dalkeith, into Edinburgh, or to Monteviot, near 
Jedburgh, to visit Lord Ralph Kerr’s brother and Philip’s uncle, Schomberg Kerr.
Lady Anne watched her children’s spiritual development carefully. At five years old 
she described Philip as ‘not very pious’ but had ‘a great deal o f faith and is sure that 
“dear Mary” will give him a fine day or anything he wants for his amusement’. 15 She 
wrote that:
J2 Ibid.
13 Lady Anne Kerr, Sept 1887, Private Collection, Monteviot House, Brown Envelope labelled ‘Early 
Letters Before Schooldays, Early Letters Pre-School’.
14 Lady Anne Kerr, 21 Oct 1887, Private Collection, Monteviot House, Brown Envelope labelled ‘Early 
Letters Before Schooldays, Early Letters Pre-School’.
15 Ibid.
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all the children have a great idea o f praying for the conversion o f their friends, 
Baby [Lady Margaret Kerr, only three years old at the time] carries it further 
and prays nearly every day for the conversion o f the ‘Salvation Army’. They 
have a meeting house near us in York and she hears their band and 
immediately says ‘there are those silly people, please God make them 
Catholics’.16
Lady Anne went on to record Cecil asking if ‘Our Lord was in the Protestant churches 
as much as he was in the houses o f every where [sic.] else’. 17 The children were 
acutely aware o f their Catholicism from a very young age and were developing a 
sense o f superiority over other denominations. Philip was reported to have said his 
catechism very well and had an understanding o f the ‘Blessed Sacrament’. His 
mother had been surprised to find how well he had understood the Consecration after 
serving Mass with his father.
Religion will be an important theme running throughout this thesis in relation to 
Kerr’s attitude to the Irish question and his own religious struggles. The Kerrs 
became Protestants at the time o f the Reformation, yet today they are among the most 
prominent Catholic aristocratic families o f  Great Britain. In his introduction to The 
Catholic Families, Mark Bence-Jones states that ‘The Catholic families, most o f them 
o f ancient and illustrious lineage, form a distinctive group in the British aristocracy 
through having suffered for their faith during the centuries following the
16 Lady Anne Kerr, Sept 1887, Private Collection, Monteviot House, Brown Envelope labelled ‘Early 
Letters Before Schooldays, Early Letters Pre-School’.
17 Lady Anne Kerr, 23 Oct 1887, Private Collection, Monteviot House, Brown Envelope labelled ‘Early 
Letters Before Schooldays, Early Letters Pre-School’.
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Reformation’.18 Due to their religious affiliations there was a tendency to intermarry 
and therefore, according to Bence-Jones, they became like one extended family. He 
explains that the nineteenth century conversions to Catholicism were largely 
associated with the ‘Oxford Movement’, but there were a variety o f other causes.19 
The Kerr’s were part o f this wave o f conversions. Philip’s Grandmother, Lady Cecil 
Chetwynd Kerr, was married to John William Robert Kerr, the Seventh Marquess o f 
Lothian. She converted to the Catholic faith in 1851, ten years after her husband’s 
early death. Her conversion has been described in numerous works, including The 
Oxford Movement in Scotland and the memoir edited by her granddaughter and 
namesake, Lady Anne Cecil Kerr, entitled Cecil, Marchioness o f  Lothian: a 
Memoir
Her story draws a fascinating parallel with that o f  her grandson Philip as they both 
went to live in Ireland as children where their fathers held posts for a number o f years. 
Both were only nine years old when they arrived in Ireland; Lady Cecil was fifteen 
when she left in 1821 and Philip fourteen when his father retired and returned to 
Scotland in 1896. Philip’s great-grandfather, Charles Chetwynd Talbot, Second Lord 
Talbot o f Hensol, had been appointed Lord Lieutenant o f Ireland in 1817 while Sir 
Robert Peel was Irish Secretary. His wife, Frances Thomasine, was from Irish stock, 
being the first daughter o f Charles Lambert o f Beau Parc in County Meath. Indeed, 
Talbot’s Irish family connections had almost deprived him o f the position as it raised 
serious objections from Peel and Lord Whitworth in putting him at the head o f  the 
country’s affairs.21 Despite this, Talbot became popular in Dublin and developed a 
close relationship with Peel. The former took a special interest in Ireland’s
18 Mark Bence-Jones, The Catholic Families (London, 1992) p. 17.
'9 Ibid., p. 17.
20 William Perry, The Oxford Movement in Scotland (London, 1933); Lady Anne Cecil Kerr, Cecil,
Marchioness o f  Lothian: a Memoir /  edited by her Granddaughter (London, 1922).
"1 Norman Gash, Mr. Secretary Peel, The Life o f  Sir Robert Peel to 1830 (London, 1961) p. 229.
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agriculture during his time in office, and was created a knight o f the Order o f St. 
Patrick when George IV visited Ireland in 1821. Although he opposed the movement 
for Catholic emancipation, Daniel O ’Connell acknowledged his impartiality.22 Yet 
discontent in Ireland increased during Talbot’s time in office and he was replaced by 
Lord Wellesley in 1821.
Talbot’s daughter, Cecil, as previously mentioned, was nine years old when he 
moved his family to Dublin. Her biography suggests that the death o f  her mother in 
1819 ‘seems to have awakened her young soul, and to have made her thoughtful 
beyond her years’.2j Further to this it is suggested that ‘No doubt, too, her residence 
in a Catholic country must have made some impression on an intelligent girl o f her 
age, although the religion o f the people can hardly have been able to show itself in its 
true light to the child o f the English Viceroy.’24 There is a clear link made between 
her time spent in Ireland as a child and her conversion to Catholicism many years 
later. Ironically, her grandson Philip would spend years there as a child when already 
a member o f the Catholic faith, and then in later years convert to Christian Science. 
Cecil Talbot became Lady Lothian on her marriage to John William Robert Kerr, the 
Seventh Marquess in 1831. She became interested in the Tractarian Movement 
through her brother, John Talbot, and her brother-in-law, Lord Henry Kerr, who were 
both studying at Oxford. Indeed, she has been credited with helping to publicise the 
Oxford movement in Scotland. William Perry claimed that ‘The romance o f  religion 
went to her head’ since she attracted attention by travelling long distances on foot to
' 2 E. I. Carlyle, ‘Talbot, Charles Chetwynd-, second Earl Talbot ofHensol (1777-1849)’, rev. H. C. G. 
Matthew, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, 
Jan 2008.
Lady Anne Cecil Kerr, Cecil, Marchioness o f  Lothian: A Memoir /  edited by her Granddaughter 
(Edinburgh, 1922). p. 4.
24 Ibid.
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attend Mass.25 When Henry Edward Manning defected to Rome in 1850, she 
followed him saying ‘Manning’s course shall decide mine’.26 She converted officially 
to Catholicism in 1851.
Following her conversion Lady Lothian was treated with suspicion by her 
husband’s family. He had died at an early age in 1841 and the guardians o f his will 
feared that she would attempt to convert her younger sons to Catholicism, as her 
daughters had already followed their mother into the faith. These fears were 
confirmed when Lady Lothian escaped by night from Newbattle to Edinburgh where 
Bishop Gillis received her sons, Lord Ralph and Lord John Kerr, into the Catholic 
Church. Their eldest brother, William Schomberg Robert Kerr, the Eighth Marquess 
o f Lothian, was away at Oxford at the time and remained a staunch Episcopalian. On 
his early death in 1870 he was succeeded by his brother Schomberg Henry Kerr, who 
had also remained an Episcopalian. Lord Walter Talbot Kerr, the next brother in line, 
had been away at sea at the time o f his younger brothers’ conversion but followed 
their lead, becoming a Catholic in 1856. There tends to be a misapprehension that the 
Lothian title has been a Catholic one for generations. This is not the case.
Schomberg Kerr’s son, Robert, became the Tenth Marquess in 1900 and like his 
father was not a Catholic. On inheriting the title from his cousin in 1930, Philip 
became the Eleventh Marquess and the first to have been bom a Catholic. To 
complicate matters further he was a practising Christian Scientist by this time, having 
officially left the Catholic faith in 1923 after years o f religious doubt. It was not until 
the succession o f his cousin, Peter Francis Walter Kerr, in 1940 that the title became a 
Catholic one. The Twelfth Marquess died in 2004 and was succeeded by his son, the
25 William Perry, The Oxford Movement in Scotland (London, 1933) p. 41-42.
26 Ibid. p. 44.
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former Conservative Minister for Northern Ireland, Michael Andrew Foster Jude Kerr 
(Michael Ancram).
Philip Kerr’s father, Lord Ralph Kerr, never wavered from his faith following his 
conversion in 1851. He had been the closest o f his brothers to their mother and 
joined her in Rome shortly before her death in 1877. His conversion is described in 
his own words in his daughter’s work on her grandmother, Cecil: Marchioness o f  
Lothian 21 Lord Ralph ensured Philip’s strict Catholic upbringing when he married 
into the most powerful Catholic family in Great Britain. Philip’s mother, Lady Anne 
Fitzalan-Howard, was the daughter o f the Fourteenth Duke o f Norfolk. The Fitzalan- 
Howards held the premier dukedom in the English peerage, and as hereditary earl 
marshals, the Dukes o f Norfolk supervised the coronation o f each monarch.28 Indeed 
they are the only surviving dukedom o f medieval creation. John Martin Robinson has 
written the main history o f the family.29 In his preface he summarises what has made 
the family so intriguing:
they were at the centre o f things and yet excluded because o f their adherence 
to Catholicism, a religious denomination which was illegal in England for 
three hundred years and o f which they were the leading members. For 
centuries it has been their peculiar position to have been, on the one hand, 
premier English peers, great officers o f state and the possessors o f incredible 
riches, and on the other, debarred from most o f the consequences and rewards 
o f this pre-eminence by loyalty to a proscribed religion.30
~7 Lady Anne Cecil Kerr, Cecil, Marchioness o f  Lothian: a Memoir /  edited by her Granddaughter pp
121-134.
38 David P. Billington, Lothian, Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order (Westport, 2006) p. 5.
"9 John Martin Robinson, The Dukes o f  Norfolk (Chichester, 1995).
30 Ibid., p. vi.
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Philip’s parents therefore gave him an interesting mix o f  both Scottish and English 
aristocratic ancestry and an allegiance to the Catholic faith. What is interesting for 
the purposes o f this study is the connection o f both families to Irish politics.
Philip’s Uncle, Henry Fitzalan-Howard the Fifteenth Duke o f Norfolk, held 
staunch views on Ireland. He had strongly opposed Gladstone’s Home Rule policy o f 
the 1880s and aligned with the Conservatives. Robinson points out that although a 
Catholic, the Duke was a wholehearted Unionist and was against any proposals which 
he saw as likely to dismember the United Kingdom. Whilst he regretted that there 
had been ‘evil in the past in the government o f Ireland’ he did not believe the answer 
was in self-government.31 According to Robinson, the Duke was in high demand on 
Unionist platforms as he demonstrated that the Irish question was not simply 
Protestant, against Catholic.32 This also counteracts the argument made by Gary 
Peatling that Catholics were traditionally unsympathetic to imperial goals, and hence 
families such as Philip Kerr’s were troubled by this association.33 Robinson goes so 
far as to state that it is one o f the tragedies o f modem British history that the Duke 
was not appointed Viceroy o f Ireland under Salisbury and Balfour from 1895 to 1905. 
It was not possible at that time however for a Catholic to hold the position. He goes 
on to argue that the Duke, along with George Wyndham as Chief Secretary, would 
have formed a powerful combination in favour o f reconciliation and might have 
avoided the disaster o f partition.34 This is not convincing as Wyndham’s appointment 
o f a Catholic Under-Secretary in a sense brought about his downfall (this will be 
discussed below). The Duke’s younger brother and Kerr’s uncle, Edmund Talbot, 
became the first Catholic Viceroy o f Ireland in spring 1921. It seems that the
31 Ibid., pp. 228-229.
32 Ibid, p. 229.
33 G.K. Peatling, British Opinion and Irish Self-Government, 1865-1925 (Dublin, 2001) p. 116.
34 John Martin Robinson, The Dukes o f  Norfolk, p. 229.
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government decided to make a conciliatory gesture towards the Irish and passed a 
special Act o f Parliament so that he could be appointed. Cardinal Logue reportedly 
observed at the time that ‘we would as soon have a Catholic hangman’.35 In order to 
become Viceroy, Talbot was elevated to the peerage and took the title Viscount 
Fitzalan o f Derwent.
In 1893 the Duke o f Norfolk led the protest o f  the ‘British Catholic Unionists’ 
against Home Rule. His brother in law and Philip’s father, Lord Ralph Kerr, was one 
o f the signatories o f the statement printed in the newspapers. The group’s concern 
was primarily a religious one. They rejected the claim that Home Rule would 
promote the welfare o f the Catholic Church in Ireland. Instead, the statement 
condemned practices used by supporters o f Home Rule such as boycotting and the 
‘Plan o f Campaign’, practices that had also been condemned by the Holy See. The 
Catholic Unionists argued that individuals carrying out such acts would become 
political leaders in a Home Rule government and therefore must be opposed. 
Ultimately they disapproved o f any attempts to break up the United Kingdom. The 
printed statement provides a direct indication o f Philip Kerr’s family’s stance on 
Ireland and Home Rule.36 As both English and Scottish Catholic Unionists, his father 
and uncle publicly opposed Gladstone’s second Home Rule Bill. This adds an 
intriguing dimension to Philip’s later role as he would assist in implementing Home 
Rule in Ireland.
As a younger son o f the Seventh Marquess, Lord Ralph Kerr would not have been 
expected to inherit the Lothian title. He led a distinguished military career, joining 
the Tenth Hussars in 1857 and commanding the regiment in the second Afghan War 
o f 1879. There has been no biography o f Ralph Kerr and there is no significant
35 Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey (London, 1954) p. 574.
‘British Roman Catholics and Home Rule’ in The Times Tuesday 1 June 1893, p. 7, col. B.
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archive material relating to him. However one is able to gain some insight into his 
life and character from his daughter’s Cecil, Marchioness o f  Lothian. Contemporary 
newspaper accounts also add to our knowledge o f him. In 1891 he was appointed 
major-general in command o f  the British military base at the Curragh in Ireland. This 
is o f considerable significance to this study as Philip Kerr would have had childhood 
memories from this period. Admittedly, Philip would not have spent a great deal o f 
time in Ireland as the family would have been there only a year before he was sent 
away to school in England in 1892. School holidays were often spent at the home o f 
his relatives, the Fitzalan-Howards, at Arundel in West Sussex. Nonetheless this is a 
firm connection to Ireland during his formative years. His father was there in a 
position o f policing the British Empire and Philip would have been exposed to 
political and religious life in Ireland. He was old enough to have had an awareness o f 
events around him and to form strong impressions.
The British army’s chief role in Ireland was to maintain law and order. During the 
1880s the main threat to peace had been from agrarian agitation and sectarian 
disturbances. Following the Plan o f Campaign, by the 1890s these problems had 
largely subsided due to policies o f coercion and conciliation by the Irish Chief- 
Secretary, Arthur Balfour.37 Yet these years were turbulent ones in a political sense. 
The split within the Irish Parliamentary Party following the Parnell divorce scandal 
(the Parnell Split), and the death o f its leader Charles Stewart Parnell in 1891, meant 
that it would never regain its former strength. Gladstone’s second Home Rule Bill for 
Ireland was introduced in 1893 and eventually rejected by the House o f Lords. As 
previously discussed, Ralph Kerr became involved in Irish political affairs through his 
opposition to this Home Rule Bill. He was not actively involved in politics however.
37 Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902 (Manchester, 1992) p. 220-221.
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As major-general in command o f  the Curragh district his role was prim arily a m ilitary 
one.
Contemporary newspaper reports suggest that his promotion to m ajor-general 
shortly before his posting to Ireland sparked some controversy. The Belfast News- 
Letter wrote:
To say that the recent promotion o f  Lord Ralph Kerr to the rank o f  major- 
general by selection has occasioned dissatisfaction in the army is very 
inadequately to express the widespread feeling o f  disgust with which several
38o f  the senior colonels over whose heads Lord Ralph Kerr has been advanced.
The report went further in describing his prom otion as ‘m onstrous’ and as 
‘favouritism’.39 The paper did not speculate on the possible reasons for this supposed 
preferential treatment. Yet his religion m ay have been the reason for this prom otion 
and post. Kerr was openly Catholic and actively involved with the local clergy and 
parish life wherever he happened to be. It is possible that he was thus a suitable 
choice to command the Curragh and win the respect o f  the local Catholic population. 
Furthermore, the Adjutant-General o f  the army, Viscount W olseley, had expressed 
concerns to the Duke o f  Cambridge regarding the reliability o f  Irish troops, believing 
them to be easily led and prone to drink.40 Prince George, the Second Duke o f  
Cambridge and Queen V ictoria’s cousin was com m ander o f  the forces and also a 
Catholic. It is possible that he may have seen Ralph Kerr as an obvious candidate for 
the role. Shortly after Kerr took up his post, Cambridge visited the Curragh and in a 
speech praised the appearance and training o f  the troops under the form er’s charge.
38 ‘Pickings from Piccadilly’, The Belfast News-Letter, Friday, 7 Feb 1890, p. 7, column 6.
39 Ibid.
40 Edward M. Spiers, The Late Victorian Army 1868-1902, p. 222-223.
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This may have been nothing out o f  the ordinary but it would have gone some way 
towards counteracting the bad publicity surrounding K err’s appointment.
Ralph Kerr did become actively involved in Catholic life both at the Curragh and 
in the Kildare district. He played an integral role in the opening o f  a Catholic 
Soldiers’ Institute at the Curragh in 1896, contributing fifty pounds to the fund and 
becoming a patron o f  the institute. A contribution o f  ten pounds was also made by 
James Lynch, Bishop o f  Kildare and Leighlin, and Father Joseph Delany, chaplain to 
the forces, had visited parishes in the diocese collecting for the building expenses.41 
This was Ralph K err’s most significant legacy from his tim e at the Curragh. His wife, 
Lady Anne Kerr, had laid the building’s foundation stone in a cerem ony that was 
widely reported in the press. K err’s participation in the religious life o f  the diocese 
was not however restricted to the Curragh Camp. In 1894 a fair was held under the 
patronage o f  Lord Ralph and Lady Anne Kerr to celebrate the opening o f  the new 
Carmelite Church o f  the W hite Abbey, K ildare.42 The Kerrs were thus a visible 
presence in the Catholic com m unity o f  Ireland during the five years that they spent 
there, and given their social position, they would have known and come into contact 
with prominent Irish Catholic figures.
Ralph Kerr was a member o f  the Com m ittee o f  Cardinal L ogue’s Testim onial 
Fund in 1893. Other members o f  the Committee included the landowner and 
politician Sir Thomas Henry Grattan Esmonde, and judges Christopher Palles and 
Peter O ’Brien. It is difficult to determine how Kerr was perceived by Irish Catholics 
such as these considering his own anti-Horne Rule stance and high rank in the British
Con Costello, Most Delightful Station: The British Army on the Curragh o f  Kildare, Ireland (Cork 
1996) p. 126.
" Freeman's Journal and Daily Commercial Advertiser (Dublin, Ireland), Tuesday, 23 Oct 1894, p. 6, 
col. 4.
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army. There is no m ention o f  him  in O ’B rien’s m emoirs o f  the period.43 Presum ably 
he would have fitted in well as Esmonde had joined the anti-Pam ellite side in the 
early 1880s. Logue had only just been made Cardinal in 1893 and was also active in 
promoting the anti-Parnellite cause. Yet his political views tended to be more 
concerned with guaranteeing the Catholic Church’s interests in Ireland, than 
identifying with popular causes. David M iller has noted the description o f  L ogue’s 
politics as ‘national rather than nationalist’.44 Indeed he enjoyed ‘waiting upon 
royalty, delighted in entertaining visiting British dignitaries w ith champagne and 
oysters’.43 Although Archbishop W illiam W alsh o f  Dublin had greater tact, it was 
Logue who received the Cardinal’s hat in 1893. It is likely that Logue would have 
charmed the Kerrs as high ranking, aristocratic Catholics, and Ralph K err’s 
membership o f  Logue’s Testimonial Com m ittee hints at his regard for the Cardinal.
There is potentially another interesting link between the Kerrs and the Irish 
hierarchy during their time in Ireland. The Bishop o f  Kildare and Leighlin from 
1869-96 was James Lynch. Lynch had been m oved to Kildare following his highly 
controversial period as coadjutor bishop o f  the W estern District o f  Scotland between 
1866 and 1868. There had been popular unrest between Scottish and Irish Catholics 
in the W est o f  Scotland for some time prior to Lynch’s appointment. Following the 
famine years o f  1846-7 there was a large influx o f  Irish Catholics who settled in the 
Glasgow area.46 Suspicion had grown between the rival Scottish and Irish 
communities. The Irish clergy and laity in the area felt discrim inated against by the 
Scottish comm unity and ecclesiastical authority, whilst the Scots clergy and laity
43 Peter O’Brien, Reminiscences o f  the Right Hon. Lord O ’Brien (ofKilfenora), Lord Chief Justice o f  
Ireland (London, 1916).
44 David W. Miller, Church, State and Nation in Ireland 1898-1921 (Dublin, 1973) p. 12.
Ibid.
46  T-rt
Thomas Davitt, James Lynch (1807-1896)’ in Colloque, Journal o f  the Irish Province o f  the 
Congregation o f the Mission No. 34 (Autumn, 1996) p. 294.
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feared the Irish gathering too much pow er and influence. In particular they were 
afraid o f  the spread o f  Fenianism by the imm igrant Irish.47 Lynch’s appointm ent did 
nothing to alleviate these problem s and instead aggravated the grievances o f  both 
sides. As an Irish clergyman, his appointment was surprising to the Scots, and his 
ordination at the Irish College in Paris, rather than Glasgow, showed a lack o f  
sensitivity to Scottish feelings. Lynch also m anaged to alienate the Irish com m unity 
by choosing to live in a better o ff  area o f  Glasgow, instead o f  the B ishop’s quarters in 
the chapel house o f  St. Andrews. Added to this he became w idely regarded as 
supporting the views o f  the Glasgow Free Press which supported the Fenian 
movement. As the situation worsened, a visitation by the Archbishop o f  W estm inster, 
Henry Edward M anning, was deemed necessary in 1867. In his subsequent report he 
recommended that Lynch and Bishop John Gray be rem oved from the W estern 
District. Lynch was thus appointed to the coadjutorship o f  Kildare and Leighlin on 5 
April 1869 and in 1888 succeeded Bishop James W alshe as Bishop o f  Kildare and 
Leighlin. By the time o f  K err’s arrival in 1891 L ynch’s health was failing, although 
his mind remained sharp. As a Scottish Catholic, Ralph Kerr was no doubt fully 
aware o f  Lynch’s years in Glasgow, and the controversy that surrounded them.
Philip Kerr would almost certainly have come into contact with such people during 
his childhood. A diary from 1898, when the family were back in Scotland, records 
visits by members o f  the clergy to the K errs’ home o f  W oodbum , near Dalkeith.
Philip noted visits in August by various priests on a daily basis, and by the 
Archbishop o f  Edinburgh, Angus M acD onald.48 Lord Ralph Kerr had read the 
address in St. M ary’s Cathedral at M acD onald’s enthronem ent in 1892. Visits by the 
Irish clergy to their home at the Curragh would have also occurred. Unfortunately we
47 Ibid. p. 294-295.
48 Philip Kerr’s Diary 1898, Private collection, Monteviot House.
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have no first-hand impressions o f  Philip K err’s life at the Curragh or references to 
him meeting members o f  the Irish clergy. The letters he sent to his parents in Ireland 
from school were mainly frill o f  news relating to his studies or sports that he played. 
On one occasion he wrote to his father asking if  ‘Jack’ m inded the big guns and what 
regiments were coming down for the sum m er.49 This is one o f  K err’s only references 
to life at the Curragh. No historian to date has attem pted to explore his early 
connection to Ireland and his fam ily’s tim e there. Yet these years were significant 
because they would have helped to shape his perceptions o f  Ireland and the Irish. 
When he later drafted the Government o f  Ireland Bill he was not ignorant o f  Ireland 
and the Irish people.
One reference within the private papers at M onteviot House confirms a connection 
between Philip Kerr and a prom inent individual w ith links to Irish affairs during this 
early period o f his life. W ilfrid W ard was a notable Catholic and ecclesiastical 
biographer who produced works on Cardinals Nicholas W isem an and John Henry 
Newman.50 W ard was related to Philip Kerr by marriage, having m arried K err’s 
cousin, Josephine M ary Hope, the daughter o f  James H ope-Scott and Victoria 
Howard, Philip’s aunt. Philip’s grandm other, M inna, duchess o f  Norfolk, had been 
W ard’s godmother. W ilfrid W ard’s father was the philosopher, W illiam  George 
Ward, a follower o f  Newman who had converted to Catholicism  in 1845. Like Kerr, 
Ward had grown up in a strict Catholic atm osphere and had considered the priesthood 
as a career. Finding that the church was not his true vocation, he left the sem inary o f  
Ushaw College, County Durham, in 1881 and em barked on a career o f  journalism  and 
writing. W ard was a friend o f  George W yndham, the C hief Secretary for Ireland
Philip Kerr to Lord Ralph Kerr, 20 May 1894, Private Collection, Monteviot House, ‘Letters from 
Philip Kerr to his family from school and Oxford’. It is not clear who ‘Jack’ was. He may have been 
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50 Wilfrid Ward, The Life and Times o f  Cardinal Wiseman (London, 1897); The Life o f  John Henry
Cardinal Newman (London, 1912).
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1900-1905. They were both members o f  the ‘Synthetic Society’, formed in 1896 to 
discuss agnosticism and w ork towards a philosophy o f  religious belief based on 
modern lines. W ard’s daughter, M aisie, wrote that her father’s close friendship and 
admiration for W yndham immensely influenced his ow n Irish outlook.51
Wyndham, a Tory romantic, was an imperialist w ith some sym pathy for Irish 
nationalism.52 He appointed a Liberal and Catholic Irishman, Sir Antony 
MacDonnell, as his U nder-Secretary for Ireland, prom ising that M acDonnell was not 
a symbolic appointment but would have influence over the direction o f  policy. 53 
Early in 1902 W yndham  had written to his father stating ‘I shall pass a Land Bill, 
reconstruct the Agricultural Departm ent and Congested Districts Board, stimulate 
Fishing and Horse-breeding; and revolutionise Education. Then I shall “nunc 
dimittis” and let some one else have a tu rn .’54 W yndham ’s Land Act o f  1903 was the 
main achievement o f  his time as Irish Secretary. His term  in Ireland ended in 
controversy, however, as he was accused o f  being involved in proposals for a limited 
form o f  administrative devolution in Ireland. His Under-Secretary, M acDonnell, was 
certainly involved, although W yndham ’s own involvement has never been proved. It 
has been said that W yndham  had an alm ost G ladstonian sense o f  m ission w ith regard 
to Ireland, and genuinely w anted to advance Irish interests.55 But the devolution 
affair tarnished his Irish legacy. M aisie W ard wrote that W yndham  ‘loved the Irish -  
and he believed in the Em pire’.56 She explained that both W yndham  and her father,
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1937) p. 83.
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as sincere Unionists, ‘took it as simply axiomatic that England m ust continue to 
govern Ireland’ and with this the absolute obligation that ‘England m ust govern 
Ireland with regret for the past, wholly in the interests o f  Irishmen, and with the
57largest possible measure o f  generosity’.
Philip Kerr knew W ilfrid W ard well. W ard’s daughter, M aisie, and Philip’s 
second cousin, wrote in her m emoirs that her father and Philip enjoyed playing go lf 
together and talked a great deal about politics and philosophy.58 It is unfortunate that 
no correspondence exists between the two. There is a m ethodological problem  here in 
that Kerr would see the people that he discussed political issues w ith on a regular 
basis and therefore he did not write about his thoughts on these issues. This was also 
the case with regards to his friendships w ith Lionel Curtis and Nancy A stor at a later 
stage. Some guesswork is therefore necessary at times in order to determine his 
views. It is reasonable to suggest that K err’s earliest discussions o f  Irish affairs were 
with Ward, and there is some evidence to support this. One reference does exist. In a 
letter to his m other in 1902 Kerr wrote that ‘W ilfrid W ard gives no news he is not 
going to Ireland until Jan 14th so you can hear no more o f  G eorge W yndham  after 
that.’59 The Kerrs would have rem ained interested in Irish political affairs on their 
return to Scotland in 1898 and no doubt would have followed W yndham ’s efforts 
closely. His appointment o f  a Catholic would have particularly interested them, given 
their own social and religious position. W riting in 1902, K err’s reference m ay have 
been in relation to W yndham ’s Land Bill proposals or to ‘inside inform ation’ from 
Ward. Kerr was from a Unionist background; he believed in the integrity o f  the
57 Ibid. p. 83.
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British Empire but would develop an interest in devolution. These early 
conversations with W ard very likely shaped his initial view  o f  the Irish question.
In 1892 Kerr was sent to the Oratory School, Edgbaston, founded by Cardinal 
Newman in 1859. During his time there he considered joining the priesthood or the 
army but remained uncertain o f  his future career.60 He entered New College, Oxford, 
in 1900 to study m odem  history. Robert Sangster Rait was K err’s tutor there. Rait 
was an eminent historian and strong Unionist who published im portant works on the 
union between England and Scotland.61 His influence may have helped to cement 
Kerr’s early Unionist and imperial leanings. Both o f  K err’s biographers, however, 
refer to his religious doubts as stemming from  this tim e.62 The Catholic bishops had 
banned their flock from studying at the university until 1896 when the ban was lifted 
due to pressure from the English Catholic community. The bishops had harboured 
concerns regarding the spirit o f  critical inquiry challenging the idea o f  a single 
intellectual authority. Kerr was an example o f  their fears becom ing reality. Butler 
singles out the works o f  George Bernard Shaw as having influenced K err’s thought in 
this respect. He does not mention which particular works Kerr was reading. Those 
published before Kerr entered Oxford include Plays Unpleasant, Plays Pleasant, and 
Three Plays fo r  Puritans which appeared during K err’s early O xford years. It is 
possible that Captain Brassbound’s Conversion m ay have affected Kerr. The play 
makes references to intolerance towards creeds that are not Christian, and presents the 
character, Lady Cicely, rejecting the law o f  any Church; instead she uses her own
60 J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940 (London, 1960) p. 4.
61 These include R. S. Rait, The Scottish Parliament Before the Union o f  the Crowns (London, 1901); 
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common sense and judgm ent.63 Shaw was descended from  the Protestant ascendancy, 
the landed gentry that had settled in Ireland after C rom w ell’s time, although his own 
upbringing was a poor one. He was not drawn to any Church or sect. He believed in 
tolerance and criticised institutional churches, such as the Catholic Church, for not 
being willing to ‘liberalise them selves’.64 It is impossible to prove or to determine 
Shaw’s influence on K err’s religious thought.65 It is not unrealistic, however, to 
suggest that his work led him to question his religion. Until he arrived in O xford Ken- 
had always lived in a predom inantly Catholic environm ent. Yet despite his religious 
doubts surfacing at Oxford, K e n  rem ained a practising Catholic for some years after. 
He was not introduced to Christian Science until 1914. Letters to his parents from 
South Africa between 1905 and 1909 show that he rem ained devoted to his Catholic 
faith for some time.
After graduating from Oxford with a first class degree in 1904, K e n  took up a 
secretarial post in the Transvaal. The British adm inistration was in the process o f  
reconstructing the country following the Boer W ar (1899-1902). John Buchan, a 
friend o f  K e n ’s tutor, R.S. Rait, and political secretary to Alfred, Viscount M ilner, 
Governor o f  the Transvaal, helped to secure K e n ’s appointment. K e n  jo ined Sir 
Arthur Lawley’s staff in 1905. Lawley was Lieutenant G overnor o f  the Transvaal and 
had served under Ralph K en  in the Tenth Hussars. K en  worked for him  barely two 
months before accepting a new position as Robert B rand’s secretary at the In ter­
colonial Council and Railway Com m ittee o f  the four South African colonies.
Kenneth Ingham has written that ‘Philip K e n ’s years in South Africa from  1905 to 
1909 were a period o f  apprenticeship to the causes which were to occupy him for the
63 Annika Ganter ‘Shavian Religion in Captain Brassbound’s Conversion and St Joan’ in The Journal 
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rest o f  his life” .66 As the literature review demonstrated, there has been a great deal 
written about Alfred M ilner and South Africa, and the group o f  young adm inistrators 
that surrounded him, known affectionately as ‘M ilner’s K indergarten’. K err’s years 
in South Africa undoubtedly influenced his political thought and future career and 
therefore it is important to anchor him within the M ilnerite K indergarten tradition.
Yet there is still room  for some fresh interpretation o f  his time there as his letters 
home reveal not only details o f  his w ork but also his attitude towards his religion and 
what he was reading. These details provide clues to his later thoughts on Ireland.
Kerr had been in South Africa only a week before M ilner’s retirem ent and return 
to England. Nevertheless Kerr was quickly absorbed into the ‘K indergarten’. The 
members were mainly Oxford graduates, recruited by M ilner as adm inistrators and as 
a sounding board for his ideas.67 M ilner had wanted to unify the colonies and 
republics o f  South Africa into one dom inion ‘independent in the m anagement o f  its 
own affairs, but still remaining, from its own desire, a member o f  the great 
community o f  free nations gathered under the British flag’.68 He had no ideological 
view o f  the form that union would take, but had come to the conclusion that the ‘best 
practical solution would be to have a strong federal governm ent dealing with customs, 
railways, defence and, possibly native affairs.’69 Following his departure in 1905 the 
Kindergarten aimed to carry on promoting M ilner’s vision for South Africa under the 
new High Commissioner, W illiam  W aldegrave Palmer, the second Earl o f  Selboume. 
At twenty-three Kerr was the youngest o f  the group and was treated as such, with
66 Kenneth Ingham, ‘Philip Kerr and the Unification of South Africa’ in John Turner (ed.), The Larger 
idea, Lord Lothian and the Problem o f  National Sovereignty (London, 1988) p 20
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‘indulgent firmness’ by the other m em bers.70 They would rem ain his life-long 
friends, in particular Lionel Curtis and Robert Brand. The group held weekly 
meetings, or ‘m oots’, where they would discuss political affairs and ways by which 
South African union could be achieved. Kerr remained a firm Unionist while in 
South Africa, arguing that ‘They [the Liberals] have made a real mess o f  affairs in 
natal’.71 In an earlier letter to his father he wrote that ‘we have just heard that Arthur 
Balfour has been defeated by 2000 votes and that the Liberals have gained 35 out o f
72the 40 votes polled. I suppose you are all in the depths o f  despair at this tim e.’ 
Kenneth Ingham has discussed the role o f  the K indergarten in the eventual 
unification o f  South Africa. He argues that they were an elite group who were out o f  
touch with the political trends at home, such as the policies o f  the new Liberal 
government o f  1905. Ingham explains that the comm itm ent o f  the K indergarten to 
their cause ‘sometimes blinded them  to the fact that their own role was a relatively 
minor one.’73 For Kerr, the effort to prom ote South African union was a valuable 
experience that ‘sharpened his organisational abilities’, while discussions w ith the 
Kindergarten ‘sharpened his intellect and encouraged his critical faculties’.74 In the 
later months o f  1906 the Kindergarten had set about drafting what becam e know n as 
the ‘Selbome M em orandum ’, an argum ent in favour o f  closer union o f  the South 
African states, to be presented to the British public. K err’s own contribution was in 
relation to the railways, arguing that they could only operate efficiently i f  centrally 
controlled.75 The drafting was done in secret and Kerr begged his parents’ discretion
70 Ibid., p. 23.
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when writing to them .76 The memorandum  was generally well received in the press, 
yet the Kindergarten believed that federation w ould be a long, drawn out process.
They continued their efforts throughout 1907 and early 1908, establishing a weekly 
newspaper The State, edited by Kerr, that put forward arguments for closer union in 
South Africa.
When federation o f  South Africa did come about it happened very quickly and the 
Kindergarten were ‘overtaken by events’ when Jan Smuts and J.X. M errim an 
introduced their plans for union in M arch 1908.77 Ingham  writes that ‘The 
Kindergarten themselves had little doubt that they had played an important part in 
bringing about the unification o f  South A frica’, while arguing ‘It is un like ly .. .that the 
Kindergarten had saved South Africa for the British Em pire’.78 He explains that as an 
elite group concerned with political ideas, there was a great gu lf dividing the 
Kindergarten from those who bore the practical burden o f  government. This would be 
a criticism levelled at them  in their later incarnation as ‘The Round Table’ group. It is 
a convincing argument as Kerr would not fully understand the real difficulties o f  
governing until he worked for Lloyd George at Downing Street. Nevertheless South 
Africa prepared Kerr for his later roles as editor, draftsm an and secretary to the Prime 
Minister. His capacity for hard w ork was astonishing and com m ented on by his peers. 
It is little wonder that his health suffered during the course o f  his life. Nevertheless, 
his colleague, Robert Brand, wrote to Philip’s m other in 1906 telling her that Philip 
was in good health despite the fact that he had worked for a year w ithout a holiday 
and ‘ought to have one soon’. Brand continued:
76 Philip Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, Dec 1906, Lothian Papers GD40/17/454/59; Philip Kerr to Lord 
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As to his work, there is only one opinion among everyone. O f  them, the High 
Commissioner, Duncan, Farrar, Hichens and the Railway Officials, m ost o f  
whom  are our natural enemies say the same thing, that he has done 
extraordinarily well. They all seem  struck not only with his clear headedness, 
but with the tremendous industry he has shown. It is a great thing that he can
79take a lot o f  w ork and calmness w ithout getting fussed.
Kerr remained a practising Catholic during his years in South Africa, attending the 
sacraments and making an effort to mix with other Catholics. In a letter to his m other 
in December 1905 he described how he had w alked across an open plain at night in 
danger o f  his life ‘except t h a t ... [he had] a loaded revolver’ in his pocket, so that he 
could attend confession.80 Kerr would have been anxious to confess so that he could 
take Holy Communion on Christmas Day. Unlike Easter, Catholics were not 
obligated to take Communion at Christmas and therefore this suggests some devotion 
on Kerr’s part. In a later letter to his father he tells o f  his shame at the ‘lim ited nature 
o f  my religious and charitable perform ances’ and hence joined the Saint Vincent de 
Paul Society, also making ‘a variety o f  other efforts to get in touch w ith Catholics 
here’.81 Kerr did not present him self as a saint-like being; rather he struggled w ith his 
piety. He told his father on one occasion that ‘The reason why I so seldom  refer to 
religious matters, is that there is never anything to chronicle - except the tale o f  my 
soul, which is, I ’m afraid, not too exem plary’.82 Robert Brand wrote in 1960 that ‘It 
was quite apparent indeed in South Africa that he was not an ardent Catholic. Y et he
80 Robert Brand to Lady Anne Kerr, 3 March 1906, Lothian Papers GD40/17/455/1.
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held out for long’.83 Brand, who thought that his own father was an agnostic, believed 
that it was K err’s eight years at the Roman Catholic Oratory School in Birmingham  
that shaped the rest o f  his life, as Kerr never forgot its teachings and found it 
intolerable to have no definite religion.
If  it was apparent to Brand that Kerr was not an ardent Catholic during his tim e in 
South Africa then it was not so to others. Following a visit to South Africa in 1907 a 
cousin, W illiam H. Kerr, wrote to Philip’s father reporting that ‘I think that you and 
Anne will be pleased to hear that I have ascertained that he is spoken o f  in 
Johannesburg as an “Edifying Catholic” . . .going to his duties regularly and 
frequently’.84 Brand may thus have been w rong in 1960 and speaking w ith the benefit 
o f  hindsight. Kerr’s letters home suggest that Catholicism  was very m uch a part o f  
his every day life, and inherent in who he was. On one occasion he expressed concern 
to his father that he could not find his crucifix which he used to lay on his dressing 
table.85 In another letter to his sister, M argaret, he wrote to her describing the Bishop, 
claiming that he had an ugly face. He told her ‘Even the Bishop him self argued that 
the best way was not to eat fish on Fridays as it was a “luxury” !’86 Kerr was quite 
serious in encouraging his younger brother, David, in his own religious duties. He 
wrote to him saying ‘I suppose you will begin on Retreat before very long .. .1 used to 
like the retreats, I hope you will too. The only boys who d idn’t like them  were the 
ones who didn’t try to keep them properly.’87
Kerr’s attitude towards religion is clearer in a letter to his m other written in 1907. 
She had asked him about the religious beliefs o f  his colleagues, Patrick Duncan and 
Lionel Hichens. He replied:
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Religion is not a matter o f  intellect -  though it is an intellectual process to 
formalise what you mean o f  religion .. .one’s exact beliefs m ust take different 
forms according to the quality and capacity o f  one’s mind. W hat exactly the
Catholic religion means to a backward Irish peasant is obviously very different
88to what it means to you or father.
Kerr identified with his social class when it came to religion, and it seems that his 
former connection with Ireland had heightened his sense o f  superiority. He was 
probably referring to the superstitious quality linked to the religious life o f  the Irish 
peasantry. Kerr’s family were followers o f  Cardinal Newman, who was associated 
with intellectual thought. Lord Ralph Kerr had attended his funeral in 1890 and 
Philip had been educated at the school that he founded. Philip had spent time with 
Catholic intellectuals such as W ilfrid Ward. He may have claim ed that ‘Religion is 
not a matter o f  intellect’ yet he associated his own strain o f  Catholicism  with an 
intellectual and elevated form. For Kerr, this seems to have been a class divide and 
not a national one. He did not necessarily single the Irish out as he also wrote that 
‘People here [South Africa] are the most non religious in the world. There are very 
few o f  even the psalm saying ruffian type’.89
Meanwhile South Africa gave Kerr a new philosophy in the shape o f  imperialism. 
For the rest o f  his life he would believe in the suprem acy o f  the British Empire and 
her dominions. Kerr read the work o f  Richard Jebb while in South Africa. He wrote 
to his father in 1906 about a book by ‘a man called Richard Jebb entitled Colonial 
Nationalism ’. He continued ‘I strongly advise you get it and read it. It is
2  Philip Kerr t0 Lady Anne Kerr’ 11 May 1907> Lothian Papers GD40/17/456/23.
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extraordinarily good, and throws a tremendous lot o f  light on the relations betw een 
Britain and her colonies.’90 Kerr’s reading o f  Jebb throw s some light onto his own 
thoughts at this early stage o f  his career. Kerr told his father ‘he is absolutely 
righ t.. .It is a book I think we should have in the house -  a classic in its own tim e’.91 
Jebb was bom  in Ellesmere, Shropshire, in 1874. His father, Arthur Trevor Jebb, was 
a landowner and his mother, Eglantyne Louisa and his father’s distant cousin, was the 
daughter o f  Robert Jebb o f  Killiney, Ireland. Jebb was educated at M arlborough and 
New College, Oxford, later becoming a publicist and theorist on imperial themes.
After winning a prize at school for an essay on imperial federation, the Em pire 
became his life’s principal concern.92 W hile travelling the self- governing colonies 
between 1898 and 1901 Jebb gathered valuable material for his ideas on colonial 
nationalism, later publishing his Studies in Colonial Nationalism in 1905, and as a 
result gained public recognition.93
The work considers Jebb’s view o f  imperial evolution, based on the experiences o f  
Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. In his preface, he set out his 
thoughts on the colonial ideal and specified what he considered to be the problem s 
associated with colonial mle. In particular, he supported the notion o f  an alliance 
between the m other country and the self-governing colonies rather than the principle 
o f  federation. According to Jebb, an alliance system  w as preferable as it would 
recognise separate national aspirations. Federation, on the other hand, suggested a 
growing consciousness o f  common nationality, which he did not believe existed. He 
argued that Britain’s pitfall was the idea that the self-governing colonies could be 
treated as a whole and if this idea continued then there would be no hope o f  closer
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union. Jebb believed that in order to achieve closer union Britain would have to 
accept the differences inherent in the various nations. In his opinion there were two 
main features common to the four nations that he was exploring: firstly that they were 
all travelling the road from colonial to national status; and secondly that the 
development o f  national consciousness in each was a process o f  internal friction.
Jebb looked to the imperial statesmen to recognise these factors and to accept them  if  
any form o f  union was to be maintained. He criticised Britain more heavily in the 
main body o f  his text. He credited Rudyard Kipling, another ardent imperialist and 
acquaintance o f  Kerr’s in South Africa, as being the first ‘prophet o f  im perial tru th ’, 
that is, the first to recognise the realities o f  the new nations.94 This recognition 
involved the separate aspirations and patriotism  o f  these younger nations and their 
assumed loyalties to Britain. Jebb explored the nationalism  that he believed to exist 
in places such as Australia, with the example that it had its own nationalist poetry. 
Britain was therefore seen as greatly m istaken in trying to enforce her own suprem acy 
and in failing to recognise the separate national sentiment o f  the colonies. From 
Jebb’s point o f  view, if  she did not then the new nations w ould eventually break away 
and the union would be merely ‘an empty vision’.95 Jebb predicted that ‘In the 
fullness o f  time the children shall surpass their grey mother, in all save honour. The 
imperial city shall lose her pride o f  p lace.’96
Kerr would later echo Jebb’s arguments in his w ork The Prevention o f War and in 
what he perceived to be the problem o f  national sovereignty.97 Yet the difference 
between Kerr and Jebb was that the former would come to see federalism  as a 
solution to international problems, as it would address issues com m on to all states,
94 Ibid., p. 327.
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while recognising their separate issues, whereas Jebb saw federalism  as prom oting 
separate national aspirations. Kerr urged his father to ensure that Jebb’s w ork became 
a part o f their own library on account o f  it being ‘a classic in its own tim e’. But 
although Jebb was among the most prominent o f  imperial publicists his influence 
rapidly waned and his public reputation diminished. J.D. M iller has explained that 
Jebb recognised colonial nationalism, not as merely separatism  but as a complex local 
feeling and attachment to Britain. He argues, however, that the imperial 
federationists, and in particular the Round Table group headed by Lionel Curtis, did 
not understand the strength o f  this sentiment and therefore that their ow n proposals 
would fail.98 Nevertheless, reading works such as Jebb’s opened K err’s mind to 
possible solutions to the problems associated with imperial governm ent. K err’s 
experiences in South Africa and his association with the K indergarten had 
consolidated his imperial thought and led him to develop it further.
Kerr was devouring a wide range o f  material in South Africa and there is evidence 
o f  him reading works by Irish political figures. In the same letter that Kerr advised 
his father to read Jebb’s Colonial Nationalism, he also said that ‘There is another 
book that we ought to have if  you haven’t already got it “The New Century in 
Ireland” by Horace Plunkett. I have been reading it here’.99 Kerr would later 
correspond with Plunkett whilst acting as Lloyd G eorge’s secretary. Plunkett was an 
agricultural reformer and politician. A member o f  the landed class, he founded a 
movement in which rural comm unities could w ork together for improved agricultural 
production, processing and distribution.100 He had learned a great deal from  his own 
experiences ranching in America and therefore came to believe that the Irish farm er
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University Press, Sept 2004. Online Edition, Jan 2008.
iooP h i l ‘P  Kerr t0 Lord Ralph Kerr’ 1 April 1906> Lothian Papers GD40/17/454/16.
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needed greater independence and autonomy. In Ireland in the New Century he set out 
a comprehensive statement o f  his philosophy.101 There was a varied response to 
Plunkett’s work and it was not uniformly well received. It also isolated the author as, 
against the advice o f  friends, he included attacks on the role o f  the Catholic clergy in 
Irish society and on the Irish people ‘for their lack o f  m oral fibre’. 10" One review, 
however, declared that Plunkett’s case was a complicated one, and that it was rare that 
an author had the courage to express such a valuable opinion so openly. It was 
explained that Plunkett’s criticisms were directed to the im provem ent o f  industrial 
character and not against any one group, be it Orangemen, Catholics, Unionists or
103Nationalists.
During this period the Irish Parliamentary party was no longer as strong as it once 
had been in the 1880s. The fall o f  Parnell had weakened the party and his ultim ate 
successor, John Redmond, attempted to carry on his legacy and continue to fight for 
the Home Rule cause. This period also saw the rise o f  Sinn Fein and the form ation o f  
the Ulster Unionist Council. These elements together saw the political scene in 
Ireland change dramatically. Although Redm ond would actually see Hom e Rule put 
on the statute books in 1914 the party would never regain its form er support as it 
failed to move with the changing times. Plunkett tended to disparage politics and 
argued that the methods employed for the attainm ent o f  Hom e Rule had been 
injurious to the industrial character o f  the people .104 He did recognise, however, that 
an engagement with politics was necessary. But it is difficult to define his political 
ideals. Plunkett won a seat for South County Dublin as a Unionist in 1892 with the
101 Horace Plunkett, Ireland in the New Century (with a foreword by Trevor West), (Dublin, 1982).
l02Philip Bull, ‘Plunkett, Sir Horace Curzon (1854-1932)’, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography, 
Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edition, Jan 2008.
103 F.Y. Edgeworth, ‘Reviewed Works: Ireland in the New Century by Horace Plunkett’ The Economic 
Journal, Vol. 14, No. 55. (Sept, 1904), pp. 430-433.
104 Ibid.
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aim o f  promoting his ideas, and he maintained an am bivalent attitude to nationalism. 
Philip Bull has noted, however, that it was in Sinn Fein that Plunkett found a 
nationalism with which he was able to identify due to its attachm ent to com m on ideas 
o f self-reliance and moral regeneration. He was com m itted to the idea o f  Irish 
nationality rather than ‘the specific forms taken by nationalism ’. 105 His nationalism  
had become overt by the time he was appointed chair o f  the Irish Convention o f  1917- 
18 and his main aim became to avoid partition. This fact is particularly interesting 
considering Kerr’s later involvement in the partition o f  Ireland and his connection 
with Plunkett. Kerr would also receive advice from George W. Russell ( ‘HT) whose 
work Social Silhouettes he read while in South A frica.106 Plunkett and Russell 
illustrate Kerr’s interest in Ireland during his time in South Africa and also forge a 
link between his early career and his later work in Irish affairs.
The points raised in this chapter provide new background to the w ork that Philip 
Kerr would carry out in relation to Ireland between 1916 and 1921. He was bom  into 
an aristocratic, Catholic family opposed to devolution for Ireland. As a m ajor-general 
in the late Victorian army, Kerr’s father, Lord Ralph Kerr, was in charge o f  
maintaining law and order there while based at the Curragh from 1891 until 1896. As 
a child Philip spent some time in Ireland and w ould have been exposed to Irish 
religious and political life. He would have certainly come into contact with the Irish 
clergy and perhaps such controversial figures as Cardinal Logue and James Lynch. 
Logue would be outspoken in the Irish national cause in later years, when Kerr was at 
Downing Street. I f  Kerr did not encounter such figures as a child then his family 
most certainly did. In addition this chapter has dem onstrated that Kerr had an interest 
in Irish affairs through such acquaintances as W ilfrid W ard and through his reading in
Philip Bull, Plunkett, Sir Horace Curzon (1854—1932)’, Oxford Dictionary o f  National Biography, 
m(Xford Universlty Press> September 2004; online edition, January 2008.
’ Philip Kerr to Lord Ralph Kerr, 29 Dec 1906, Lothian Papers GD40/17/454/62.
60
South Africa. Meanwhile Kerr began to develop an imperial philosophy and a belief 
in the need for federation as a means o f  governing the British Empire. His 
membership o f  the Kindergarten prepared him for the work he would undertake as a 
member o f  the Round Table and as the Prime M inister’s secretary; w ork that would 
have a direct impact on Ireland and her future.
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Chapter 3
The Round Table and Ireland 1910-1916
The period between 1910 and 1916 was significant for both Philip Kerr and for 
Anglo-Irish politics. For Kerr it was a time o f  high responsibility as he becam e one o f 
the founding members o f  the Round Table M ovem ent for Imperial Federation and 
editor o f  its quarterly journal. This quickly developed into a movem ent for federation 
o f the United Kingdom as well as the Empire, and for this reason Kerr was draw n into 
the debate about Ireland. During these years he would also face bouts o f  illness and a 
deep personal crisis relating to his religion. This led him to take time out from  his 
work and in the course o f  this period he drew closer to Nancy Astor, who would 
become his life long friend and confidant. M eanwhile Anglo-Irish politics went 
through an eventful period with the introduction o f  the third Home Rule Bill in 1912 
and Home Rule finally placed on the statute books in 1914, although this was 
postponed due to the outbreak o f  the First W orld War. The 1916 Easter Rebellion in 
Dublin then caused political upheaval and the British governm ent faced criticism  as a 
result o f  its swift execution o f  the rebel leaders. This chapter explores the 
development o f  Kerr’s thought on the Irish question betw een 1910 and 1916, in view 
o f  his membership o f  the Round Table and his other experiences during these years.
Kerr left South Africa and returned to Britain in June 1909 along with Lionel 
Curtis and Robert Brand. They sailed to England on the same boat as the delegates 
carrying the Bill o f  Union for South Africa to W estminster. As explained in Chapter 
2, the Kindergarten members believed that they had saved South Africa for the British 
Empire and were full o f  enthusiasm for what they m ight further achieve as a group.
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Kerr left South Africa a convinced imperialist and intended to enter politics on his 
return home. Letters he sent to his parents between 1905 and 1909 reveal that he was 
following in his fam ily’s Unionist tradition. Following the Liberal landslide in the 
1906 general election Kerr wrote to his father:
Luckily the Liberals have already done their worst about Chinese Labour, so I 
hope they will now leave South Africa and concentrate their energies on 
problems at hom e.1
After learning o f  the committee appointed to deal with the constitution for the 
Transvaal, which included H.H. Asquith and W inston Churchill, Kerr wrote:
It is the best o f  a lot o f  bad news that w e’ve heard la te ly .. .Being young and 
inexperienced I am still optimistic, and fully believe things will come right in 
the long run and that because people are liberals or socialists they are not 
necessarily knaves as well as fools.2
Later, in M ay 1907, Kerr comm ented to his father that the ‘governm ent at home seem 
to have got into a pretty good mess over the Home Rule Bill. I t’s another nail in their 
coffin’.3 Presumably he was referring to the Irish Council Bill introduced by the 
Liberal government on 7 May. The Bill provided for a scheme in which an 
administrative council would advise and assist the governm ent o f  Ireland. It was a 
similar proposal to Joseph Cham berlain’s ‘central board’ scheme o f  the 1880s.4 The
' Philip Kerr to Lord Ralph Kerr, 14 Jan 1906, Lothian Papers GD40/17/454/4.
3 PhlllP Kerr to Ford Ralph Kerr, 12 Feb 1906, Lothian Papers GD40/17/454/9.
4 PhlllP Kerr t0 Lord Ralph Kerr, 27 May 1907, Lothian Papers GD40/17/456/26.
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Irish Nationalist leaders, John Redmond, John Dillon and T.P O ’Connor, were 
opposed to the Bill. It did not make provision for direct popular elections and they 
refused to support the policy unless it could be seen as a step in the direction o f  
further reforms.5 A revised version o f  the Bill was later withdrawn by the 
government. As previously noted, K err’s father had publicly opposed G ladstone’s 
second Home Rule Bill o f  1893 and it is reasonable to suggest that Kerr was also anti- 
Home Rule at this stage in his career.
Some months before Kerr left South Africa he had arranged for his father to set the 
groundwork in securing a Unionist candidacy in Scotland. The former reported to 
Lord Ralph that ‘apparently our little schemes for go lf etc. with Arthur Balfour have 
had, and are still having effect’. He was however aware o f  the potential difficulty o f  
his religious affiliation:
I wish I could have been behind him [Balfour].. .and heard m yself discussed. I 
can well imagine the Buccleugh family weighing up the difficulties which 
would stand in the way o f  a Catholic being elected for any constituency in 
which they exerted any influence.6
Kerr consulted Simon Joseph Fraser, the Fourteenth Lord Lovat, regarding a seat in 
the Catholic districts in the north o f  Scotland. The Frasers, like the Kerrs, were also 
Catholic members o f  the Scottish peerage. Lovat had thought it was a useless quest as 
he believed all o f  the northern seats would vote solidly Liberal until the impending 
Land Act was passed. He gave Kerr some hope, however, suggesting that religion did 
not count so much in the south. Kerr told his m other that Lovat’s view ‘was that in a
5 Ibid., p. 99.
Philip Kerr to Lord Ralph Kerr, 16 Dec 1908, Lothian Papers GD40/17/457/53.
64
border constituency my name would more than counteract my relig ion’. The 
following month Kerr urged his father to visit Arthur Balfour at his home, 
Whittinghame, to ‘just remind him o f  Uncle Schomberg, and the family 
connections’.8 By M ay he was confident that he had ‘enlisted the support o f  quite a 
lot o f  people, Balfour, Curzon, W alter Long and Selbome. So things ought to be 
managed somehow’.9
Kerr had formed these career plans before leaving South Africa. On his return 
however, he became swept up in Lionel C urtis’ enthusiasm  and found him self 
following quite a different path. Their experiences in South Africa had left the 
Kindergarten convinced o f  the need for Imperial federation if  Britain was to maintain 
efficient government over all o f  her dependencies. They believed in M ilner’s vision 
of:
a group o f  states, independent o f  one another in their local affairs, but bound 
together for the defence o f  their com m on interests and the developm ent o f  a 
common civilisation, and so bound, not in an a lliance...bu t in a perm anent 
organic union10
Lionel Curtis outlined a campaign to federate the Empire. He proposed to recruit 
small groups o f  men in each dominion with a central group in London. Each would 
publish a magazine based on The State that Kerr had edited in South Africa and 
debate a statement on the imperial problem  drafted by the central group. W hen all o f
’ Philip Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 8 March 1909, Lothian Papers GD40/17/458.
 ̂ Philip Kerr to Lord Ralph Kerr, 4 April 1909, Lothian Papers GD40/17/458.
,oPhihp Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 9 May 1909, Lothian Papers GD40/17/458/26.
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the groups had agreed on some form o f  federation as the solution, then the m ovem ent 
would be publicly launched.11 The plan was adopted by a m eeting o f  Lord M ilner and 
the Kindergarten members on the Anglesey estate at Plas Newydd in W ales betw een 
the 4 and 6 September 1909. They agreed that their main objective was ‘the 
discovery o f  some form o f  federation which shall be at once effective and acceptable 
-  by comparison with disruption -  to the various D om inions’.12 An office was to be 
established in London with Kerr as the secretary, as well as editor o f  what would 
become The Round Table, the same name that the group would give to themselves.
The title itself suggests that they viewed them selves as young rom antics with a 
crusading aim.
Kerr’s parents supported his decision to abandon his plans for a parliam entary 
career to take on his Round Table responsibilities. Lord Ralph Kerr informed Philip 
that the county committee had voted for him as a candidate, presum ably for the 1910 
general election. He did not however want his son to infer from  this that either he or 
Lady Anne wanted him to accept the offer; the choice was Philip’s to make freely.
Lord Ralph Kerr counselled:
I feel that you before all things owe absolute loyalty to your present 
employers, who have a right to your whole service, and have given you a 
start...The Imperial interests for which you are working are a grand work. O f 
course the committee want to get a candidate for Parliament, but there are 
other fish in the sea .. .Let your record be one above the average for a sense o f
>2 ? t V1t P' J,lllh!ft0n’ Jr" Lothian: PhmP Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order (Westport 2006) p 19
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honour.. .Let Milner feel that he can rely absolutely on you, it will pay in the 
end.13
Kerr’s mother supported this stance and helped to persuade him against the offer o f  a 
candidacy.14 Yet there may have been another reason for his parents’ advice. The 
January election o f  1910 had produced a hung parliam ent and K err’s chances o f  a 
parliamentary seat would depend on the Conservatives, led by Arthur Balfour, 
breaking the deadlock. K err’s imperial w ork m ay thus have appeared a more secure 
option for the time being. Following the Plas Newydd m eeting Kerr and Curtis 
embarked on a fact finding tour o f  Canada, B ritain’s largest dominion, to explore the 
sentiment for closer imperial union. During meetings in January 1910, M ilner and the 
Kindergarten decided to proceed with their p lans.15
As the literature review demonstrated, John Kendle has explored the role o f  the 
Round Table and a federal solution to the Irish problem  at length in his fine w ork on 
the subject. Equally, there have been important studies o f  Irish Home Rule and the 
federalist debate in the United Kingdom between 1910 and 1914.16 Although some 
consideration o f  the Round Table will be necessary in the pages that follow, it is not 
the intention to cover the same ground here. Rather, the aim is to build on the 
excellent work already undertaken by considering K err’s personal perspective o f  
events during these years, and how this fits in to the w ider frame o f  his later w ork on 
Ireland.
As the Round Table was beginning its crusade Britain was on the verge o f  a 
constitutional crisis. This came about when House o f  Lords refused to pass the
”  Lord Ralph Kerr to Philip Kerr, 7 April 1910, Lothian Papers GD40/17/460/1
]5 Lady Anne Kerr to Philip Kerr, 8 April 1910, Lothian Papers GD40/17/460/2.
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Most notably Alvin Jackson’s Home Rule: An Irish History (London, 2004).
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‘People’s Budget’ o f  1909. As a result the Liberal Party, under H.H. Asquith, 
introduced a parliamentary bill rem oving the Lords’ veto on financial legislation and 
restricting their veto elsewhere to a two years delay. The crisis potentially threatened 
imperial welfare and therefore the Round Table members, along w ith influential 
outsiders, including F.S. Oliver, Leopold Am ery and Lord Robert Cecil, saw an 
opportunity to consider constitutional reform  o f  the United Kingdom. Again, John 
Kendle, and also Patricia Jalland, have both discussed the federalist project for the 
British Isles in detail in their respective w orks.17 The theory was that to gain m ore 
efficient administration over its dependencies abroad, Britain w ould first have to put 
her internal affairs in order. Fédéralisation o f  the United Kingdom  was thought to be 
a workable solution. The group adopted a strategy o f  trying to influence politicians 
through correspondence, and the public with the use o f  pam phlets and F.S. O liver’s 
Pacificus letters to The Times.'* As a result o f  this shift from an imperial United 
Kingdom to a federation, the group began to consider the Irish question more 
carefully as a problem that had dom inated British politics for decades.
The Round Table was not the first group, or indeed individuals, to suggest federal 
schemes for Ireland, and the federal idea m eant different things to different people. 
The prospect o f  federalism had been raised as far back as the 1840s when Sharman 
Crawford, an Ulster landlord, advocated a scheme in which Ireland would retain the 
union with Great Britain for the sake o f  w ider concerns while an Irish parliam ent 
would deal with domestic affairs. He also believed that separate parliam ents for 
England and Scotland should be included in this scheme. Like F.S. Oliver, Crawford 
was inspired by American federal principles. Daniel O ’Connell himself, the great
John Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution (Kingston, 1989); Patricia Jalland, ‘United Kingdom
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leader o f  the Repeal movement had briefly flirted with the federal idea as enthusiasm  
grew for it in the early to mid 1840s. As a devoted supporter o f  Queen Victoria, 
O ’Connell wanted an independent Ireland under the Queen; two kingdoms under one 
ruler. He also announced his ‘preference for the federative p lan’ in the ‘Derrynane 
m anifesto’ o f  October 1844.19 Yet he quickly retreated to ‘simple repeal’ following 
the outcry from his supporters and the realisation that the federal idea would alienate 
them. Alvin Jackson has noted that the vagueness o f  repeal had been a source o f  
strength, given the extent and diversity o f  the popular m ovement. He further explains 
that the “ ‘Derrynane m anifesto” highlighted the dangers involved w hen a leader 
sought to exchange the generous ambiguities o f  the national cause for a more specific
programme’.20
In the late 1870s Isaac Butt also took up the federal cause.21 Butt, a Donegal 
Protestant, had rejected O ’Connellite repeal. In maintaining the union he believed 
that Ireland could have her say in the governm ent o f  a great empire. He distinguished 
his own plan o f  federal Home Rule from repeal, claim ing that federalism  w ould offer 
Ireland an opportunity for independence w ithout breaking up the unity o f  the Em pire, 
interfering with the monarchy or endangering the rights or liberties o f  any class o f  
Irishmen.22
Butt founded the Home Government Association in M ay 1870 and in doing so 
launched the concept o f  Home Rule with its constitutional focus. The term  ‘Hom e 
Rule’ was thought to have been first used by Joseph A. Galbraith, a m em ber o f  the 
Home Government Association, in order to maximise the m ovem ent’s appeal.
Alvin Jackson, Home Rule, An Irish History 1800-2000 n 18
20 Ibid.
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Although Butt won widespread support, his achievements would be eclipsed with the 
rise o f Charles Stewart Parnell and his own campaign for Home Rule in the 1880s. 
Pamell initially won much Fenian support through tying Home Rule in w ith the land 
question, the great Irish political issue o f  the day. The 1881 Land Act, and the 
Kilmainham Treaty that effectively ended the Land War, enabled him to campaign for 
Home Rule by constitutional means. Again, like O ’Connell, Butt, and later the Round 
Table, Pamell kept his approach to Home Rule deliberately vague. Home Rule was 
many things to many different political and social groups. Alvin Jackson has written,
2 3‘in the diversity o f  the cause lay both its strength and its fragility’.
Prime M inister W.E. Gladstone’s conversion to the cause in the mid 1880s m eant 
that for a time Home Rule developed into a better defined concept. The Home Rule 
Bill o f  1886 envisaged a local assembly in Dublin that would deal w ith Ireland’s 
internal affairs while the Imperial Parliament at W estm inster would retain control o f  
foreign matters, security and taxation. Gladstone had used the Canadian m odel when 
drafting the first Home Rule Bill in 1885, although the Dublin parliam ent was to have 
more limited powers than its Canadian counterpart.24 In trying to develop a Home 
Rule scheme there remained unresolved problems, such as the question o f  taxation, 
representation and, not least, the failure to address the interests o f  Protestant Ulster. 
Gladstone’s 1886 Bill was defeated in the Commons and actually split the Liberal 
Party. His 1893 Bill was passed in the Commons on its third reading but rejected by 
the House o f  Lords. It was not until the Round Table g roup’s arrival on the British 
political scene that there had been such an organised m ovem ent for devolution o f  the 
whole United Kingdom.
^  Alvin Jackson, Home Rule, An Irish History 1800-2000, p. 11. 
Eugenio F. Biagini, Gladstone (London, 2000) p. 103.
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In exploring Kerr’s approach to the Irish question during this period it is im portant 
to contextualise the evolution o f  federal ideas for Ireland. Only then can his position 
be fully understood. Kerr was not fully convinced by the federal project for the 
United Kingdom. As the previous chapter demonstrated, his own father had been 
opposed to Gladstonian Home Rule. His prim ary goal at this tim e was imperial 
federation. He did not believe that it was necessary to federate the United Kingdom  
before imperial federation could be achieved. David B illington has discussed this 
issue in his biography o f  Kerr. He has observed that Kerr actually tried to restrain the 
Round Table’s enthusiasm for United Kingdom  devolution. In a letter to Curtis in 
1910 Kerr asked ‘Is Ireland to be a Canada or a Q uebec?’. In other words, Billington 
notes that Kerr was asking if  Ireland would have the autonom y o f  a dom inion or the 
more limited government o f  a Canadian province. Although the Round Table 
members preferred the latter, Kerr still urged caution. He posed the question: ‘what 
part, if any, has the present movement for federalising the United Kingdom  to play in 
the march to Imperial U nity?’; and answered: ‘Strictly it has none, for its ostensible 
object is to entrust the control o f  “purely Irish” affairs to  local assem blies -  even the 
Irish Nationalists only ask for this -  leaving national and imperial affairs to the 
present imperial parliam ent’. 26 It was K err’s view that the ultimate goal was im perial 
unity. Considering the practicalities o f  any devolved United Kingdom  governm ent, 
he pointed out that there would be more difficult issues in the various regions o f  
Scotland and Wales than simply administrative ones. Am ongst these, he included the 
concerns o f  churchmen in Wales regarding the control o f  the W elsh church and the 
worries o f  Scottish landowners at the possibility o f  a radical assem bly in Edinburgh.
It seems that Kerr recognised that a federal Ireland would have difficulties in
26 du-r d T  Bllllngt0n’ J r ’ Lothian: p hiUp Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order, p. 31.
P ^ err t0 Lionel Curtis, 30 Sept 1910, Lothian Papers GD40/17/2/103.
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reconciling Ulster, so other parts o f  the United Kingdom  would also have challenges 
to confront.
Despite his caution Kerr knew the history o f  Home Rule and the term inology used 
in promoting such schemes for Ireland. He recognised that the term  ‘federalism ’ 
could be problematic but it was the best option available. The problem  arose from  the 
fact that it came from the American model o f  governm ent and Kerr explained to 
Curtis that ‘under no scheme would there be a supreme court to interpret the 
constitution. The imperial parliam ent would rem ain suprem e’.27 This would be 
different from the American system. Yet Kerr believed that:
it [Federalism] is a good fighting word. [To] begin with D evolution has 
noisome associations. Home Rule all Round worse, Federalism has been a 
success everywhere and people will therefore not be inclined to fight shy o f  
the word, - a great advantage.28
He appears to have been clearer than his colleagues on what exactly the Round 
Table’s purpose was at this time. It never defined or adopted a federal plan; initially 
its main aim was to get federalism discussed at the Constitutional Conference in July- 
November 1910. Kerr had:
little hope that anything practical will come out o f  the conference.. .But 
whatever the outcome o f  the conference, I believe we shall have Federalism  
discussed next year as a possible line o f  advance. That is a trem endous gain .29
^  Philip Kerr to Lionel Curtis, 10 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers GD40/17/2/91.
Ibid.
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He thought that if  federalism was discussed as a serious option for constitutional 
reform then it was only a matter o f  time before one o f  the political parties adopted the 
policy in some form or other. At that stage, Kerr explained, that the process o f  
educating the people would begin in earnest. To have implem ented a scheme in 1910 
would have required a powerful advocate. Kerr told Curtis Only a m an o f  
Gladstonian force, or with Joe’s personality [Joseph Chamberlain] could educate the 
mass o f the people sufficiently rapidly in Federalism ’.30 In the meantime, he stated 
that ‘our business is to work out the plan in detail and test its practicability’ and 
further explained that their main aim was to ‘make people more fam iliar w ith the idea 
o f Federation, so that they will be all the more ready to swallow our gospel when it is 
published’.31 Two o f  the main criticisms made o f  the Round Table are that it failed to 
define a precise scheme o f  fédéralisation and did not educate the ordinary citizens. 
Kerr’s letter to Curtis suggests that in 1910 he was aware o f  these potential pitfalls 
and it is tempting to speculate that the project might have achieved greater success 
had he not become detached through illness in 1911-14. This will be discussed in 
further detail below.
Kerr was writing to Curtis while the latter was touring New Zealand, A ustralia and 
Canada to meet with dominion groups in order to exchange ideas. During this time 
Kerr kept him up to date on developments at home. In 1910 he told Curtis that he had 
had a long talk with Lord Grey (Albert Henry George, the Fourth Earl Grey and 
Governor-General o f  Canada) who had devised a scheme for withdrawing Am erican 
financial support from John Redmond, the Irish Parliam entary Party leader, and 
transferring it to William O ’Brien if  the latter would adopt the federal solution.32 This 
might have been no more than an attempt to split the Home Rule Party as there is
31 I b l d '
32 PhlliP Kerr t0 Lionel Curtis, 31 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers GD40/17/2.
‘ Philip Kerr to Lionel Curtis, 10 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers GD40/17/2/85.
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reason to suggest that Redmond was also considering federalism in 1910. M ichael 
W heatley has written about this, arguing that historians have tended to ignore 
Redmond’s federalist views as they would complicate the perceived position o f  Irish 
Nationalists during this period.33 Redmond gave an interview to a New York 
newspaper, commenting ‘What I mean by absolute Home Rule is a Parliam ent in 
Ireland with such control over State affairs as State Governments have over State 
affairs in America, leaving to the Imperial Parliament at W estm inster all such affairs 
as you call federal’.34 This was o f  course aimed at an Am erican audience, yet T.P. 
O ’Connor, part o f  the inner leadership o f  the Irish Parliam entary Party, made 
numerous statements in full support o f  a federal solution, suggesting that Redm ond 
had to be thinking along the same lines. In 1910 the New York Sun published an 
interview with Redmond. ‘We are strongly in favour o f  a Federal Em pire’, he was 
reported to have said, ‘and once we receive Home Rule we shall dem onstrate our 
loyalty beyond question.’35 W heatley claims that both men put forward the view that 
Home Rule should be the beginning o f  a federal process. This suggests that the 
Round Table’s ideas were not so far removed from those o f  the Home Rulers at this 
stage, and were prepared to draw on contacts to achieve the federation o f  the United 
Kingdom, including Ireland. Both Redmond and O ’Connor would also have been 
influenced by the fact that Cecil Rhodes had offered Parnell m oney to prom ote 
federation as far back as 18 8 8.36 Rhodes had wanted Irish m em bers to be retained in 
an imperial parliament as exclusion would persuade the English that Home Rule 
meant separation, and that the Irish would attempt to set up a republic. He therefore 
sought a federal system with a view to imperial federation.
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Rhodes’ interpretation was probably close to K err’s own view, considering his 
ultimate vision o f  imperial federation. Lionel Curtis was also convinced o f  the 
interconnection o f  imperial federation and federation o f  the United Kingdom. This 
followed the notion that the Empire could only maintain its strength if  British 
domestic politics were put in order. Yet Kerr was not fully convinced o f  this 
argument as he believed that no scheme o f  federation for the United Kingdom  alone 
that included England, Scotland, W ales and Ireland would have any direct bearing on 
imperial union. In his view, no matter how many powers were devolved, there would 
still be duties that a national parliament would have to perform .37 Hence, for Kerr, 
‘federalism’ was a ‘good fighting w ord’ as he believed that if  the Round Table could 
manage to get federalism discussed, then the achievement o f  imperial union could be 
the next step. In his view, these were only the early stages o f  a very long journey and 
he was fully aware o f  the difficult task ahead. The party system  in Britain made it 
particularly difficult to consider such a step due to the rigidity o f  party creeds and 
alliances. Kerr believed that when it came to Ireland the Unionists would be attracted 
to the idea o f  federation as the country would lose its over-representation and Irish 
members would soon vote Conservative. But the difficulty came in the fact that they 
could not desert Ulster; Kerr felt that it would take the 1885-95 generation to die out 
before the Unionists could seriously consider devolution. Furtherm ore he believed 
that constitutional change would not fit with the party’s ideals as the Unionists were a 
party o f constitutions and strong government. The Liberals, on the other hand, w ere 
traditionally a party o f  social change, anti-capitalism, anti-landlordism  and anti-
Philip Kerr to Lord Henry Schomberg Kerr, 22 Dec 1910 Lothian Papers GD40/17/2/162-3.
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privilege.38 It was therefore the role o f  the Round Table to use its resources to plough 
‘the hard soil so as to prepare it to receive our seed later on ’.39
Kerr was prepared to use a range o f  contacts to do this. Grey had put him  in touch 
with two individuals who could be o f  assistance. The first, Bourke Cockran, was an 
Irish-American and the head o f  Redm ond’s comm ittee in the United States. The 
second was an Anglo-Irish landlord named M oreton Frew en.40 Frewen was the uncle 
o f both W inston Churchill and Shane Leslie, and was extremely well connected on 
both sides o f  the Atlantic. His numerous financial failures and disastrous schemes 
earned him the nickname ‘M ortal R uin’ as he was frequently close to bankruptcy. 
Although both Kendle and Alfred M. Gollin have written about Frewen in the federal 
context, Alan Ward is the only historian to have explored his involvement in the Irish 
federal project in detail.41 W ard points out that Frewen’s ch ief motive in becom ing 
involved in the federalist plan was less the problem o f  Irish governm ent than the 
implications o f  Lloyd G eorge’s budget o f  1909. He saw this as an attack on the 
landed and wealthy. Kerr knew this and explained to Curtis that ‘Their great interest 
is to kill Lloyd Georgism, which they regard as an attack on property, which is certain 
to cross the Atlantic if  it becomes the accepted policy here’.42
Frewen sought funds in the United States to support a federal solution to the 
difficulties facing the United Kingdom. He joined forces w ith constitutional
Philip Kerr to Lionel Curtis, 10 Aug 1910, Lothian Papers GD40/17/2/87-89.
39 Ibid.
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nationalist, William O ’Brien, who supported a union o f  both Catholic and Protestant 
in Ireland. To this end he became a supporter o f  federalism as a means to  draw both 
sides closer together.43 Frewen managed to raise no more than £4000 in the United 
States and the flow was never sustained. Nevertheless, Kendle writes that much o f  
this was sent to O ’Brien to support his activities through his ‘All for Ireland L eague’. 
In allying him self with O ’Brien, Frewen could attempt to split the Home Rulers and 
strengthen Asquith’s hand against Redm ond’s dem ands.44 W ard writes that Frewen 
spent most o f  his time trying to secure Cockran’s support. Cockran was interested in 
federalism and also opposed to the Lloyd George budget. A lthough he did not admit 
his aims publicly, Frewen believed that he could persuade Cockran to transfer support 
to O ’Brien. Yet Cockran refused to play a role in Irish factional politics and w ould 
later support Eamon de Valera. Frewen ultimately failed in his strategy, as he never 
achieved widespread support in either the United States or the United Kingdom, and 
his attempts to organise a Federal Union League in 1913 and 1914 failed.45 His niece, 
Ruby, married Sir Edward Carson in 1914 and the same year he signed the British 
Covenant in support o f  Ulster. Frewen’s nephew, Shane Leslie, w rote that ‘M oreton 
worked to split the Irish P arty .. .He intrigued with Carson. He financed W illiam 
O ’Brien. He fought and finessed with Redmond. He was forever trying to get [John] 
Dillon thrust to the wolves’.46 Frewen eventually lost all hope o f  a peaceful solution 
following the growth o f  republicanism during the First W orld W ar and after. It is 
interesting, however, that to the Round Table he was potentially a very useful ally in 
these early attempts to promote federation.
43 John Kendle, Ireland and the Federal Solution, p. 110.
45 I b i d e m  FreWen'S An8lo_Amer'can Campaign for Federalism, 1910-21’, p.  260.
Shane Leslie, Studies in Sublime Failure (London, 1932) p. 285
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Kerr described Cockran and Frewen as ‘both rather discredited ; Cockran 
presumably because he had been the head o f  John Redm ond’s com m ittee in the 
United States, and Frewen due to his ‘unsuccessful financial proclivities’.47 
Nevertheless, he believed that Cockran, in particular, would be a useful ally. He told 
Curtis that Cockran was:
an extraordinarily clever fellow on constitutional matters. He is a most 
effective advocate, and was determined to do all he could to bring about 
federalism in the United Kingdom as a means o f  solving the Irish problem , in
48which he has been interested from youth.
Furthermore Cockran could use his experience as a senator in the United States ‘to 
prove that federalism is practicable, answering objections, and expounding its 
advantages’.49 Kerr saw the value o f  maintaining such contacts yet he warned Curtis 
that ‘We can have nothing to do with either o f  these people, but I propose to keep in 
touch with them as they have a scheme for starting a federal league to do the 
preliminary work o f  preaching’.50 In some respects this attitude anticipates K err’s 
later approach to his contacts while dealing with the Irish question between 1919 and 
1921. It will become clear that he did not always accurately assess the value o f  his 
informants. This instance nonetheless demonstrates that Kerr placed greater emphasis 
on setting the groundwork for fédéralisation.
Kerr would remain as editor o f  the Round Table journal from  1910 until he joined 
Lloyd George’s secretariat in 1916. Between 1911 and 1914, however, it was edited





by his colleagues Robert Brand, Edward Grigg and F.S. Oliver as Kerr was ill, 
suffering with severe depression and exhaustion in a variety o f  sanatoria and resorts in 
Europe. As a result there is a significant gap in the archive material during these 
years. Meanwhile the controversy raged over the third Home Rule Bill and Britain 
came to the brink o f  civil war. The Asquith government introduced the Home Rule 
Bill in April 1912 and Sir Edward Carson, the leader o f  the Irish Unionists in the 
House o f Commons, pledged to oppose it. He declared that if  U lster was to be driven 
by force then he could imagine they could use no means too strong in order to prevent 
it. To this day we do not know for certain whether or not Carson was bluffing, and 
whether the situation would have come to a head in full blown civil war. All sides 
were saved by the outbreak o f  the First W orld W ar in August 1914 when political 
leaders closed ranks in support o f  Britain’s war effort. There was, and is, a deeply 
engrained history o f  militancy being used to put pressure on the constitutional side in 
Anglo-Irish relations. It had worked in the case o f  the Irish Church Act in 1869 and 
Gladstone’s Land Acts had been the result o f  Fenian pressure. Carson, as a lawyer, 
was putting pressure on the negotiating side at W estminster, although it seems likely 
that he would have taken military action had war not broken out in 1914.
The Round Table’s role in this crisis has been described in detail by John Kendle,
while Gollin has highlighted M ilner’s support o f  U lster.51 In his biography o f  Kerr,
Billington argues that ‘it seems likely he [Kerr] shared the opposition o f  Lord M ilner
and the rest o f  the Moot to Irish autonom y’.52 Milner, like most Unionists, believed
that Irish Home Rule would lead ultimately to separation and the end o f  the Empire.
Furthermore to force Irish Protestants against their will was viewed as an attack on
democracy itself. Yet Billington argues that although Kerr was not involved in the
51John Kendle Ire land and the Federal Solution, p. 152-176; A.M. Gollin, Proconsul in Politics: A 
Study oj Lord Milner in Opposition and in Power (London, 1964) p. 172-222.
David P. Billmgton, Jr., Lothian: Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order, p. 31.
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events o f 1912-14, ‘the unfolding crisis brought to a head the movement that he had 
helped to organise and direct’.53 Lionel Curtis and Edward Grigg urged W inston 
Churchill to propose a federal solution in a speech on 12 September 1912. This 
involved dividing the United Kingdom into ten or twelve regional governm ents, 
including one for Ulster. The proposal was however attacked by Liberals and Irish 
Nationalists as a device for excluding Ulster from the United Kingdom  and neither 
took up the idea. Meanwhile F.S. Oliver renewed his own efforts to promote 
devolution and pressed for a peaceful outcome while fully supporting the Unionist 
cause. On 20 September Ulster Protestants began to sign a ‘Solemn League and 
Covenant’ pledging to resist Home Rule should it be enforced and the param ilitary 
Ulster Volunteers were formed.
The Round Table were not ready to provoke civil war, but they undoubtedly 
supported Ulster. To this end, M ilner and the members formed a plan to gain 
signatures in the United Kingdom to demand a referendum  on Home Rule. They 
received mixed support from prominent Unionists. Lord Robert Cecil refused to 
support the British Covenant arguing that a call to civil w ar was unnecessary and 
would be an affront to the rule o f  law. Austen and Neville Chamberlain also refused 
their support.54 The Unionist Party leader Andrew Bonar Law approved o f  the plan, 
along with W alter Long. The most enthusiastic Unionist m em ber o f  the Round Table 
Moot was Geoffrey Dawson, editor o f  The Times. He endorsed the Covenant and 
helped to publicise it through the paper. While his colleagues, Curtis and Brand, were 
shuttling between the two parties arguing the case for federation, Dawson thought that 
Carson had played his cards exceedingly w ell.55
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., p .  34.
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There seem to have been differences in the approach and sentiment o f  the Round 
Table group to the Ulster Crisis. Milner, for example, financed the arms that were 
bought from Germany and landed at Lame in April 1914 for the use o f  the U lster 
Volunteers.56 On the other hand, Curtis’s biographer, Deborah Lavin, writes that 
although he considered signing the Covenant for Ulster in 1912 he later came to 
believe that the Easter Rebellion o f  1916 had been the result o f  the failure to suppress 
the organisation o f  armed force in Ulster in 1912.57 In 1914 he made a last attempt, 
along with Edward Grigg and Robert Brand, to put a federal solution in place. Both 
Churchill and Lloyd George agreed to take the plan to Asquith while Curtis, Grigg 
and Brand were to approach Bonar Law, Carson and Chamberlain. The Unionist 
leaders were in agreement, although this may have been a bluff. The Prime M inister, 
however, turned it down.
Asquith had offered an amending bill before the final vote on Home Rule in the 
spring o f 1914. The bill allowed Ulster to opt out o f  Home Rule for a period o f  six 
years. Carson, however, dismissed this as merely a stay o f  execution. M eanwhile, 
Churchill warned that any illegal action in Ulster would be met with force. The 
military leaders at the Curragh Camp were instructed to prepare for deploym ent to 
Northern Ireland and, in response, most o f  the officers resigned their com m issions in 
the infamous ‘Curragh M utiny’.58 It is unfortunate that there appears to be no record 
o f Kerr’s reaction to this. Lord Ralph Kerr must surely have had contacts from his 
own time commanding the forces there and presum ably he would have had strong 
opinions about the Ulster crisis. The Home Rule Bill was passed by the Com m ons 25 
May 1914. When the House o f  Lords altered the amending Bill perm anently to
”  n T d P' Bllllngton’ J r ’ Lothian: Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order p 35 
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exclude Ulster the King sent for the Liberal, Unionist, Irish Catholic and Protestant 
leaders. Although they agreed to discuss the permanent exclusion o f  U lster they were 
deadlocked over the area to be excluded. The crisis was effectively averted when war 
broke out in Europe in August 1914 and all sides pledged their support.
As we have seen, Kerr was completely rem oved from the crisis o f  1912-14 due to 
ill health. There is no reason to suggest, however, that he would have supported 
Ulster’s actions. He may have tried, like Curtis, to persuade party leaders to 
implement an immediate federal scheme. But he had warned Curtis in 1910 that 
Ulster was not ready for federation:
As for the Unionists, 1 do not believe they could, on their own initiate, touch 
Federation today. The old guard who fought for Ulster in 1886 and 1893 are 
still in command; even if  they could be persuaded, the party could not adopt 
Federalism until Tariff Reform was out o f  the w a y .. .The Unionists, therefore, 
today have their hands tied.59
The only reference we have to the crisis in 1914 is in a letter Kerr wrote to Nancy 
Astor aboard the ‘S.S. Persia’:
I don’t know what to think about politics. I don’t like what Reuter tells us o f  
the proceedings o f  the Die-Hards. I suppose W aldorf still belongs to the gang.
I fear he worships courage too much. There’s reason and heart in politics as 
well as pluck, and if Ulster has the first and the last virtues she has not a spark
Philip Kerr to Lionel Curtis, 30 Sept 1910, Lothian Papers GD40/17/2/151.
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o f the second. They seem to want civil w ar now for its own sake and M ilner I 
suspect as a lever to compulsory service.60
This observation has not previously been identified and it appears to be the only 
evidence o f  Kerr’s reflections on the situation. It quite clearly suggests that he did not 
approve o f  U lster’s actions and doubted the reasoning behind them. He was an 
imperialist and believed in the unity o f  the Empire. As Lloyd G eorge’s secretary he 
would later recognise the need to make provision for Ulster in any Hom e Rule 
settlement. But in determining his views in 1912-14 it is not enough simply to place 
him alongside other members o f  the Round Table. He, for example, regularly 
disagreed with Lionel Curtis. O f course we do not know what news Kerr was 
receiving while he was away and how it was being reported. At sea he would have 
received only fragments o f news or none at all. In early 1912 he had written to Nancy 
Astor from the ship the S.S. Halsburg commenting that ‘I suppose you are all awaiting 
the Home Rule Bill. I haven’t the foggiest notion o f  what is going on at home, as I 
have had no letters for a m onth’.61
The biographies by Butler and Billington both explore K err’s ill health during this 
period. It is, however, through Kerr’s close relationship with Nancy A stor that we 
can best develop not only an understanding o f  his absence during these years but also 
a greater appreciation o f  him as a person. The letters that he w rote to Nancy are very 
revealing as she became his close confidante. He was also a good friend o f  her 
husband, W aldorf Astor, and would remain on close terms with the couple until his 
death, even being given the privilege o f  having his own room  in their grand home, 
Cliveden. The biographies o f  Nancy Astor are also particularly useful in this regard.
^  Philip Kerr to Nancy Astor, 12 March 1914, Nancy Astor Papers MS1416/1/4/47.
Philip Kerr to Nancy Astor, 2 Jan 1912, Nancy Astor Papers MS1416/1/4/45.
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The classic works include Christopher Sykes’ Nancy: the Life o f Lady Astor and John 
Grigg’s Nancy Astor62 Sykes refers to the fact that years o f  overw ork in South Africa 
had caused Kerr, like Robert Brand, to suffer perm anent ill health.63 Brand had a 
weak heart in any case and his workload in South Africa presum ably would have 
taken a further toll. It is certainly true that K err’s letters to his family during his 
South African years suggest that he was greatly overw orked and when he did have 
holidays they were short and long overdue. According to Sykes, he became prone to 
nervous prostration, accompanied by m inor physical disorders, which affected his 
mind. Despite this poor state o f  health, Kerr had thrown him self im m ediately into 
exhausting work for the Round Table on his return from South Africa, touring Canada 
and the United States for research purposes while editing the Round Table journal and 
contributing articles on imperial affairs.
In the summer o f  1911 Kerr underwent an operation on his nose. According to 
Butler, this was meant to relieve him from deafness, chronic colds and nervous 
disability.64 Not long after this trauma, he embarked on another lengthy tour in order 
to collect material for an article on Europe. Imm ediately after this he left for a more 
extensive tour o f  the Near East and Asia, returning through Canada and the United 
States, and finally arriving back in England at the end o f  August 1912.65 Kerr spent 
two and a half months o f  this tour in India, explaining why the Round Table papers in 
the Lothian collection for these years contain mainly volumes on Indian affairs.
While in India Kerr wrote to Brand reporting that ‘Here I am in a state o f  complete 
mental com a.. .1 suppose it’s what they call brain fag -  coming out o f  the stress o f  the
6(FdthTm Plh982^ykeS’ N m C y ’ ^  U f e  °f  L a d y  A S t ° r  (NeW Y° rk’ 19?2); J° hn Gr' g8’ N a n C y  A s t ° r
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last few w eeks’.66 Kerr visited a nerve specialist in New Y ork who diagnosed his 
nervous system as being in a state o f  chronic over-tension which was, in turn, 
upsetting his physical system. He subsequently spent five weeks in ‘D octor 
Dapper’s ’ sanatorium at Bad Kissingen, Germ any.67 Yet Kerr was not always 
completely detached from his Round Table colleagues during his illness. In January
1912 Curtis went to stay with Kerr at his family home at W oodbum , Dalkeith, while
68
the latter was convalescing from a period o f  ‘overexcitement o f  the nerves’. Kerr
wrote to Nancy saying ‘Lionel is here — bored to death, I ’m afraid — for I w on’t talk 
politics and Empire and he is bubbling over with both. I ’m taking him to indoctrinate 
Rosebery today and A.J.B. [A.J. Balfour] tom orrow’.69 Although Rosebery and 
Balfour were politically ‘dead’ by this time, Kerr tried to use his fam ily’s position to 
assist Curtis in gaining contacts for the Round Table movement.
Other than overwork, Both Butler and Sykes have pointed to the fact that there 
were additional factors affecting K err’s health during this time. His religious beliefs 
have already been discussed at length in Chapter 2. It was during these early years o f  
the Round Table that he suffered a crisis o f  faith. He had also fallen in love w ith the 
daughter o f an Anglican aristocratic family, Lady Beatrice Cecil, soon after his return 
from South Africa.70 This in itself meant a crisis o f  religion, as a marriage to a 
Roman Catholic would have been viewed as a calamity o f  a sacrilegious kind for such 
an Anglican family, or indeed it might have meant comprom ising K err’s own faith 
and alienating his family in the process.71 It seems that he turned to Nancy Astor for 
counsel and consolation. Indeed the letters that he wrote to her in late 1911 show him
66 Ibid., p. 49.
67 Ibid., p. 50.
Philip Kerr to Nancy Astor, 2 Jan 1912, Nancy Astor Papers MS1416/1/4/45
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pouring out his heart, saying that only she and Lionel Curtis knew o f  the situation.7'  
Following his return to England in August 1912 the relationship with Cecil ended.
The distress o f this only heightened the poor state o f  his health. It would be alm ost 
another two years before he was in a fit enough state to return to work.
In January 1913 Kerr accompanied the Astors to St. M oritz for a period o f  
extended rest on the recommendation o f  Sir Bertrand Dawson, later in the year 
travelling to India, also on Dawson’s advice, in order to avoid the harsh English 
winter.73 He did not return until M arch 1914 and it seems that he was no better; if  
anything he was worse. Sykes has recounted how, while staying w ith the Astors in 
April, Kerr became violently ill, experiencing excruciating internal pain; he was 
suffering with acute appendicitis. The doctors found that an immediate operation was 
needed and, as Sykes has noted, appendix operations were a fairly recent innovation 
at that time and the danger o f  death in such a case was high. Follow ing a successful 
procedure, Kerr remained at the A stors’ home for the duration o f  his convalescence.
It was during this time that he read Science and Health with Key to the Scriptures by 
Mary Baker Eddy. From 1914 onwards he would become more and m ore convinced 
by Christian Science and a follower o f  its teachings.
While recuperating from his operation The Times printed a piece entitled ‘Parnell’s 
Love Story’, referring to the Irish leader’s relationship with Katherine O ’Shea.74 The 
article was accompanied by the serialisation o f  the book written by O ’Shea, Parnell’s 
widow, with extracts o f  his love letters to her. The Times had been a bitter enemy o f  
Parnell in his day. Kerr wrote to Nancy Astor asking ‘Did you read Parnell’s letters 
in the Times today? He must have been an extraordinary man and she an
^  Philip Kerr to Nancy Astor, 8 Dec 1911, Nancy Astor Papers MS 1416/1/4/45
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extraordinary beast.’75 Although he was not complim entary towards O ’Shea, he 
appears to have admired Parnell, commenting that there was ‘a fine courage about 
him’. He ended by noting that he would like to read a good life o f  Parnell but there 
was not one. This in fact reveals a great deal about Kerr. An excellent biography o f  
Pamell did exist in Richard Barry O ’Brien’s The Life o f Charles Stewart Parnell 
1846-1891,76 Kerr would have almost certainly have known about it as O ’Brien was 
a journalist and author who published extensively. There are two possible reasons 
why he thought a ‘good life o f  Parnell’ was not available. Either he thought that an 
Irish ‘peasant’ could not write a good biography, or he may have wanted to read m ore 
about the divorce scandal. O ’Brien omitted any discussion o f  Parnell’s private life. 
Either way, this suggests that Kerr appreciated the romance surrounding such 
passionate political figures.
Kerr returned to work in the autumn o f  1914 and became preoccupied with editing 
the Round Table as a vital part o f  the war effort. For the rem ainder o f  1914, and 
throughout 1915, the lull attention o f  its members would be focused on the conflict. 
Kerr’s brother, David, had joined the Royal Scots and was killed in action in October. 
A grieving Kerr was determined that David’s death should not have been in vain and 
focused his attention on convincing the Round Table readers that the Empire had to 
defeat the German threat. It was not until 1916 that Ireland would once more become 
the centre o f attention. Kerr analysed the events that took place there in an article 
written for his journal and therefore we have a very clear idea o f  his thoughts on 
Ireland and the history o f  the Anglo-Irish relationship written only months before his 
appointment to Lloyd G eorge’s secretariat.
76 phln P Ke^ t0 Nancy Astor’ 19 May 191A Nancy Astor Papers MS 1416/1/4/47.
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As the British forces were facing their worst year o f  slaughter on the western front 
in 1916, an event took place in Dublin that would forever change the shape o f  Irish 
history and the Irish political scene. On 23 April, Easter Sunday, about 1,000 
volunteers, and just over 200 members o f  the Irish Volunteers and Citizen Army, 
seized the General Post Office and other sites in Dublin. A proclam ation w as read in 
the name o f the Provisional Government o f  the Irish Republic and fighting continued 
with crown forces until 29 April with much devastation brought to the city centre. 
Supporting actions also took place in W exford, Galway and County Dublin, and an 
attempted mobilisation occured in Cork. In Dublin, 64 insurgents were killed, along 
with 132 crown forces and around 230 civilians. The governm ent’s harsh reaction to 
the rebellion has been blamed for the sympathy that the rebels received, and indeed 
continue to receive, as they gained martyr status following the rising. The Easter 
Rising has been covered extensively by historians and the m ythology surrounding the 
rebels has continued to capture the imagination o f  subsequent generations.77 W hat is 
relevant to this study, and is largely uncovered ground, is K err’s reaction to this 
episode.
Following the rising Kerr made a trip to Ireland in June 1916 in order to research 
the article he was to write for the September edition o f  the Round Table. This visit 
does not appear to have been well documented by his biographers. Kerr stayed with 
Sir Horace Plunkett at his home near Dublin and while there he also met George W. 
Russell. As previously discussed, he had read works by both men during his tim e in 
South Africa, and would later correspond with both on Irish affairs while acting as 
Lloyd George’s secretary. It is possible to get a sense o f  K err’s views on Ireland at 
this time from the letters that he wrote to Nancy Astor and to his m other while staying
Most notably by Charles Townshend in his work Easter 1916: The Irish Rebellion (London, 2006).
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with Plunkett. He seems to have approached the situation in a very detached way and 
certainly did not feel passionate about the position in Ireland. Kerr described going 
into Dublin to look at the aftermath o f  the rising. In a letter to Astor he noted that 
‘Sackville Street is certainly pretty bad -  whole blocks blown up or burned down.
78Then I came back to lunch and played golf with Sir H orace’.
As the rising took place two months earlier, it is possible that his initial reaction on 
hearing o f it may have been quite different to the attitude that comes across in these 
letters written from Ireland. In June the state o f  hysteria that would have taken hold 
only months before had evaporated. Kerr nevertheless observed that Ireland was 
greatly troubled and he believed that it was mostly hatred that was at the bottom  o f  the 
trouble: everyone seemed to hate somebody else.79 Following the rising, Prime 
Minister Asquith had commissioned Lloyd George to negotiate with the Irish parties 
and attempt to strike a deal on the basis o f  a six-county exclusion o f  U lster.80 In a 
later letter to Nancy, Kerr explained that everybody was opposed to Lloyd G eorge’s 
proposals and he could not see how they could be carried. He opined that ‘I think 
they are bad in themselves, and only tolerable as the stepping stone to eventual unity. 
But it does not look as if  they could even be that’.81 W hat is particularly interesting 
here is the fact that Lloyd G eorge’s proposals were not so far rem oved from the 
proposals o f  the Government o f  Ireland Bill that Kerr would work on in 1919-20. 
Indeed, he would spend the years 1919-21 defending the Government o f  Ireland Bill 
as the best possible solution that the government could offer under the circumstances, 
and hoped that the proposals would indeed lead to eventual unity.
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Like many at the time Kerr appears to have found the Irish situation confusing and
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believed that it was no use writing about it as ultimately it would do no good. 
Corresponding with his mother, he explained that ‘Ireland is a difficult place to get 
hold of. I ’m not much wiser now than when I arrived, only slightly more confused. I 
don’t know whether I shall be able to write anything useful’.83 He went further in 
another letter a few days later, stating ‘Fortunately it’s Ireland’s relations to the 
outside world with which I ’m concerned. I should never get to understand the
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devious workings o f the Irish mind, so far as its internal politics are concerned’.
This goes some way to explaining K err’s stance in 1916. His prim ary concern was 
with Ireland’s place in relation to the British Empire. He had no real interest in trying 
to understand its internal politics. He does not appear to have been anti-Irish, just 
somewhat detached from Irish domestic affairs. This may have been rooted in his 
father’s earlier position there, effectively policing the country through his role at the 
Curragh Camp. Nevertheless, Kerr described Ireland as a lovely country and felt that 
it had been good for him to get out o f  ‘the war laden atmosphere o f  London’ as 
Ireland seemed to be hardly concerned with the w ar.86 He had also enjoyed the 
company o f  George W. Russell (TE) while staying at the home o f  Plunkett, describing 
him as a ‘delightful creature -  with a most loving heart’.86 This trip certainly assisted 
him in making connections with figures such as Plunkett and Russell who were 
located within the Irish political spectrum. He would be able to draw on these 
contacts while subsequently working for Lloyd George at Downing Street.
One final point o f  interest relating to Kerr’s trip to Dublin involves his visit to a 
Christian Science church during his stay. Before leaving for Ireland he w rote to
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Nancy Astor saying that he wanted to meet more Christian Scientists and that he 
would try to do so in Dublin as there was such a church there. He added that it would
87
be interesting to find out what the local Christian Science view o f  the rebellion was.
It is disappointing that there is no record o f  whether Kerr actually did discover this as 
it would have added a fascinating dimension to our understanding o f  his own views 
and o f  the various Irish reactions to the rebellion. He did however respond very 
positively to the Christian Scientists he met, commenting that they were ‘very friendly 
and kind’.88 Considering his reactions to these people it is perhaps possible to suggest 
that he was not so much anti-Irish but unsympathetic towards Irish-Catholics. He 
certainly admired figures such as Parnell and responded favourably to individuals 
such as Russell. It can be contended that his more negative comments, such as ‘the 
devious workings o f  the Irish m ind’, were directed more towards the Catholic masses 
or the nationalist agitation in general. This will be explored further in Chapter 7. 
Following his visit to Dublin Kerr went to Belfast in order to compare reactions to the 
Easter Rising there. It is unfortunate that there are no letters describing his findings or 
impressions o f  people in the north.
Despite his confusion regarding the Irish situation, Kerr tried to make some sense 
o f the rising in his article and to put the events into perspective.89 It was printed in 
the September edition o f  the Round Table and essentially aim ed to place the rebellion 
within the context o f Anglo-Irish history. Kerr suggested that initially people were 
shocked by the rising but, with no coherent narrative o f  its significance, attention 
quickly returned to the war. British and Irish troops were being slaughtered on the 
Western Front in 1916 and many Irish families had fathers, sons and brothers 
involved in the fighting. As a result, there was not a great deal o f  sym pathy for the
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rebels or any real understanding o f  their motives. Kerr admitted that it was the 
government’s policy that turned public attention back to events in Ireland and sparked 
sympathy for the insurgents. He wrote that it was the ‘steady trickle o f  executions’ in 
the aftermath that had caused ‘a violent revulsion o f  feeling.. .as it appeared that the 
British government was taking revenge for a political rising o f  no great im portance’.9 
Kerr briefly mentioned Lloyd G eorge’s failed attempt to negotiate a deal and argued 
that there was much in the previous months that had been ‘obscure’ and ‘much that 
has revived passions too long fed on memories o f  a tragic p as t’. He intended to tell 
the story ‘accurately’ and ‘in perspective’. In so doing his intention was to ‘recall 
attention to the permanent and unchangeable facts which must govern a settlem ent’.91
Following his trip to Dublin, Kerr had come to realise that the rebellion was m ulti­
layered and not simply the result o f  surface tensions. He recognised that there were 
obscurities in the events themselves and misunderstandings on both sides that were 
deeply rooted in the history o f  the islands. This may have reflected the opinions o f  
Plunkett and Russell. Kerr argued that unless these m isunderstandings were rem oved 
then hostilities would be continuously renewed. He thus attempted to bring 
perspective to the events o f  the past by examining the history o f  the relationship 
between the two islands. Two main points arose from his analysis and were, in his 
opinion, the root causes o f  tensions. The first was the fact that Britain and Ireland 
were inseparably interrelated. He insisted that the very basic fact o f  geography meant 
that this was unavoidable. Secondly he argued that the Irish were far behind Britain 
in terms o f  civilisation. His account here is perhaps somewhat patronising. There is 
evidence to suggest that Kerr did not consider the Irish as equals and believed in
90 Ibid., p .  614.
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national stereotypes. In a letter to F.S. Oliver in 1915 he gave a less than 
complimentary description o f a man named Sheridan, who he described as:
an Irishman and has the characteristic qualities o f  an Irishman. He is rather
lacking in responsibility I should say, but is a decent fellow on the whole. He
is o f no importance politically in the Transvaal nor is he ever likely to become
92so.
Kerr blamed Ireland’s ‘backward condition’ on the failure o f  earlier conquests by 
the Normans, and subsequent rulers, to establish proper government in Ireland. He 
wrote that Henry II had difficulty establishing England and Ireland as one kingdom  
due to the tribal system in the latter country. This may have reflected the thought o f  
Lionel Curtis, as Kerr quoted from his Commonwealth o f Nations when defining 
tribalism:
The tribe is an embryonic state limited by the fact that its essential bond o f  
blood relation arrests its development at the point beyond which its members 
cease to be sensible o f  their kinship.93
Although he maintained that the kings o f  England had done the right thing in unifying 
the two kingdoms in Tudor times, Kerr was nevertheless sympathetic to the 
subsequent plight o f the Irish people. Describing the Protestant plantations under 
Cromwell and the penal laws o f  the eighteenth century, and possibly with his own 
Catholic heritage in mind, he wrote that:
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Ireland passed through a vale o f  tears to a condition in which her people were 
artificially depressed by a strong government in the interests o f  Protestantism
94and o f the Protestant mmority.
Despite this Kerr defended the actions o f  W illiam Pitt following the rebellion o f  1798, 
asserting that the Act o f  Union was the only course to adopt. He stated that the ideal 
o f separation was not only suicidal but impossible because:
if  the British people are still to be responsible for the unity, good governm ent 
and safety o f  the Empire as a whole, they can never allow that Irish harbours 
and ports should be liable to be used as the bases for foreign fleets.93
This would be a factor that would concern Kerr for the rem ainder o f  his career.
During 1919-21 he would be emphatic in stating that for security purposes Britain 
could never allow Ireland control o f  her own defence. He would insist that no m atter 
what deal was struck Britain must be allowed to maintain military bases in Ireland. 
With this proviso, he argued that the union had two key merits: the first that it made 
Catholic emancipation possible, and the second that it ensured Ireland was no longer a 
dependency and came to occupy the same status as England, Scotland or Wales.
In discussing the history o f the Home Rule movement Kerr recognised that the 
union had failed to undermine ‘the persistent consciousness in the Irish m ajority that 
they are a separate nationality’.96 He did not provide a detailed history o f  the so- 
called ‘persistent consciousness’; rather he explained that up until 1870 this had been
[Philip Kerr] ‘Ireland and the Empire’, p. 621
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concerned with the repeal o f  the union, and from 1870 ‘nationalism  solidified into its 
present shape o f  the demand for Home Rule’. This is o f  course a very simplistic 
view. Kerr explained however that the movement was not an attempt to reverse the 
union settlement. Instead he saw it as the acceptance that the comm on affairs o f  the 
United Kingdom should be handled by a common parliament, and a demand for a 
separate Irish parliament to handle national affairs. Not surprisingly Kerr defined this 
as fundamentally ‘the principle o f  federation’. He refrained from apportioning blame 
for the 1912-14 Ulster crisis, although he did emphasise his belief that a m inority 
never has the right to resist the law in a democratic system. Instead he attacked the 
abolition o f the Lords’ veto and appeared to blame this for U lster’s situation. This is 
the only explicit evidence we have o f  K err’s thought regarding the Third Hom e Rule 
Bill crisis. Although he sympathised with Ulster he was opposed to the threat o f  civil 
war. His point with regard to the Lords’ veto may have been with his own fam ily in 
mind: both the Marquess o f  Lothian and the Duke o f  Norfolk would have had the 
right to sit in the Lords as peers o f the realm. Yet he argued that there was a need for 
an independent separate chamber constituted on different principles from  the lower 
house and that a written constitution could only be altered by a special procedure with 
direct reference to the electorate. Ultimately, he blamed the ‘defects’ o f  the 
constitution for the gravity o f  the crisis and recognised that the position had only 
narrowly been saved by the outbreak o f  war in Europe.
Kerr began his section entitled ‘The Sinn Fein Rebellion’ by contrasting his praise 
for John Redmond’s support for the war with the ‘elements in Ireland that were blind 
to these larger hopes’. He divided these elements into three groups, starting with the 
‘Sinn Feiners’. Kerr presented Sinn Fein as a product o f  the Gaelic League.
Plunkett’s influence was evident when he wrote ‘o f which [the Gaelic League] the
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most remarkable fruit has been the co-operative movement and the Irish Agricultural 
Organisation society’.97 He presented Sinn Fein as an insignificant force before the 
war, originally ‘a protest against the continuous intriguing about Irish affairs at
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Westminster, and the continuous financing o f  Irish politics from A m erica’. Ken- 
blamed the Irish Volunteers for the militarization o f  the organisation, although he 
contended that the name, ‘Ourselves A lone’, demonstrated a failure to grasp the 
fundamentals o f  the Irish problem and a predisposition to methods o f  violence. K en  
pointed out that the Volunteers were originally formed in response to U lster’s reaction 
to the Home Rule Bill in 1912. This was in line with Lionel C urtis’ argum ent that the 
Easter Rebellion was the result o f  the governm ent’s failure to suppress Ulster 
militarism. However, he accused Sinn Fein o f  being forgetful o f  Ulster and by the 
fact that a Home Rule Act was on the statute book. Again, this anticipates the attitude 
that K en  would adopt in 1919-21 as Sinn Fein grew in strength.
K en devoted little space to the second group he defined -  the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood (IRB). He described the group as the descendants o f  the Fenians and a 
very small band, almost entirely animated by a passionate hatred o f  England. The 
IRB, he explained, probably formed a link between Germany and the revolutionaries 
and provided a channel for the organisation and arming o f  the Volunteers from 
German and Irish-American sources. Although Kerr was writing only a few months 
after the rising, when information was still unclear, his research appears to have been 
thorough.
The third ‘elem ent’ in the rising, and the one that troubled Kerr the most, was the 
Citizen Army under James Connolly. The reason for this was Connolly’s socialism .99
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Kerr argued that it was the most important element o f  all because it was concerned 
with a social and economic rather than a political revolution’. 100 He was careful to 
point out that ‘Its genesis was not political idealism but, revolt at a state o f  affairs in 
the Dublin slum s’.101 He referred to Connolly’s goal, and that o f  the Citizen Army, as 
mainly a syndicalist revolution. He would say more about his opposition to socialism 
during his later career, but it is interesting to note his reaction to it in relation to the 
rising. Butler writes that ‘Highly as he venerated the state as the guardian o f  peace 
and justice... he dreaded its effect on individual initiative and enterprise should it 
proceed to own and manage industrial concerns’.102 In the afterm ath o f  the war, Kerr 
would be particularly alarmed by the Bolshevik revolution in Russia.
We should remember that Kerr’s brother had been killed in the w ar and he fiercely 
defended its conduct. He would thus have viewed the Easter Rising as a serious 
distraction from the conflict. The article duly described how the rebels were 
denounced by Redmond and how the British troops were ‘eagerly awaited and 
joyfully welcomed by the majority o f  the Dublin people, who fed and assisted them  in 
every way’.103 Kerr therefore maintained that it was the policy o f  daily executions 
and stories o f  brutality under martial law that generated sympathy for the rebels from  
the Irish public and horrified the world. Yet, presumably with Connolly in mind, Ken- 
argued that Ireland had never been so prosperous and that the governm ent’s duty was 
to restore law and order.
Kerr suggested that the anti-English reaction was inevitable in light o f  the history 
o f Irish wrongs’ and the executions were viewed as the vengeance o f  English rulers 
on those who had dared to challenge their domination. On the other hand, he
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described the English view o f  the rebels as traitors, not only to the Empire but also to 
the Allies when a measure o f  Home Rule was in fact on the statute books. It is 
possible that Kerr was consciously writing this as a Scotsman, judging by his 
references to the ‘Irish’ and the ‘English’. No doubt he was aligned with the 
‘English’ point o f view, but he seems to have been trying to distance himself. He 
referred a few ‘hotheads’ undoing ‘the new union which the common heroism  o f  
Irishmen, Scotsmen, W elshmen and Englishmen was cementing on the battlefields o f  
Europe’.104 As for Lloyd G eorge’s settlement attempts, he argued that ‘W hat really 
killed it was the violent hostility in Ireland to the idea o f  partition’. 105 He believed 
that negotiations had laid bare the essentials o f  the situation as it had become clear 
that Ireland contained ‘not one nation, but tw o’ and that the six counties o f  U lster 
could not be coerced.106
With hindsight, his analysis o f  Sinn Fein is particularly interesting. The Sinn Fein 
rebellion had, Kerr thought, brought the desire for absolute independence out into the 
open and forced it to show its strength:
That is a great gain, for its strength is more apparent than real, and once the 
case for separation is argued openly and on its true merits, as it must be argued 
now between Nationalists and Sinn Feiners, it will fail in the minds o f  all 
reasonable men through its own inherent w eakness.107
Yet his pre-occupation with the socialist side o f  the rebellion may have contributed to 
his underestimating the importance o f  the Sinn Fein element. He cannot be blamed
[Philip Kerr] ‘Ireland and the Empire’, p. 644.
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for this as it was not the well organised political machine in 1916 that it would later 
become. As Michael Laffan has argued in his excellent work, people joined Sinn Fein 
in their tens o f thousands because they were attracted by its romantic image, and 
because their Anglophobia surfaced after the Easter Rising and during the 
conscription crisis. Indeed, he has described how there was a tendency after the rising
for Sinn Fein spokesmen to communicate in terms o f  spiritual nationalism; using the
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language o f a cult rather than a political party.
Kerr did not come up with a detailed set o f  proposals to solve the problem. He did 
conclude that no form o f  Home Rule by itself could be final as it would involve the 
retention o f Irish members in a legislative dealing with the affairs o f  Great Britain.
This was the same argument used by Cecil Rhodes to Parnell, as explained above.
Kerr argued that any Home Rule Act must lead to some form o f  federation, either for 
the United Kingdom or for the Empire, stating ‘The principle o f  federation, indeed, is 
the key to the solution o f  the problem ’. By using the examples o f  Am erica, Canada 
and Australia, he strengthened his point, contending that almost every federal 
constitution in the world was an attempt to get rid o f  perennial strife by granting 
separate states or nationalities the control o f  their own affairs. It would be unfair to 
argue that Kerr was out o f  touch because from 1916 onwards there would be a rise in 
separatist feeling in Ireland. Like many people at the time he could not have foreseen 
that the rise o f Sinn Fein would render a federal solution impossible.
As a result o f  his years working in South Africa, Philip Kerr had played an integral 
role in forming the United Kingdom ’s first organised pressure group for federalism. 
Although the Round Table s main goal was imperial federation, it became apparent 
that proposals for a federated United Kingdom could potentially provide a solution to
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the Irish problem. Kerr’s caution suggests that he understood the potential difficulty 
in converting Unionists. His long-term aim was political education in the hope that a 
party would eventually take it up. But he and his colleagues could not have predicted 
the fallout from the Third Home Rule Bill and the subsequent Ulster crisis. Despite 
Kerr’s removal from the political scene at this time, it is likely that he would have 
argued against coercion o f  Ulster but at the same time opposed her armed resistance. 
His visit to Ireland in the aftermath o f  the 1916 rising, and the article that he 
subsequently wrote, puts an interesting slant on his later work on an Irish settlement. 
He seems to have been more concerned by James Connolly’s attempt at a social 
revolution than the rebels associated with the Sinn Fein movement. Possibly as a 
result o f  his father’s position in Ireland during his childhood, he always m aintained 
the belief that Ireland was, in the final analysis, a member o f  the British Empire. He 
came to believe that a federal measure o f  self-government would pacify what he 
perceived to be centuries o f  ‘Irish w rongs’ by the English government. This is the 





In December 1916 Kerr was appointed to Lloyd G eorge’s wartime adm inistration 
as secretary for the colonies and foreign affairs. He took up his post in early 1917, 
arguably beginning the most interesting phase o f  his career. Kerr would w ork closely 
with Lloyd George until 1921 and during this period he would take on a variety o f  
roles, including those o f  advisor, draftsman and the Prime M inister’s representative. 
His work on Irish policy while at Downing Street is the focal point o f  this study and 
this chapter aims to explore Kerr’s attitude to Ireland as a member o f  the secretariat 
during the early years o f  his service to Lloyd George. The government were still 
grappling with Irish policy between 1917 and 1918. Lloyd George was a new Prime 
Minister with a strongly Tory, wartime coalition government. There was constant 
pressure from Irish Nationalists to implement immediate Home Rule while Unionists 
strongly opposed the measure. Although Ireland was not one o f  K err’s immediate 
concerns as a member o f  the Prime M inister’s secretariat, he did address the situation 
through the drafting o f  memoranda and through his support for extending conscription 
to Ireland. These will be discussed, along with his relationship with the Prime 
Minister. Consideration o f  the years 1917-18 provide an insight into K err’s attitude to 
the Irish question before his closer involvement with the issue between 1919 and 
1921.
Kerr had experienced a difficult few years prior to 1916, due to his intense w ork 
for the Round Table, ill health and personal crisis, as described in Chapter 3.
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Following the death o f  his younger brother, David, in 1914 his desire was to go into 
the army. Kerr’s parents, however, were understandably set against the idea. His 
colleagues also believed that his service to the Round Table was more important to 
the war effort. When Kerr was called up following the introduction o f  conscription in 
1916, Lionel Curtis and other Round Table members persuaded the tribunal to exempt 
him. Although Kerr was uneasy about this, the Round Table reached the height o f  its 
circulation during his wartime editorship. K err’s friends and family were however 
clearly concerned about his desire to enlist. Lord Selbome wrote to Philip’s m other in 
July 1916 explaining that:
we quite understand his position, his natural feelings, and the danger o f  the 
misunderstanding o f  the ignorant.. .I f  it is m ilitary service and military service 
only which will satisfy him, then I don’t think that Curtis or any o f  us should 
continue to stand in his w ay .1
Selbome recognised that editing the Round Table was not stretching or satisfying 
Kerr. He reassured Lady Anne that ‘I will do my best to find him some war w ork at 
home, worthy o f his pow ers’.2
Things fell into place for Kerr when in 1916 Lloyd George became Prime M inister
following the fall o f  the Asquith government, and asked Lord M ilner to jo in  his W ar
Cabinet. Milner suggested Kerr to Lloyd George as a possible m em ber o f  his wartime
administration. Kerr’s Round Table colleagues would no doubt have been delighted
to have one o f their own members so close to the political centre. M ilner com m ented
to a friend in February 1917 that ‘our friend P.K. has a great chance o f  making
^Sdbourne to Lady Anne Kerr, 30 July 1915, quoted in J.R.M. Butler, L o rd  Lothian  (London, 1960) p.
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himself heard throughout the Em pire’.3 He would indeed potentially have a great 
influence over the Prime M inister during his years working at Downing Street. Ken- 
joined Lloyd G eorge’s secretariat in January 1917. The secretariat became known as 
the ‘Garden Suburb’ in reference to its tem porary offices in the Downing Street 
garden. John Turner explains that the Garden Suburb was to be responsible for 
maintaining contact between the Prime M inister and the departments o f  governm ent, 
and for writing reports on matters o f  special concern. He defines it as prim arily an 
administrative intelligence department for Lloyd George that was disbanded at the 
end o f the war.4 Under the original plan Kerr was to be in charge o f  labour matters. 
However in a later scheme it was decided that he would deal with foreign and colonial 
questions.5 On the establishment o f  the ‘Garden Suburb’ in early 1917, The Times 
explained that the secretaries had been enlisted for special work under ‘the immediate 
eye’ o f the Prime M inister but noted that ‘It is not, o f  course, intended that they 
should have executive power or that their appointment should affect in any w ay the 
position o f the regular Civil Service’.6
The Garden Suburb was controversial as it was accused o f  being a ‘Fabian-Like 
Milnerite Penetration’ and, in effect, an extension o f  the Kindergarten that had 
surrounded Milner in South Africa.7 Turner argues that this was not the case and, in 
reality, it was more like a cohort o f  W elshmen. Regardless, the accusation reveals the 
concern that contemporaries felt regarding the potential influence that this group
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could have over the Prime Minister. Turner quotes H.W. M assingham, writing in The 
Nation in February 1917:
A little body o f illuminati, whose residence is in the Prime M inister’s garden, 
and their business to cultivate the Prime M inister’s m ind ...T hey  are rather a 
class o f travelling empirics in Empire, who came in with Lord M ilner... Their 
function is to emerge from their huts in Downing Street, like the competitors 
in a Chinese examination, with answers to our thousand questions o f  the 
Sphinx.8
This is a bitter statement and it is obvious that there were objections to this secretariat 
experiment. In the same article M assingham attacked Kerr, in particular, calling him 
‘Narcissus...rapidly assimilating the popular ideas o f  his day, and presenting them  to 
his chief, as it were, in concentrated pellets’.9 The motive for the personal attack on 
Kerr can be explained by a number o f  factors. He was young, aristocratic, attractive 
and a well-connected individual closely associated with certain ideas about empire. 
Indeed the Round Table was an elite group o f  intellectual young men who viewed 
themselves as crusaders for their cause, hence the association with the myth o f  
‘Camelot’. Aside from his personal attributes and associations, Kerr was also widely 
regarded as being the closest advisor to Lloyd George, and would subsequently be 
kept on as the Prime M inister’s private secretary when the secretariat disbanded. 
Thomas Jones, Lloyd G eorge’s chief W elsh aide, noted that ‘Adams, e.g. he rarely 
sees, Kerr much oftener, Astor som etim es’, suggesting that Kerr did have the
® Ibid., p .  165.
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potential to hold the greatest English (or arguably Scottish) influence over Lloyd 
George, if indeed that was possible.
Kerr very quickly became absorbed into the social circles connected to Downing 
Street. He was a member o f  the Travellers’ Club, and the Athenaeum  Club, an 
intellectual harbour closely linked to Lloyd G eorge’s associates. Through being part 
o f these networks Kerr would come into regular contact with notable figures 
associated with Ireland. When working on the Government o f  Ireland Bill betw een 
1919 and 1920 Kerr for example asked the Protestant Nationalist, and former 
Redmondite M.P., Stephen Gwynn, to dine with him  at the Travellers’ Club to discuss 
Irish affairs.10 Kerr also spent a good deal o f  time at Cliveden, the home o f  the 
Astors, during this period. This explains the lack o f  letters written to Nancy A stor 
while Kerr was at Downing Street. Not only would he see her regularly at weekends, 
but he also would have seen her husband and his close friend, W aldorf Astor, who 
also worked for Lloyd George, on a daily basis. The Astors would continue to host 
grand dinners at Cliveden to which leading politicians, writers and intellectuals o f  the 
day would be invited and current affairs discussed and debated. Kerr often invited 
guests from Westminster. In his diary, Thomas Jones comm ented on his first 
impression o f  Nancy Astor, after having visited Cliveden for the first time:
She is one o f the most ‘vital’ women I have ever met. Kerr had prepared me 
for a wonderful woman. I can convey no idea o f  her pervasive 
personality.. .You feel she has a golden heart and I can understand what a 
mothering influence she has been to the young knights o f  the Round Table.11
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But not every guest shared this view. W inston Churchill and Nancy Astor for 
instance were acrimonious friends, and there were frequent heated conversations
during his visits to Cliveden.12
Kerr’s connection with the Astors, and his regular visits to Cliveden, points to the 
people that he would have mixed with on a regular basis outside his working hours. 
Undoubtedly Irish affairs would have been discussed frequently at Cliveden as many 
o f the guests were, or had been, involved with the issue in some way. Edward Carson 
was one such individual, along with Arthur Balfour. Although Kerr had come into 
contact with many o f these figures before he joined Lloyd G eorge’s service, he was 
now moving in high circles. It is little wonder therefore that his influential and well 
connected position was noted, and perhaps resented, by some at the time.
As noted above, John Turner has assessed the role o f  the Garden Suburb, exploring 
what he describes as ‘the curious and neglected world where politics and 
administration intersect’.13 Yet he does not fully explore Kerr’s involvement with 
Ireland as a member o f  this secretariat. This is because m ost o f  the work relating to 
Ireland was carried out by W.A.S. Adams, a former lecturer in political science at 
Oxford, who had served in the Irish Department o f  Agriculture and Technical 
Instruction.14 Like Kerr, Adams was a Scot and initially they held similar views. 
Although sympathetic to Home Rule Adams was in favour o f  a federalist solution to 
the Irish problem. But he differed from Kerr over the proposal to extend wartime 
conscription to Ireland. Kerr supported the idea, while Adams opposed it. (This will 
be discussed further below). It is unfortunate that there appears to be no existing 
correspondence between Kerr and Adams during this period, but this is no doubt
13 Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set, Portrait o f  an Exclusive F ra tern ity  (London, 2001) p. 38.
|4 1°hn Turner, L loyd  G eorge's Secretariat p. 1.
John Turner and Michael Dockrill in John Turner (ed.), The L arger Idea, L o rd  Lothian a n d  the  
rrob lem  oj N ational Sovereignty  (London, 1988) p. 36.
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explained by the fact that they would have been working in close proxim ity in the 
purpose-built offices in the Downing Street garden. However it is clear that most o f  
the Irish work was probably carried out by Adams between 1917 and 1918 and so 
Kerr would have been more in the background at this time in relation to Ireland.
Some brief discussion o f  Lloyd George and Ireland is necessary before any further 
exploration o f Kerr’s work and views. As the literature review dem onstrated, the 
subject has been discussed at length by historians. It is not the purpose therefore to 
cover the same ground here but to briefly consider Lloyd G eorge’s connection with 
the issue. It would be an understatement to say that the Prime M inister was a major 
player in Anglo-Irish politics during his premiership. Indeed he was a m ajor player in 
everything that he was involved in. Historically, he has gained renown as a m aster 
diplomatist who could negotiate a deal in the most complicated o f  situations. Lloyd 
George had already experienced some direct involvement in the Irish question before 
he became Prime Minister. Following the Easter Rising o f  1916 the then Prime 
Minister, H.H. Asquith, asked him to negotiate a settlement between the parties 
concerned. An agreement was reached between John Redm ond and Edward Carson 
whereby Home Rule would be granted to the twenty-six counties o f  the south, and the 
remaining six counties in the North East would remain under the administration o f  
Westminster for the time being. Unfortunately, the two Irish leaders had interpreted 
the partition proposal in different ways, Redmond seeing it as a tem porary measure 
whereas Carson viewed it as perm anent.15 Leading Tories and southern Unionists 
exploited the confusion to register their own protests and influence the shape o f  the
' Alvin Jackson, H om e Rule, A n  Irish H istory 1800-2000  (London 2004) p. 180.
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deal. The bill eventually reflected Tory fears to the extent that Redmond was 
compelled to turn the offer dow n.16
This could have potentially have been very damaging for Lloyd George. As A.J.P. 
Taylor noted, ‘Lloyd George told Redmond that he had placed his life upon the table 
and would stand or fall by the agreement come to ’. Yet when the proposals were 
abandoned he did not keep his promise to resign.17 All o f  this provides an important 
context to Lloyd G eorge’s later Irish policy as Prime M inister. W hen he did replace 
Asquith as premier in December 1916 Lloyd George was certainly not inexperienced 
in dealing with Ireland; in fact he would have understood more than most the 
complexities and potential problems associated with reaching an agreement. He 
would not want to fail again. It would be easy, w ith the benefit o f  hindsight, to 
dismiss the seriousness o f  this situation for Lloyd George at the time. However the 
diaries o f Frances Stevenson provide an insight into the difficult position in which he 
found him self in 1916. Although one should be aware that Stevenson was Lloyd 
George’s secretary and mistress, and therefore her accounts are partial, and not always 
reliable, her diaries provide a valuable insight into his personal struggles w ith the 
situation.
Stevenson’s observations are interesting in that she did not agree with Lloyd 
George’s decision to stay on when the negotiations failed. She w rote that the Irish 
were angry with him and that she believed they had reason to be. A lthough she 
recorded that ‘D. [David] is depressed and worried about the situation’ she explained 
that he now openly supported Asquith in the House o f  Commons because he thought 
that the Irish were unreasonable.18 Stevenson thought that ‘it would be a pity if  it [his
n  I b l d '
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reputation] were spoilt by this wretched Irish business’. 19 She changed her mind, 
however, when she began to realise that A squith’s supporters were beginning to see 
Lloyd George, the Secretary o f  State for War, as a threat. There were interesting Irish 
overtones to this situation as Sir George Riddell told Stevenson that Lloyd G eorge’s 
opponents would:
stoop to the trick that was played on Parnell if  they thought they would get rid 
o f him that way. The divorce in that case was only brought about from 
political motives, because Parnell’s opponents thought that was the way to 
crush him.20
This would undoubtedly have disturbed her given the nature o f  their personal 
relationship. All o f  this eventually convinced Stevenson that Lloyd George had been 
right in his decision not to resign over Ireland. Indeed if he had done so he would 
have lost a great deal o f  his power in being excluded from  the Cabinet. Instead, by 
holding his ground it was Lloyd George who ousted Asquith from the prem iership in 
1916.
Kerr’s relationship with the new Prime M inister is particularly interesting. On 
joining the secretariat he fell under his spell. Butler writes that he:
profoundly admired Lloyd G eorge’s genius -  the drive and imagination which 
he infused into the war effort, his courage and resource, his freedom  from
20  I b ' d -
p° f ™ 8 Slevens0n' dlary entry 28 July 1916 in A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), A D iary  by F rances S tevenson ,
109
snobbery and his readiness to try novel solutions. He felt also the charm  o f  his 
C h iefs  personality.21
More importantly, Frank Owen points out that Kerr was reputed to be one o f  the few 
outstanding men in British public life who worked with Lloyd George and never 
quarrelled with him .22 In her memoirs, Stevenson described Kerr thus:
His sincerity expressed itself in his benign and handsome countenance. He 
judged no one harshly, and I never saw him ruffled. He responded to L .G .’s 
tantrums with an amused smile, realising that they were often the result o f  
some annoyance which L.G. had to distribute on someone who happened to be 
around -  not necessarily the person who caused it. He knew, too, that 
sometimes they were deliberate, in order to gain a point. In fact he knew his 
chief through and through and he loved and adm ired him .23
Kerr would have been an extremely useful ally for Lloyd George. For those who 
considered Lloyd George a social inferior, Kerr elevated his status as an aristocratic 
secretary and advisor. The latter’s Unionist background could also have assisted 
Lloyd George in keeping him in touch with the views o f  the Tories in the coalition 
government. Kerr’s capacity for hard work would also make him an invaluable aide 
to the Prime Minister. Although other aides, such as Tom  Jones, were important to 
Lloyd George for different reasons, it is little wonder that the Prime M inister came to 
rely increasingly on Kerr and entrusted him with m atters o f  importance. M uch later,
writing to his first wife M argaret Lloyd George in 1920, the Prime M inister expressed
21
^ J.R.M. Butler, L ord  Lothian  (London, 1960) p. 66.
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his frustration at Kerr’s sick leave, on the orders o f  Bertrand Dawson, following a 
breakdown. He wrote: ‘It will be a great loss to me to get on without Kerr. He and I 
fit in so absolutely in our ideas. I miss him  here when there is work to be done’.24
It is difficult to determine the precise level o f  influence that Kerr had over Lloyd 
George and vice versa. In his diary, Thomas Jones noted that ‘Kerr pum ps things into 
him and he seems to agree and then he goes and does the opposite. You hate and love 
him in turns, as Kerr put it to me today.’25 Norman Rose has argued that K err’s 
influence has sometimes been exaggerated, not least by himself; he notes, however, 
that it was still considerable. He quotes an incident that was recounted by Arthur 
Balfour when he had asked Kerr if  Lloyd George had read a certain memorandum. 
Kerr had responded ‘I don’t think so, but I have’, to which Balfour replied ‘N ot quite 
the same thing, is it, Philip -  yet?’26 It can be safely acknowledged that both Kerr and 
Lloyd George had a high regard for each other and hence in shaping policy there 
seems to have been little disagreement. It is important to bear in mind, however, that 
when it came to Ireland they did not always share the same perspective. John Grigg 
has explained that Lloyd George had a bad conscience about his failure to bring about 
an Irish settlement in the spring o f  1916.27 It is therefore understandable that he 
would have proceeded with caution when it came to introducing conscription and 
furthering attempts to implement the Home Rule Act that was already in place from 
1914. Equally, it is understandable that he sought to push ahead with the Irish 
Convention in 1917-18, although Kerr counselled him not to be too hasty. These 
factors will be discussed in due course.
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Kerr was thrown into the deep end in January 1917, judging by the correspondence 
and paperwork that he was dealing with. Although Adams was chiefly responsible for 
handling Irish matters. Early on in his new administrative role there is evidence o f  
Kerr addressing the Irish question on behalf o f  the Prime M inister as part o f  his role 
o f dealing with foreign and colonial issues. In 1917 the Prime M inister o f  Australia, 
W.M. Hughes, sent a telegram to Lloyd George regarding the agitation o f  the Irish in 
Australia to further Home Rule in Ireland. The Irish Party in Australia proposed to 
lobby state leaders to express their support for Home Rule in order to help John 
Redmond drive it forward. Hughes’ telegram  expressed support for Lloyd George 
and, although claiming to be sympathetic to Home Rule, informed the Prime M inister 
that he refused to support the Irish Party in their resolution as his main aim  was to 
follow the latter’s lead. Indeed Hughes’ attitude was in fact quite similar to that o f  
Kerr. Like Kerr, Hughes was a Catholic and a firm supporter o f  conscription. His 
support for conscription has made him a controversial figure in Australian history. 
Geoffrey Bolton has explained it was the conscription controversy that split the 
Australian Labour Party, revived sectarianism and divided the Australian public as 
possibly no issue has before or since.28
Kerr drafted a reply to Hughes’s telegram for Lloyd George and, in doing so, laid 
out his vision o f  the way forward for Ireland. In a letter to Lloyd George dated 13 
January 1917 Kerr set out the basis o f  a settlement in four main points: the Home 
Rule Act would be brought immediately into force; Ulster would be given the right to 
contract out for a period o f  three years; conscription would be introduced to Ireland 
with immediate effect; and, finally, Home Rule and conscription would be 
implemented simultaneously. Hence we have a very clear indication o f  K err’s view
Geoffrey Bolton in Michelle Grattan (ed.), A ustra lian  P rim e M inisters (Sydney, 2000). p. 102.
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of the Irish situation at this tim e.29 Kerr drafted a reply to Hughes, explaining the 
situation and urging him to persuade the Irish-Australians to put pressure on the Irish 
leaders to accept any settlement that did not force Ulster into accepting Hom e R ule.30 
Kerr was now clearly a player in Anglo-Irish politics. A lthough it was not his 
primary role in the secretariat, he was certainly involved in the issue behind the 
scenes.
It was the conscription issue that defined K err’s position on Ireland in 1917-18. 
John Turner and M ichael Dockrill have explained that his influence became more 
evident in Irish policy because he supported the Cabinet’s decision to extend 
conscription to Ireland, whereas Adams opposed it. Consequently, Kerr enjoyed 
Lloyd George’s confidence in Irish affairs.31 In April 1918 the newspaper proprietor, 
C.P. Scott, went to see the Prime M inister, observing that ‘Kerr, on whom  he 
evidently relies on increasingly, was in the room  most o f  the time, but it d idn’t much 
matter’.32 Kerr appears to have been very much in Lloyd G eorge’s confidence after 
only a year in his service. In his diary Scott described discussing the conscription 
issue with them both. He wrote that ‘[Lloyd] George started right away by saying he 
was determined to put Conscription through in Ireland’.33 The diarist expressed 
concern that this would ruin any chances o f  an agreed settlement on Home Rule. 
Although Lloyd George had been inclined to agree with Scott, he argued that it had 
become a political necessity if  the Tories were to accept Home Rule. The 
implementation o f  military conscription was intended to be put through with Home 
Rule as a parallel measure and part o f  the same policy. Kerr reportedly agreed with
^  Philip Kerr to Lloyd George, 13 Jan 1917, Lloyd George Papers, F /89 /1 /1 .
^ Lloyd George to W.M. Hughes, 13 Jan 1917, Lloyd George Papers, F /89/1/1 .
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the Prime M inister saying ‘I am certain that is the only policy. M ake the two 
measures strictly coordinate and force them  both through’.34 Although both Kerr and 
the Prime M inister acknowledged that enforcing conscription would bring w ith it 
rioting and bloodshed, they were determined to counter this quickly, unlike the stream 
of executions following the Dublin rising in 1916. Kerr stated that ‘The executions 
after the Dublin rising, spread out day after day, a fresh batch every day for breakfast, 
had been intolerable.’35 As we saw in Chapter 3, he believed that it was this policy 
that had gained so much public sympathy for the rebels.
Scott was particularly interested in Ireland as one o f  the great political issues o f  the 
day. Both he and Kerr corresponded during their careers and the latter contributed 
articles to The Manchester Guardian, Scott’s newspaper. It is unfortunate, however, 
that there is no reference to Ireland in their correspondence. Scott only made 
reference to this in his diary. He wrote that:
Kerr is quite a good Liberal (though an opinionated and rather cranky one), 
and very much in Lloyd G eorge’s confidence, this m ay be taken to show that 
he at least believed George to be quite sincere and not, as the Irish suspect, to 
be playing for a fall and using Conscription as a means o f  killing Home 
Rule.36
The conscription issue can potentially be viewed as an example o f  K err’s influence 
on Lloyd George. Grigg explains that the Prime M inister had been extremely 
reluctant to embrace the proposal as he was aware that it was m ilitarily futile and
34 Ibid., p. 343.
35 Ibid., p. 342.
36 Ibid., p. 343.
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politically lethal.37 He was, however, under pressure from Conservative, m ilitary and 
British labour opinion to bring in Irish conscription, as well as pressure to put forward
38
another immediate Home Rule Bill as a means o f  appeasing Irish nationalists. It 
seems likely that Kerr pushed the Prime M inister in this direction, judging from the 
account in Scott’s diary. The fact that Lloyd George, in a typical manner, 
subsequently played for time on the issue, and the fact that conscription was never 
enforced, suggests his reluctance. Nevertheless, he put forw ard the measure in the 
new manpower bill o f  1918. In the meantime, the Prime M inister appointed a Cabinet 
committee to draw up a new Home Rule Bill for Ireland following the failure o f  the 
Irish Convention and the pressure to implement conscription.39 The com m ittee met 
for the first time in April 1918, under the chairmanship o f  W alter Long, who would 
also chair the Cabinet Committee on Ireland in 1919.40 Long argued that it was no 
use trying to placate the Irish Nationalists as they wanted a Bill that would give them  
dominion status based on the Canadian model. He explained that the Canadian 
constitution had grown very gradually and that the responsibility o f  military defence 
had been taken on in slow stages. Kerr was not part o f  the comm ittee in 1918; rather 
it was Adams who was the secretary. He would take on this role at a later stage in 
1919.
Dockrill and Turner explain K err’s attitude to conscription for Ireland in two ways. 
The first is that he did not believe in the narrow sectional interests o f  a m inority in a 
time o f emergency. In this case he believed the war must take precedence. Secondly 
they point out that he doubted the sincerity o f  the Irish resistance m ovem ent.41 Kerr,
7 John Grigg, L loyd  George, War Leader, 1916-1918  p. 466.
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like Lloyd George, would often refer to Ireland in relation to the Am erican Civil W ar, 
as a state that should not be allowed to secede. Lloyd George had explained to Scott 
that it was the right o f  Parliament to levy troops as controller o f  the C row n’s armed 
forces. To deny this right was virtually to claim  independence. He had argued that 
President Lincoln had met with the same problem  and dealt with it by force ‘and he 
should not shrink from the same course’.42 Conscription confirmed Ireland’s position 
as a member o f  both the United K ingdom  and the British Empire. Kerr agreed with 
this viewpoint. In contrast, Adams did not support the decision to introduce 
conscription, perhaps because he had spent a considerable am ount o f  time in that 
country. Conscription ‘represented the negation o f  Redm ond’s vision o f  a distinctive 
and voluntary Irish arm y’ and was unpopular within Ireland; Adams understood the 
strength o f  this feeling.43
Kerr had a different perspective. As a child, he had seen his father command the 
Crown forces in Ireland and believed that Ireland should contribute to the war effort 
as a member o f  both the United Kingdom  and the Empire. His ‘draconian’ attitude to 
Ireland appears to have been unpopular with his contemporaries. Kerr had been a 
member o f  the ‘Romney Street G roup’, a luncheon group founded in 1917 that 
brought together leading civil servants, journalists and thinkers to discuss post-w ar 
reconstruction. It was claimed by Joseph Thorp that Kerr made an early exit from  the 
group as a result o f  outraging members ‘by his Lincolnian views on conscription for 
Ireland’.44 Clearly he was not afraid to make his opinions on Ireland known, even if  it 
caused offence to colleagues.
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Although Kerr’s most important work on Ireland was carried out between 1919 
and 1921, the Lloyd George and Lothian papers reveal that he drafted speeches for the 
Prime Minister, and advised him through m em oranda on Ireland, especially during the 
first five months o f  1917. It was a delicate situation. The Irish leaders would still 
have been reeling over the Asquith governm ent’s failure to finalise a settlem ent and 
Lloyd George’s role in that episode. In the meantime, the stalling o f  negotiations 
continued to allow the strengthening o f  Sinn Fein as the Irish Parliam entary Party 
dwindled. Kerr sensed this and recognised that any m ajor speech that the Prime 
Minister gave on Ireland had to be carefully thought out. In his notes for the 
Premier’s speech in M arch 1917 Kerr argued that events were now beyond the point 
o f humouring and gentle pacification :
I think that the most fatal thing that you could do next W ednesday would be to 
return the ordinary official non-possum us reply. Ireland expects things from 
the new Government and will listen to anything you have to say. To return an 
official answer would be to disappoint the hopes that there is now someone at 
the head o f  affairs who really cares for Ireland itse lf and not as an appendage 
o f Great Britain, who is determined that Ireland should be as happy and 
contented and prosperous as Great Britain, and is anxious for a settlement just 
as much for Ireland’s sake as England’s sake. Such an answer would play 
directly into the hands o f  Sinn Fein.45
4 Philip Kerr to Lloyd George, 3 March 1917, Lloyd George Papers, F/89/1/3.
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Yet Kerr also advised Lloyd George not to be too hasty in proposing a conference on 
Ireland.46 He felt that the Irish people were too divided, and feeling was too bitter, for 
such a forum to work at this time. Kerr explained:
What matters in appointing a convention is putting in the men who can carry 
an agreement into the country afterwards. In the present disunited condition 
o f Ireland, how are we to find them. A  conference at this m om ent would 
either fail to agree as it did in 1910 & 1914, or if  its m em bers did agree they 
would fail to carry their proposals as in 1916.47
The speech that Lloyd George gave was, in the end, disastrous. He ignored K err’s 
advice to present a change o f  attitude from the old governm ent and instead announced 
that the view taken by the present government was the same as its two predecessors. 48 
As a result, the Irish Nationalists walked out o f  the House following the debate. The 
Prime Minister also proposed an immediate convention to bring Irishm en together to 
discuss the division o f  opinion. Kerr attempted to limit the damage by sending a 
memorandum to the Prime M inister advising him on the approach that the 
government should take, not least that it should not be distracted by the ‘theatrical 
conduct o f the Irish’.49 The advice was that the next move for any settlem ent would 
have to come from Ulster, as the government had explicitly stated, that although it 
was in favour o f  immediate Home Rule, there would be no coercion o f  the north.
Kerr, therefore suggested that Ulster should accept the invitation to attend the 
convention in order to discuss the basis o f  a settlement.
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid.
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The Irish Convention took place betw een July 1917 and M arch 1918. There is a 
considerable amount o f  literature on this event, the classic w ork being The Irish 
Convention by R.B. M cD ow ell.50 The Lothian Papers suggest, however, that during 
this period Kerr had less direct involvement with Ireland and concentrated more on 
foreign affairs. But he did deal w ith correspondence prior to the convention; in 
relation to its organisation. Kerr passed on Edward Carson’s thoughts to Lloyd 
George regarding the appointm ent o f  a chairman and delegates, and received the 
report o f Lord M onteagle’s Irish Conference Committee concerning the possible sub­
division o f groups at the convention.51 The Irish land Commissioner, Frederick 
Wrench, also wrote to Kerr in M ay 1917 regarding the conference preparations. He 
was worried that every day that the conference was delayed lessened the chances o f  
its success.52 Aside from this level o f  involvement, Kerr did not attend the convention 
himself and had little formal association with it. Rather, it was his Round Table 
colleague, F.S. Oliver, who was heavily involved and claimed to be responsible for 
the convention as a result o f  his Pacificus letters to The Times.
As it became clear that the convention would not reach agreem ent in 1918, Oliver 
wrote to Kerr in M arch regarding a federal settlement. He began by observing that ‘I f  
you think fit you may show this to the Prime M inister’, suggesting that some o f  the 
Round Table saw Kerr as their man on the ‘inside’ and that they could potentially 
influence the government through him .53 Turner and Dockrill claim  that although 
Kerr’s influence was evident in Lloyd G eorge’s w ar aims speeches o f  1917 and early 
1918, this does not justify the suggestion that, through him, the Round Table Group
5| KB. M cDowell, The Irish  C onvention 1917-18  (London, 1970).
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had acquired a back-stairs influence over policy.54 This seems fair, although it 
appears that Oliver at least tried to establish this avenue. He argued that if  the 
conference failed then the governm ent would have to impose a settlement o f  its own. 
Unsurprisingly, he wrote that ‘The only possible settlement, in my opinion, is 
Federation for the United K ingdom ’. He argued that it was the only solution for a 
state with different traditions and tem peram ents and believed that Carson could make 
Ulster accept federalism. O liver also viewed the federal solution as a scheme for the 
better government o f  the United Kingdom. He told Kerr that ‘There is also a spirit 
fully prepared for Federalism  among the Scots and W elsh’. He counselled him to 
‘avoid two fatal pitfalls’. Chiefly, Kerr was not to ‘let the Government put forward as 
Federalism proposals which are not Federalism at all, and which would cut the ground 
from under the feet o f  Federalism  for all time. (Customs, excise, etc. etc.)’. Secondly, 
Kerr was not to ‘let it introduce the element o f  bargaining by offering a constitutional 
settlement as a price to be paid for Irish C onscription’.55
Oliver agreed with the extension o f  conscription to Ireland, going so far as to 
contend that ‘It is essential to the future o f  our race that the glory and self-sacrifice o f  
Ireland should be woven into this w ar’. He believed, however, that it had to be 
introduced on its own merits: enforced equally all round as in England, Scotland and 
Wales, and not as a bargaining tool for Home Rule. He thought that only then should 
the government make a deliberate announcement o f  its ‘intention to impose a 
settlement o f  compromise -  a Federal settlement -  on the United K ingdom ’. As noted 
above, the government did exactly what Oliver feared through the M ilitary Service 
Act of 18 April 1918. As K err’s attention seems to have been elsewhere at this time, 
we cannot be sure whether or not he advised Lloyd George along the same lines as
John Turner and Michael Dockrill in John Turner (ed.), The L arger Idea, L o rd  Loth ian  a n d  the 
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Oliver. Although he passed the letter on to the Prime M inister, it is however unlikely 
that he would have done so. C.P. Scott noted in his diary on 19-21 April 1918 that 
Kerr supported Lloyd G eorge’s decision to implement conscription and Hom e Rule 
simultaneously.
Fortunately, we also have K err’s views on the Irish Convention and conscription 
laid out in his 1918 article for the Round Table, entitled ‘The Irish Crisis’. The article 
is a valuable insight into K err’s thought at this tim e.56 Until 1966 the Round Table 
articles remained anonymous, and it would not have been w idely known outside the 
group that Kerr had written this particular piece. His previous article on Ireland, 
‘Ireland and the Em pire’, published in 1916, had been more focused on the history o f  
the two islands, the Easter Rising and Ireland’s place within the Empire. In 1918, 
however, Kerr was in a more informed position to discuss the convention, the 
conscription controversy and the involvement o f  the Catholic Church in Ireland.
The convention sat in secret therefore Kerr based his account o f  the proceedings on 
the official report. He was not present, so the article sim ply provided an outline o f  the 
position o f the main groups and their preferred settlement. Kerr defined these as the 
‘Moderates’ (Nationalist and Unionist) who formed the ‘M ajority’, the Ulster 
Unionist minority, and the Nationalist minority. He explained that the m ajority 
supported the Prime M inister’s proposal that Ireland should accept a status within the 
United Kingdom ‘substantially the status o f  a state within a federation, together with 
safeguards for m inorities’.57 In contrast, The Ulster Unionist m inority stood firm on 
the existing union, or the exclusion o f  the six predom inantly U lster counties if  Home 
Rule went through. M eanwhile, the Nationalist minority demanded dom inion status. 
Kerr criticised both m inorities for being uncompromising. He argued that ‘the line
[Philip Kerr], ‘The Irish C risis’ in The R o u n d  Table (June, 1918).
[Philip Kerr], ‘The Irish C risis’ in The R o u n d  Table (June, 1918) p. 514.
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taken by the m ajority is the only line which could possibly lead to a final settlem ent o f  
the Irish Question’ as it provided for ‘Irish self-government, for Irish unity, and for 
the unity o f the United K ingdom ’.58 Kerr said little about the workings o f  the 
convention other than com m enting on these irreconcilable differences; rather he 
focused on the conscription issue that flared up immediately after the conference 
concluded.
Lloyd George had introduced the M anpower Bill on 9 April 1918. At the same 
time, he announced the governm ent’s intention to submit proposals for Irish self- 
government to be passed without delay. Kerr explained that ‘while the two aspects o f  
this policy.. .were not dependent one on the other, no active steps would be taken to 
enforce conscription until the new Home Rule Act had been introduced’.59 Kerr was 
clearly angered at the reaction to the Bill in Ireland and com m ented that:
It evidently came as a complete surprise to a comm unity which had given little 
thought to the war, was wholly preoccupied with its own problems, and had 
been deliberately inoculated for months with the wildest tales about the 
malignant intentions o f  the English Governm ent towards them .60
He described the conference that took place in Ireland between constitutionalists and 
Sinn Féiners following the announcem ent, and the fact that they sent a deputation to 
the Roman Catholic bishops assem bled at M aynooth. The bishops had then issued a 
declaration stating:
ibid., p. 515.
Ibid, p .  516.
Ibid, p .  516-17.
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The passing o f  the Conscription Bill by the British House o f  Commons must 
be regarded as a declaration o f  w ar on the Irish nation. The alternative to 
accepting it as such is to surrender our liberties and to acknowledge ourselves 
as slaves.61
This was followed by a statement and declaration, issued on 18 April, by the 
Archbishops and Bishops o f  Ireland, headed by Cardinal Logue. It denied the right o f  
the British government to enforce conscription on Ireland and declared that ‘we 
pledge ourselves solem nly to one another to resist conscription by the m ost effective 
means at our disposal’.62 All o f  this greatly troubled Kerr. He argued that Nationalist 
Ireland as a whole had adopted the standpoint o f  the extremists and, secondly, the 
declarations were p roof that ‘the real leadership has been taken by the Irish Rom an 
Catholic clergy’.63 John Dillon, now leader o f  the Irish Parliam entary Party, united 
with the separatists in opposing conscription. But when the deputation went to the 
bishops at Maynooth, it was Eamon de Valera who drafted the statement o f  resistance 
quoted above.64
The intervention o f  religious bodies was a theme that would anger Kerr for the 
duration o f his work on Ireland. He would come to believe that religion should be 
kept completely separate from  politics. K err’s parents had known Cardinal Logue 
during their time in Kildare, yet there is no reason to suggest that Kerr had any kind o f  
contact with him, or used his connections, to approach the clergy. He was frustrated 
by their actions and believed that they had played directly into the hands o f  Ulster, 
and the fear o f ‘Rome R ule’, as the Roman Catholic m ajority had shown ‘that its
61 Ibid., p. 517.
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64 Ibid., p. 519.
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political life is mainly controlled by its clergy and bishops’. Kerr hoped that the 
actions o f the churchm en were not as serious as they appeared and that they really 
represented a reaction to:
the somewhat blunt announcem ent by the Government o f  its intention to go 
ahead with conscription, and an imitation o f  the example o f  Sir Edward 
Carson and his U lsterm en in 1914, which will abate their force when the 
sincerity o f  the Governm ent has clearly been shown.65
This suggests that Kerr did recognise that the Home Rule Bill o f  1914 represented an 
unfulfilled promise, but that nationalist Ireland would yield when reassured o f  the 
government’s sincerity. Kerr seems to have ignored the fact that the churchm en were 
themselves politically m otivated. Presumably he would have recognised this, despite 
his practice o f Christian Science by 1918.
Nonetheless, for Kerr the conscription issue was a betrayal. Irish Catholics had
volunteered to fight in the trenches and yet conscription was opposed. Alvin Jackson
has explained that where as public opinion was prepared to accept voluntary
enlistment on the advice o f  dem ocratically elected leaders, it was not prepared to
accept coercion by the British governm ent.66 Kerr wrote scathingly that if  self-
determination meant ‘that every com m unity has a right to think only o f  itself and to
set up on its own regardless o f  its neighbours whenever it chooses, it is the apotheosis
of selfishness and the highway to w ar’.67 As we have seen, K err’s own brother had
been killed in action in 1914 and he m aintained the need for solidarity if  the Allies
were to win. He insisted that Ireland must play her part in the war if  self-governm ent
66 [Philip Kerr], ‘The Irish C risis’ in The R o u n d  Table (June, 1918), p. 520.
^ Alvin Jackson, Ire land  1798-1998 P olitics a n d  War (Oxford, 1999) p. 200.
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was to follow, showing willingness to ‘march shoulder to shoulder with Ulstermen, 
Englishmen, Scotsmen and W elshm en’.68 For Kerr, the implementation o f  Home 
Rule without conscription w ould be to grant dominion status to Ireland and, in effect, 
to allow secession, something that he was strongly opposed to. He argued that it was 
essential that the governm ent stood firm in enforcing union rights on one hand, while 
conferring state rights on the other. M eanwhile, Kerr echoed O liver’s sentiments in 
suggesting that the Irish question could be swallowed up in a United Kingdom  
federation.
In 1917 and 1918 Kerr began to play a role in Irish affairs w ithin the British 
government. He was not bereft o f  insight. He advised Lloyd George that he would 
have to present him self as a politician that really cared about Ireland, and that an Irish 
convention would not achieve anything in such an atm osphere o f  division. But 
although Kerr proved to be right he failed to see that in implem enting Home Rule and 
conscription simultaneously, in the words o f  Alvin Jackson, this ‘ruined both the 
credibility o f  the convention and the residual popularity o f  Home R ule’.69 Equally, 
the conscription issue united the m oderate nationalists with the extremists. During the 
following years he would come to play a more central part in Irish policy making.
“  Md., p. 524.
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C h a p te r  5
The Government of Ireland Bill and the Anglo-Irish War 1919-1921
This chapter, and the following two, form the core o f  this thesis as they examine 
Kerr’s role in the Irish question during the height o f  his involvement between 1919 
and 1921. It has been established that up until 1918 K err’s connection w ith Ireland, 
and Irish politics, was o f  a varied nature. He had experienced life in Ireland as a boy, 
and, as a member o f  the Round Table he had been part o f  the debate surrounding 
federation as a solution to the Irish problem. Kerr had written articles for the Round 
Table journal, discussing the situation in Ireland, and as Lloyd G eorge’s secretary, he 
began to handle Irish affairs on behalf o f  the British government. His role became 
clearer between 1919 and 1920 when he was appointed secretary to the Cabinet 
Committee that devised the Government o f  Ireland Bill. The resulting Act gave self- 
government to Ireland and Hom e Rule to the six, predom inantly Protestant, counties 
of Ulster in the north. The country was partitioned, creating Northern Ireland as we 
know it today. The Bill was drafted in the wake o f  the Versailles peace talks, when 
Lloyd George had becom e increasingly reliant on Kerr. The context o f  Versailles will 
be discussed here, as well as the importance o f  K err’s appointment to the Irish 
Committee. Furthermore, his correspondence with prominent Irish figures, his 
attitude to the press, and to the increasing violence in Ireland, will be considered in 
some detail.
It is important firstly to consider the developm ent o f  the Government o f  Ireland 
Act within the context o f  the ending o f  the w ar and the peace talks that followed.
These events would have a direct bearing on British Irish policy. W hen the war came
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to an end Lloyd G eorge’s secretariat (the ‘Garden Suburb’) was disbanded and Kerr 
was the only m em ber to be kept on. He was now the Prime M inister’s private 
secretary. John Turner and M ichael Dockrill have noted that during this period K err’s 
influence on Lloyd George reached its peak .1 This was largely due to his role at the 
peace conference in Paris. He appeared to be indispensable to the Prime M inister 
during the talks. In The Kings Depart, Richard M. W att writes that Lloyd G eorge’s 
superb personal staff more than com pensated for the fact that he h im self did not work 
very hard, and ‘displayed his usual penchant for the impulsive and the erratic’.2 He 
further explains that:
Waiting in the anteroom  was his private secretary, Philip Kerr, a charming, 
persuasive gentlem an with a m em ory that bordered on total recall. From  time 
to time the Prime M inister would summon Kerr inside, where he could always 
be depended upon to provide whatever facts were necessary to help Lloyd 
George through a sticky argum ent.3
Kerr’s role soon went beyond merely providing Lloyd George with the necessary 
‘facts’. The Allies had developed a system o f  replying to the German notes o f  
observation regarding the draft treaty. In their daily sessions the Council o f  Four 
would either approve the Allied reply prepared by the appropriate comm ittee or order 
it to be redrafted. W att writes that to speed things up the Council would summon 
Kerr from an anteroom. After receiving the Council’s instructions, he ‘would retire to 
his office and, generally before the Four had completed their meeting, would return
John Turner and Michael Dockrill ‘Philip Kerr at 10 D owning Street, 1916-1921’ in John Turner (ed), 
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with his draft, which was usually adopted without further discussion’.4 K err’s value 
was such that, following the G erm an counterproposals to the treaty, in M ay 1919, he 
drafted the Allied reply. W att writes:
Kerr, known as perhaps the m ost rapid diplomatic draftsm an in the British 
delegation -  no small distinction among a group whose general level o f  
proficiency in this art was quite high -  swiftly produced what am ounted to a 
complete rebuttal to the Germ an note o f  M ay 29 .5
Kerr was thus working at the centre o f  the international stage in 1919. W hile 
attending the talks he would see all o f  the official correspondence, advise the Prime 
Minister about significant questions, and occasionally represent Lloyd George on 
committees. K err’s influence in the British delegation was further enhanced by the 
Prime M inister’s absence from  the talks from  10 February to 7 M arch 1919, when the 
former became closely involved with the business o f  the conference on the latter’s 
behalf.6 Moreover, in the sum m er o f  1919 Kerr was involved in the drafting o f  the 
Treaty o f Versailles. He was personally responsible for the drafting o f  the infamous 
‘war guilt clause’ which forced Germany to accept blam e as the aggressor responsible 
for the outbreak o f  war. Having drafted the clause, however, Kerr would always 
believe that Germany was treated harshly under the terms o f  the treaty.
While Britain was acting out her role as a major player in world politics in 1919, 
her most troublesome domestic issue reared its head at Versailles. W ith the help o f  
Irish-American support, Irish nationalists attempted to bring their case for ‘self- 
determination’ before the peace conference. This will be dealt with in more detail in
4 Ibid. p. 419.
 ̂Ibid. p. 451.
John Turner and Michael Dockrill ‘Philip Kerr at 10 D owning Street, 1916-1921’, pp. 42-43.
128
the following chapter. For now it is important to make the connection betw een K err’s 
role at the conference as a member o f  the British delegation, and the Irish agitation 
there. Kerr no doubt recognised the threat this posed to Britain’s reputation abroad 
and would partly shape his attitude toward Ireland in the following two years.
Although his role at Versailles has been well documented by his biographers, to date 
there has been no detailed w ork on Kerr with the Irish agitation in Paris. His papers 
do contain a great deal o f  information on the ‘Am erican Com m ission for Irish 
Independence’, a group that sought to lobby the British governm ent to provide 
passports for Irish delegates to the peace conference (to be dealt with later). But aside 
from these documents, the archives reveal little o f  the Irish problem  at Versailles.
The ending o f  the w ar w itnessed a rise in radical politics across Europe, and 
Ireland was no exception. Sinn Fein had been a small party before the conflict with 
little popular support. During the 1918 election, however, it won 73 o f  the 103 seats 
contested.7 In light o f  this success, a republic was declared by the Sinn Fein 
leadership and the first meeting o f  the illegal Dail Eireann adm inistration took place 
on 21 January 1919, and w ith it the beginning o f  the Anglo-Irish War. From  this 
point onwards violence in Ireland would escalate as the Republican Army, under the 
leadership o f  M ichael Collins and Cathal Brugha, increased its attacks on policemen 
and British soldiers. As the 1914 Home Rule Act had been suspended for the duration 
of the war, and the British governm ent was busy in Paris, the Irish problem  was ‘on 
hold’ until the peace terms in Europe had been established. The newly formed Dail 
seized the opportunity to gain recognition for their cause at the conference. Erskine 
Childers was chosen as one o f  the delegates sent by Sinn Fein in the summer o f  1919 
to press Ireland’s case in Paris. Childers was a fascinating, and som ewhat enigmatic,
Leonard Piper, The Tragedy o f  E rskine Childers, D angerous Waters (London, 2003) p. 193.
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character, hence he has enjoyed considerable historical attention. He was an 
Englishman whose m other was from Irish Protestant stock. Childers was sent to live 
in Ireland after his father’s death in 1876 and developed a great love for the country. 
Following his schooling in England at Haileybury College, and later Trinity College, 
Cambridge, he becam e a staunch imperialist who was anti-Irish Home Rule. He 
served in the Boer W ar as a driver, and a lieutenant in the Royal N avy Volunteer 
reserve during the First W orld W ar, and his famous novel, The Riddle o f  the Sands, 
published in 1903, was a patriotic warning o f  G erm any’s potential to invade England. 
This made Childers’s conversion to republicanism, and fierce support for the Irish 
cause, all the more remarkable.
Childers was first introduced to M ichael Collins in 1919 through his cousin, Sinn 
Feiner, Robert Barton. Collins, in turn, introduced Childers to de Eam on de Valera. 
Although the Sinn Fein leadership under Arthur Griffith and de Valera treated him 
with suspicion, they were prepared to make use o f  his talents and sent him to Paris in 
1919. A skilled propagandist, Childers sought to speak with British and other foreign 
diplomats, and to write articles prom oting the Irish cause while in France. As the 
Minister o f Propaganda in the Sinn Fein administration, Childers’ contribution would 
be considered as im portant as the m ilitary struggle in the truce that was called 
between the British and the Irish in 1921,8 In light o f  his role in the A nglo-Irish story, 
it makes it all the more fascinating that he came into contact with Kerr while in Paris. 
Kerr’s biographers have never made this connection, although Childers’s biographer, 
Andrew Boyle, explains that, through an introductory note from M rs Sidney Webb, 
his subject was able to meet members o f  the British delegation, notably Philip Kerr
8
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and Lionel Curtis.9 In fact Childers had been an acquaintance o f  Lionel Curtis at 
Haileybury College and during his tim e in the City Imperial Volunteers (C.I.V.) in 
South Africa. Unfortunately, there appears to be no surviving correspondence 
between Childers and Kerr, during the period concerned. Nevertheless, there was 
clearly contact between Kerr and the Sinn Fein administration in 1919.
Boyle writes that ‘It distressed Childers that “a nice fellow” like Kerr should bring 
up “all sorts o f  so-called European parallels where the Conference is splitting o ff 
minorities, but had to admit that Bohemia is his only real parallel to Ireland and that 
they are including the German U lster’” .10 Here we see K err’s increasingly world 
vision o f politics. The fact that he referred to a ‘German U lster’ suggests that he 
failed to see Ireland as an exceptional case. As Dockrill and Turner point out, Kerr 
began to assimilate m ost o f  the international and domestic political problem s 
confronting him to a single princip le.11 A letter that he wrote to Edw ard Lascelles in 
1920 confirms this view. Kerr believed that Britain was ‘in for a very difficult time 
all over the w orld .. .especially in India’. 12 He hoped that the passing o f  the 1920 
Home Rule Bill for Ireland would make things easier. Kerr argued that the situation 
was now exactly the same as the struggle in South Africa between the N orth and the 
South: ‘It is a fight betw een the self-governing communities for which the Am erican 
Federation and the British Em pire stand’. In December 1920 he was optim istic that 
the new Home Rule Bill would pacify Ireland and bring with it law and order. In his 
view, this signified hope for other imperial issues, arguing ‘the India problem  is 
fundamentally the sam e’. K err’s previous career in South Africa, his m em bership o f
„Andrew Boyle, The R iddle  o fE rsk in e  C hilders (London, 1977) p. 252. 
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the Round Table, and his involvem ent with the peace conference, assisted in the 
development o f  these global views.
Although Childers clearly liked Kerr, the latter’s views upset him. Nicholas 
Mansergh has described the ‘psychological changes’ that had taken place in Ireland 
between 1910 and 1918. He explains that a shift had taken place in Irish aspirations: 
the aim was no-longer Home Rule but independence. The Sinn Fein electoral victory 
and formation o f  Dail Eireann dem onstrated this, and, as M ansergh points, out Irish 
nationalism entered an era o f  m ilitary action.13 All the while the British failed to 
recognise this and rem ained under the illusion that the Irish did not want complete 
separation. Indeed, Boyle writes that Lionel Curtis distressed Childers even more 
than Kerr as he proved to be ‘m uch m ore reactionary’. 14 Childers was clearly 
frustrated that Curtis appeared to regard the Irish problem  as merely an intellectual 
exercise for constitutional experts. He claimed to have ‘rarely seen the 
English...impenetrable egotism  in such an insolent, anti-Irish form .’15
Towards the end o f  1919 Lloyd George had little choice other than to turn his 
attention towards settling the Irish question. Although, as previously explored, there 
had been attempts to do so between 1916 and 1918, there was now the added factor o f  
time. As the 1914 Home Rule Act had been suspended for the duration o f  the war, it 
would eventually come into being with the ratification o f  the Peace Treaty with 
Turkey. The governm ent could therefore either repeal the act, allow it to come into 
force or replace it with another statute.16 The first meeting o f  the Cabinet Com m ittee 
on Ireland took place on 14 October 1919. It was charged with the task o f  advising on 
Irish policy and the drafting o f  legislation. Kerr was appointed as jo in t secretary to
Nicholas Mansergh, The U nreso lved  Q uestion: the A ng lo-Irish  Settlem ent a n d  its undoing  (London,
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this committee, along with Captain L.F. Burgis. The Committee was chaired by 
Walter Long, a keen Tory federalist. Long’s role in Irish affairs, including his role in 
the Government o f  Ireland Bill, has been explored in detail by John Kendle in his 
work Walter Long, Ireland, and the Union, 1905-1920, and by Richard M urphy in his 
article ‘W alter Long and the M aking o f  the Government o f  Ireland Act, 1919-20’.17 
As the previous chapter explained, Lloyd George had appointed an earlier Cabinet 
committee under Long’s chairm anship in 1918. This Committee had drafted a Home 
Rule Bill with a view to implem enting Home Rule, along with conscription. The 
Cabinet, however, had rejected the proposed settlement. Yet the 1918 draft 
foreshadowed the settlem ent that would be embodied in the Government o f  Ireland
i o
Act two years later. The Com m ittee proposed:
That there should be two chambers, one for the north and another for the south 
o f Ireland with a com m on council w ith certain powers for the whole o f  
Ireland. Such a scheme not to be inconsistent with a Federal System  o f 
Government for the United K ingdom .19
Murphy describes L ong’s appointm ent as Chairman o f  the 1919 Com m ittee as 
‘one of Lloyd G eorge’s more inspired strokes’.20 The former was a W iltshire squire 
with important Irish connections. His m other’s family, the Humes, came from 
County Wicklow and Long h im self had been C hief Secretary for Ireland in 1905. As
17 John Kendle, W alter Long, Ireland, a n d  the Union, 1905-1920  (Montreal, 1992); Richard Murphy, 
Walter Long and the Making o f  the Government o f  Ireland Act, 1919-20’ Irish  H istorica l S tudies,
Vol. 25, No. 97 (May, 1986), pp. 82-96. See also A lvin Jackson, ‘Long, Walter Hume, first V iscount 
Long (1854-1924)’, O xford  D ictionary o f  N a tiona l B iography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; 
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the chairman o f  the Irish Unionists in the House o f  Commons from 1906 to 1910, his 
appointment to the Com m ittee would also have reassured the Ulster Unionists led by 
Sir Edward Carson. Furthermore, both John Kendle and Alvin Jackson have pointed 
to the significance o f  Long’s appointm ent within the federal context. Long claimed to 
be a federal devolutionist because he w anted to preserve the integrity o f  the United 
Kingdom. Such considerations, however, were in the background as the governm ent 
was now under real pressure to deal w ith Ireland. Despite the Cabinet C om m ittee’s
references to federal schemes, the suggestions put forward in December 1919 did not
21touch on a federal settlement. Indeed Jackson has noted that Long’s desire to be the
architect o f  a lasting settlem ent for Ireland far outweighed any debt to the federalist
22cause.
As a result o f  K err’s federal background, historians who have referred to his w ork 
on the 1920 Government o f  Ireland Act have tended to do so within the federal 
context. Jackson states that, as a M ilnerite imperialist and federalist, Kerr sponsored 
and influenced the deal that was being put together in 1919-1920 and hoped that it 
would form part o f  a wider federal reform .23 Peatling goes into somewhat more detail 
but, again in light o f  his im perialist background, explains that Kerr hoped that a 
moderate nationalist m ovem ent would emerge in Ireland to make possible a 
settlement based on a lim ited m easure o f  Home Rule. He states that he considered the 
Act a serious proposal for the better governm ent o f  Ireland and in the long term  would 
promote political unity .24
Kerr’s involvement in the Irish settlem ent is interesting in term s o f  his imperial 
and federal background. But, this was not the prim ary reason for his connection with
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the Irish Bill. His Unionist background was an important factor. Despite being a 
convinced Lloyd G eorge Liberal by 1919, the Lothian Papers reveal that Kerr had 
always maintained strong Unionist connections in Arthur Balfour; Lloyd George 
would have hoped that this would give the Ulster Unionists some confidence in the 
Committee’s deliberations. In addition, his Catholic background would have been 
useful to Lloyd George in appointing him to the Committee. Although Kerr was 
practising Christian Science by 1919, his Catholic heritage would have appealed to 
the Irish nationalists and clergy. Furthermore, as we have seen, Kerr had been Lloyd 
George’s right hand man throughout the Versailles Peace Negotiations in 1919, and 
had developed a reputation internationally as a skilled draftsman. There was no-one 
better qualified to draft an Irish Bill and in so short a space o f  time. Unless an 
alternative m easure was put in place the Home Rule Act o f  1914 would becom e law.
Kerr, like all o f  those who were involved in the Cabinet Committee on Ireland, 
recognised that the new bill had to respond to the realities o f  the situation. This m eant 
that the old debates over Home Rule and federal solutions were no longer sufficient.
In proposing two parliam ents, the governm ent would maintain its prom ise not to hand 
Ulster over to the south, while the nationalists could not claim that any part o f  Ireland 
was under British dom ination.25 The Com m ittee’s report stated that ‘No nationalists 
would be retained under British rule. All Irishm en would be self-governing’.26 As 
Murphy has pointed out, the council for the whole o f  Ireland was intended as a 
symbol o f Irish unity that did not exist, but dem onstrated that partition was only 
meant to be a tem porary measure. Indeed the m ajority o f  the Committee believed that 
unification had to be the long term  goal. W ith this in view, Long and the other 
members favoured a nine county partition o f  the historic province o f  Ulster. It is
25
m Richard Murphy, ‘Walter Long and the Making o f  the Government o f  Ireland Act, 1919-20’, p. 84.
War Cabinet, Committee on Ireland, ‘Minutes o f  M eetings’, 15 Oct 1919, Cabinet Papers 
CAB 27/68.
135
unclear if Kerr also took this view at this stage, although there is no reason to suggest 
that he did not. Long was fully aware that in proposing such a settlem ent the 
supremacy o f  the U lster Unionists would be put at risk, as the counties o f  Tyrone, 
Fermanagh, Donegal, Cavan and M onaghan all had Roman Catholic majorities. Yet 
in February 1920, while m aking am endm ents to the bill, the Com m ittee decided to 
recommend the nine county option, hoping that it would lead to the eventual 
unification o f  Ireland. The decision was, however, short lived when the sheer force o f  
the resistance by the U lster Unionist leaders was realised. The Cabinet backed down, 
preferring instead to have a six-county partition with a strong Unionist majority, 
which would lead to the U lster leaders’ support for the bill, but in effect ensured a 
permanent partition.
Lloyd George introduced his proposals to the House o f  Commons on 23 December 
1919. In keeping w ith the recom m endations o f  the Committee, he set forward the 
intention to create two parliam ents in Ireland, one for the south and one for the north. 
There would also be a Council o f  Ireland created in order to promote unity between 
the two regions.27 The Governm ent o f  Ireland Bill passed its second reading in the 
Commons on 31 M arch 1920 and, thereafter, Long chaired a subsequent comm ittee to 
consider amendments. The Bill becam e law on 23 December 1920.
There is a wealth o f  literature on the Government o f  Ireland Bill. Classic works by 
Francis Costello, Sheila Lawlor, Nicolas M ansergh and John M cColgan have all 
explored the developm ent o f  the legislation in considerable detail.28 The 
historiographical paradox, however, is that they do not explore the role o f  Kerr. He 
may have been overlooked because he was the Prime M inister’s secretary rather than
2g TAe Times, 23 December 1919, p. 15.
Francis Costello, The Irish  R evolu tion  a n d  its A fterm ath  (Dublin, 2003); Sheila Lawlor, B rita in  an d  
Ireland 1914-23 (Dublin, 1 9 8 3 );28 N icholas Mansergh, The U nresolved Q uestion: the A ng lo-Irish  
Settlement and  its undoing  (London, 1991); John M cColgan, B ritish  P o licy  a n d  the Irish  
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a Cabinet minister or an individual w ith a special interest in Ireland. Nevertheless, in 
his diary in Decem ber 1919 M aurice Hankey actually claim ed that Kerr had been the 
driving force behind the proposals for the new Act; ‘Philip Kerr was the originator o f  
the general scheme and has piloted it through its prelim inary stages’.29 It is therefore 
surprising that he should have been so overlooked in the history o f  self-governm ent 
for Ireland and especially in the history o f  partition.
The Government o f  Ireland Act o f  1920 would provide the basis for the 
government o f  Northern Ireland until the suspension o f  Home Rule in 1972.
Following the proposals o f  Decem ber 1919, the Committee members were charged 
with the task o f  giving effect to the Bill during 1920. It is difficult to determine the 
precise input o f  individual m em bers as the m inutes and m em oranda only briefly state 
the conclusions o f  each m eeting.30 Judging from  K err’s own correspondence for this 
period, however, he was a vital part o f  the C om m ittee’s netw ork system  and had 
access to contacts that would be invaluable in helping to shape the proposals. In fact, 
it could be argued that he was a binding force behind the scenes, obtaining 
information, corresponding with significant individuals, and m aintaining contact with 
the Prime M inister throughout the proceedings.
One o f the key indicators o f  his thoughts on the Irish situation during this tim e was 
his support for repression o f  the extreme nationalists under Sinn Fein. Following the 
announcement by the governm ent in Decem ber 1919 that it was to introduce the new 
Irish Bill, violence in Ireland had increased at an alarming rate. W hen the 
government auxiliary forces, nicknam ed ‘The Black and Tans’, were sent into Ireland 
to assist the regular army and police force in M arch 1920, the situation escalated to 
full-scale war as a result o f  reports o f  reprisals by the British forces. In October 1920
Diary entry, 29 Dec 1919, printed in Stephen Roskill, H ankey, M an o f  Secrets, Vol. 111919-1931
(London, 1972) p. 137.
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the president o f  the Irish Republican Brotherhood, Patrick M oylett, was sent to 
London as the personal envoy o f  Arthur Griffith. Over a three m onth period M oylett 
held secret discussions w ith the Foreign Office in an attempt to negotiate between 
Dail Eireann and the British government.
Accounts o f  M oylett’s meetings with C.J. Phillips o f  the Foreign Office are in the 
Lloyd George Papers. Kerr sent them  to the Prime M inister immediately before the 
bill passed through parliam ent. K err’s views o f  the conversations are revealing o f  his 
attitude to Sinn Fein during this time. In a letter dated 11 Novem ber 1920 he told 
Phillips that his attitude to M oylett was not harsh enough. He was annoyed by Arthur 
Griffith’s claim that Sinn Fein was winning due to the discredit that reprisals would 
bring on the British Empire. As an imperialist, this would have touched a nerve. In 
Kerr’s view, reprisals were m erely an answer to Sinn Fein’s attempt to achieve their 
goals through murder and assassination. He argued that the latter had paralysed 
Ireland’s sympathisers across the world and would continue to do so while Sinn Fein 
employed these strategies. Kerr emphasised that only when they stopped using such 
methods would the governm ent consider negotiating with them. Until then, he stated 
that the British cam paign to defeat Sinn Fein would only intensify.31
Here it seems that Kerr did not understand Sinn Fein’s hold on the Irish psyche and 
believed that the m ovem ent could be defeated. This ‘hold’ has been portrayed 
brilliantly by M ichael Laffan. He has described men such as Griffith as publicists, not 
intellectuals, who were able to convert people through im agery and a formidable 
propaganda m achine.32 Indeed Phillips disagreed w ith Kerr, arguing that he wished 
that he could share K err’s be lief that Sinn Fein sympathisers were paralysed all over 
the world. On the contrary, he believed that press reports were, as Griffith claimed,
^ Philip Kerr to C.J. Phillips, 11 N ov 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F /91 /7 /11.
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indicating that British reprisals in response to Sinn Fein activity were causing 
indignation abroad.33 This suggests a degree o f  naivety or wishful thinking on K err’s 
part.
The attitude o f  the British press towards the Irish situation in 1920-21 has been 
explored in depth by D.G. Boyce in his work, Englishmen and Irish Troubles, British 
Public Opinion and the Making o f Irish Policy ?A He has argued that although it is 
difficult to assess the impact o f  propaganda on public opinion, the A nglo-Irish W ar 
was as much a psychological as a m ilitary conflict.35 This does not appear to have 
concerned Kerr at all in counselling repression o f  the militants. He was undoubtedly 
fully conversant with the pow er o f  the press. He had edited the Round Table for a 
number o f years and was in regular contact with some o f  the m ost powerful 
newspaper men o f  his day, including Lord Northcliffe, W aldorf Astor and J.L Garvin. 
This suggests that Kerr had faith in the B ill’s potential to provide a lasting solution to 
the Irish problem and he was not prepared to allow the die-hards to interfere in 
pushing the Bill through parliament.
There is nevertheless some evidence to suggest that Kerr did attempt to limit some 
of the press damage. This is evident in an account o f  a conversation betw een Kerr 
and C.P. Scott on either the 16 or 17 M arch 1920. Scott would emerge as a critic o f  
the government’s Irish policies and it can be assum ed that Kerr tried to win him  over 
as his newspaper, The Manchester Guardian, was an influential organ. Kerr had 
apparently asked to see Scott about the Irish Bill. According to the latter, Kerr:
34 C.J. Phillips to Philip Kerr, 12 Nov 1920, Lloyd George Papers, F /9 1/7/11.
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admitted the defects o f  the Bill, but said it was the best that could be got out o f  
the existing governm ent. It would at least accom plish two essential things: it 
would take U lster out o f  the Irish question which it had blocked for a 
generation and it would take Ireland out o f  English party controversies. There 
would never be another special Irish B ill.36
Although Scott recounted only fragments o f  the conversation, it is revealing about 
Kerr’s attitude towards the settlement. He clearly did not see the Bill as a great piece 
of legislation or indeed as a historic federal settlement. In his mind, it was a means to 
an end. He believed that the Bill was the first step in a gradual process o f  establishing 
a new form o f  governing the country. In another sense, Kerr did have rem arkable 
foresight in as m uch as the Act would provide the fram ework for the governm ent o f  
Northern Ireland until 1972, and the 1920 Act would not be repealed until the Good 
Friday Agreement o f  1998.
Only days after K err’s conversation with Scott, the former sent a m em orandum  to 
Lloyd George about the Bill. He was trying to draw up a comparison between the 
1914 Home Rule Act and the new 1920 Government o f  Ireland Bill. Kerr declared 
that he could not find any body o f  opinion in either Ireland, or England, which 
preferred the 1914 Act and that he did not think that there would be any difficulty in 
establishing that the 1920 Bill was a better, and a more generous, one. He attributed 
this to the adoption o f  the two parliam ent system  and to the great increase o f  taxation 
across the United Kingdom  during the w ar.37 He was, however, aware that the six 
counties’ exclusion was controversial, asserting that the Irish nationalist press was 
howling in a rather m eaningless w ay about partition. Presum ably by this he meant
“  Trevor Wilson (ed.), The P o litica l D iaries o fC .P . Sco tt 1911-1928, p. 382.
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Sinn Fein propaganda, as he stated: ‘It clearly has not yet accom m odated itse lf to the 
fundamental fact that U lster is going to have Home R ule’.38 But in K err’s view this 
was a fundamental fact and not up for negotiation, therefore the nationalists’ backlash 
was pointless. He believed that the sooner they accepted the idea the sooner things 
would begin to settle down. In fact, Kerr believed that the best course o f  action was 
to push the Bill through as fast as possible. In doing so the policy o f  Sinn Fein, and o f  
Dominion Home Rule, would becom e absurd as they could only be achieved through 
the military conquest o f  Ulster.
Kerr still held faith in the ability o f  m oderate nationalists, such as Stephen Gwynn, 
to steer Irish politics in the right direction. He explained that in putting the Bill in 
place it would provide him  and his people w ith a chance o f  advancing their policy o f  
‘abandoning factious agitation and violence and working the Bill w ith the deliberate 
object o f inducing U lster by reason and conciliation and the use o f  the m achinery o f  
the Council o f  Ireland to agree to the re-union o f  Ireland.’39 Kerr also informed Lloyd 
George that he had received information from  a lady friend, who had been recently 
mixed up with the younger Sinn Feiners. She had apparently informed Kerr that 
while the younger people claimed to hate the Bill they in fact hoped that the 
government would force it on Ireland as they were convinced that Ireland’s salvation 
needed to come through some form  o f  government. The policy o f  agitation and 
violence, it was claimed, was not only ruining the Irish character but also leading 
nowhere.40 Therefore, based on the advice that he was being given, Kerr had 
confidence in the B ill’s potential to bring about a lasting settlement in Ireland, a 





Boyce has explored the reaction to partition in considerable depth. He has 
explained that, initially, there had been a lack o f  interest in m ainland Britain over the 
Ulster question due to the violence that was taking place in the south o f  Ireland. The 
IRA attacks, and the British reprisals, had turned the press attention away from  the 
Unionists and therefore there were no pressure groups lobbying for, or against, the 
Ulster cause.41 The introduction o f  the Government o f  Ireland Bill did arouse 
criticism, however. Critics, such as C.P. Scott, doubted the potential o f  the Council o f  
Ireland to promote unity betw een Ulster and the south and argued that to separate the 
six counties was in fact m aking the situation m ore difficult by creating a new 
obstacle. Journals, such as The Nation and The New Statesman, also denounced 
partition, suggesting that there ‘w ould be two Irish provinces, but no Ireland; a 
Quebec and an Ontario, but no C anada’.42 The m ajor newspapers, such as The Daily 
Mail, The Observer and The Times, equally doubted the likelihood o f  partition leading 
to eventual unity. M eanwhile, The Round Table, perhaps due to K err’s connection, 
remained optimistic, rem inding readers that in South Africa unity only came about 
following the withdrawal o f  the imperial power. It did acknowledge, however, that 
unless the Bill led to the union o f  the north and south o f  Ireland its intention would 
have failed.43
Boyce notes that supporters o f  the Bill m aintained that Irish unity would most 
readily come about through a process o f  evolution. He quotes both Lloyd George and 
Austen Chamberlain.44 Kerr clearly fell into this category, believing that concessions 
had to be made to Ulster if  there was to be any progress at all in dealing with the 
problem. In pushing the Bill through, he hoped that it would provide a basis from
D.G. Boyce, E nglishm en a n d  Irish  Troubles, B ritish  P ublic O pinion a n d  the M aking  o f  Irish P olicy  
1918-22, p. 103.




which to work and as an alternative to the chaos that then reigned. This was perhaps 
naïve on K err’s part as he had been clearly aware o f  the strength o f  Ulster resistance 
to Home Rule in 1912-14. But he may have been led to believe that once Unionists 
got partition they w ould be prepared to consider unity at a later stage. A lthough Ken- 
had a Unionist background, he was now a convinced Lloyd George Liberal.
David Billington has affirm ed that ‘K en  almost to the end saw Ireland through a 
Round Table lens’; m eaning that he believed the Irish problem  could be solved 
through wider United K ingdom  devolution. This is not necessarily the case, however, 
as Ken was not influenced solely by his Round Table colleagues during this period.45 
Indeed the main key to the developm ent o f  K e n ’s attitude to Ireland from  1917 
onwards was in fact Lloyd George. The latter relied increasingly on Kerr from 1919 
onwards and he, in turn, was loyal to his chief. Their views tended to be in unison, 
including those relating to Ireland. M aurice Hankey wrote to K en  in September 
1920, while the Prime M inister’s aide was resting from exhaustion due to overwork. 
Hankey informed K e n  that:
the P. M. is in favour o f  keeping the two K ’s in London for the present... Your 
letter on the subject reached the P.M. in the Rigi. It was almost w ord for word 
identical with the views he had been expressing to me on the w ay up, and he 
was very bucked. I was rather downed because I had been stating the opposite 
point o f  view .46
46 David P. Billington, Jr., Lothian, P hilip  K err  a n d  the Q uest fo r  W orld O rder , p. 68.
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Like the Prime M inister, Kerr agreed with the policy o f  repression o f  what he 
denounced as the ‘m urder gang’ in Ireland.47 According to Frank Owen, Lloyd 
George believed that the only alternative to ‘official’ reprisal was to surrender to the 
tactics o f terror, and to let Sinn Fein have its Republic, which he was not prepared to 
tolerate.48 Kerr agreed with this stance, believing that the Government o f  Ireland Bill 
would allow for a workable solution and that the Government must not be influenced 
by the violence.
Yet the other Round Table m em bers were not necessarily in agreem ent w ith K err’s 
views. In 1921 Lionel Curtis and John Dove (who was then The Round Table editor) 
wrote an article for The Round Table following the enactment o f  the Governm ent o f  
Ireland Bill. They had spent two weeks in Ireland during the spring gathering 
material for the piece. Curtis’s biographer, Deborah Lavin, wrote that the ‘two 
observers left Ireland sickened at the crim e and repression’.49 In an eyewitness 
account, they described watching a patrol by the British Auxiliaries with the 
unflattering depiction that ‘One felt all o f  a sudden as if  m onsters o f  the pleiocene age 
had revisited earth to dom inate m ortals’.50 They observed that the people’s reaction 
to the patrol was one o f  contem pt, rather than fear. Although the article 
acknowledged the difficulties faced by the British troops in fighting an unseen force, 
it condemned the governm ent’s policy o f  repression and the behaviour o f  the 
Auxiliaries. The writers pointed out that the nickname, ‘Black and T an’, in itself 
indicated the speed w ith which the governm ent had deployed the force, even before 
uniforms could be made for it, and suggested that the people saw the auxiliaries, as 
‘sub-human’ in naming them  after a famous pack o f  hunting hounds. Curtis and Dove
Kenneth 0 . Morgan, C onsensus a n d  D isunity, The L lo y d  G eorge C oalition G overnm ent 1918-1922  
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concluded that they did not necessarily believe that the governm ent’s policy had been 
to fight terror with terror, but in reality that had been the policy developed in the 
minds o f some officers, whether consciously or otherw ise.51 The article showed no 
similarity with K err’s views on the repressive Irish policy.
As for the constitutional settlem ent, the article acknowledged that the recent 
Government o f  Ireland Bill was not designed to be long lasting as it presupposed the 
union o f Ireland under one parliament. Perhaps in reference to Kerr, it pointed out 
that the authors o f  the Act would be the first to admit this. The article did not refer to 
dominion status, but it was everywhere im plied.52 This probably owed much to 
Curtis’s contacts in Ireland, including such Irish m oderates as Sir Horace Plunkett, 
George W. Russell and John Joseph Horgan. Both Plunkett and Russell were in 
favour o f a dominion solution for Ireland, while Horgan, a Cork solicitor, had 
previously argued the case for Irish self-governm ent within the Commonwealth. The 
latter would rem ain closely associated with the Round Table thereafter, in effect 
becoming the only Irish member. It is possible that Curtis made contact with him 
through either Stephen Gwynn, who corresponded with Kerr, or through Erskine 
Childers as Horgan corresponded regularly with both. Curtis and Dove argued that if 
the present Act was only delaying the inevitable, then there was good reason to put 
the fullest measure o f  autonom y in place im m ediately in order to eliminate the period 
of friction. There was an elem ent o f  finality to the dom inion plan that did not exist 
with the recent Act.
Although it has not been recorded, Kerr and Curtis must have been much at odds 
in their views on Ireland at this time. They had very different perspectives on the 
situation. Curtis had visited Ireland to witness the state o f  affairs for himself. He also
^ Ibid., p .  498.
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appears to have developed a genuine affection and admiration for the people and for 
their plight. Indeed he had considered signing the Ulster Covenant in 1912, and yet 
after his visit to Ireland he argued that the Easter Rebellion had been the result o f  the 
failure to suppress the organisation o f  armed force in Ulster. In contrast, Kerr had 
been closely involved in the drafting o f  the 1920 Act and was loyal to his chief, Lloyd 
George. He was at the very centre o f  things and hoped that the settlement o f  1920 
would be given a chance to work.
Kerr’s position at the heart o f  decision making nevertheless led to some lobbying. 
Plunkett and Russell both appealed to Kerr not only to use his position to try and end 
the violence in Ireland, but to have their own proposals for a solution considered. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, Kerr had stayed with Plunkett at his home near Dublin in 1916 
while researching an article for the Round Table. He had also met Russell there and 
had taken to him alm ost immediately. Robert Bernard Davis has explained that the 
latter was:
Neither Catholic nor Protestant, his inherent spirituality made him respected 
by many Catholics and Protestants. A nationalist, but not a revolutionary, his 
sincerity and objectivity in m atters o f  politics caused him to be trusted by all 
parties and by English statesm en as well. In the terrible days o f  the Anglo- 
Irish W ar he was one o f  those who pleaded for m oderation and sanity.53
Given Kerr’s own religious struggles and need for spirituality it is appealing to think 
that he would have been com fortable listening to Russell’s views, even if  he did not 
agree with him. There is another reason that Kerr m ay have been inclined to listen to
Robert Bernard Davis, G eorge W illiam R ussell ( “A E ”)  (London, 1977).
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him. Russell was a northern Protestant and yet, unusually for a Sinn Fein 
sympathiser, he publicly revered A lan Anderson, Tom  Kettle, W illie Redmond and 
those Irish who had died fighting for the United Kingdom  during the war.
Kerr’s relationship with Plunkett appears to have been more strained. W hilst the 
former was in favour o f  repression in Ireland, the latter was firmly opposed to the 
violence. A letter to Kerr o f  2 September 1920 suggests that they had disagreed on 
the course o f  action to being taken by the government, which appeared to be to let the 
two sides bleed to death before forced to the negotiating table:
The Irish evolution you foretold in our last conversation is beginning to 
m aterialise... You told me in effect that you had no solution for the Irish 
difficulty until the inevitable sectarian conflict had shed so m uch blood, and -  
what probably counts more with the section o f  the coalition which dictates its 
Irish policy -  had destroyed so much wealth that the leader o f  the Northern 
fanatics would approach the arch-terrorist in the south and they would decide 
to call a truce.54
Plunkett continued, however, to try and exert influence through Kerr. He believed 
that the ‘Dominion p lan ’ was a workable solution and was trying to lobby moderate 
opinion in Ireland, despite the fact that Kerr had told him  it ‘frankly did not count’. In 
doing so, Plunkett hoped to appeal to the two extremes: the extreme nationalists and 
the Ulster Unionists. But Kerr did not believe in a dom inion solution for Ireland and 
does not seem to have taken P lunkett’s intervention seriously. Plunkett subsequently 
wrote to Kerr in M arch 1921 regarding proposals for an armistice as a prelim inary to
Horace Plunkett to Philip Kerr, 2 Sept 1920, Lothian Papers G D 40/17/80/166-167.
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a settlement. He referred to discussions that had taken place within a group 
surrounding JE, and that it intended to send its proposals both to the Prime M inister 
and to de Valera. Plunkett was, in effect, using Kerr as a man ‘on the inside’ to press 
his case. K err’s reply was dismissive:
There is war in Ireland today because the three parties to it are divided by 
principles which are irreconcilable, and yet which each holds with the 
strongest conviction. I don’t see how you are to get peace in Ireland any more 
than you could in South Africa, until the said three parties can agree upon the 
fundamental basis o f  a settlem ent.55
Russell also wrote to Kerr in order to try and influence the governm ent.56 In late 
1920, just before the passing o f  the Bill, he tried to counsel the governm ent through 
Kerr on possible ways to find an alternative solution. He argued that the Government 
of Ireland Bill would not bring about a peaceful settlement and criticised the use o f  
force on both sides. He suggested that a truce should be called in order for 
negotiations to take place betw een Irish elected members and representatives o f  the 
British government, and he believed that dominion status was more acceptable to Irish 
national aspirations than the measures allowed for in the Governm ent o f  Ireland Bill. 
Economic grievances were a further complaint highlighted by Russell. He argued that 
Irish spending pow er had been exercised for British, and not for Irish, purposes and 
there was no provision in the Hom e Rule Bill that Imperial expenditure would be
56 Philip Kerr to Horace Plunkett, 24 March 1921, Lothian Papers G D 40/17/80/175.
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balanced by an equivalent expenditure in Ireland. Therefore he urged financial 
independence as a necessary factor if  friendship was to replace hostility.57
Kerr, however, believed in the merits o f  the Bill as it stood and supported the 
Prime M inister over the financial aspects. W hen it had been suggested at a Cabinet 
meeting in October 1920 that the governm ent take a more liberal attitude to finance 
Lloyd George had refused. He had argued that ‘The giving o f  Customs, Excise and 
Income Tax m eant a great deal, and if  this were done Ireland could not rem ain part o f
58the United K ingdom ’. A lthough Kerr politely acknowledged R ussell’s letter, and 
told him he would pass it on, he was more inclined to agree with the views o f  Stephen 
Gwynn. Yet Kerr and Russell were clearly on good terms and the latter joked about 
Kerr’s position in early 1921, stating that ‘The enclosed pamphlet may aid you in 
your duty as intelligence officer o f  the Irish Com m ittee o f  the Cabinet’.59 This was 
perhaps not so far from  the truth. As the violence in Ireland continued to escalate, 
Russell urged Kerr to ‘Try and put some conscience into your Com m ittee’.60
T.P. Gill was another individual, connected with Plunkett and Russell, who tried to 
influence Kerr over the 1920 Bill. Gill was a former Home Rule M.P. and from  1900 
to 1923 was secretary to the departm ent o f  agriculture and technical instruction, 
headed by Plunkett. Kerr had apparently asked Gill for his ‘view o f  the problem  o f  
Irish settlement’ in 1919 while the Cabinet Com m ittee on Ireland was drawing up 
proposals. Gill replied in D ecem ber 1919, advising against the two-parliam ent 
system.61 He claimed to have tested opinion during a business trip through the
57 Ibid.
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counties o f  Arm agh, Londonderry, Down and Antrim, w ith the result that he did not 
‘hear a word o f  approval o f  the two-parliam ent idea, but from many bitter opposition’. 
Gill argued that ‘county option’ would be a fairer form o f  safeguard for Ulster. He 
explained that to have two parliam ents would endanger the chance o f  establishing 
authority in Ireland, ‘by still further breaking up and disintegrating the idea o f  it’.
As the months went by, Gill clearly grew increasingly frustrated with the 
government’s policy, as his letters to Kerr demonstrate. In M ay 1920 he re-stated his 
opinion that ‘the double-headed regime -  will be fatal, grotesquely so, from the point 
of view o f efficiency and mere respect’.62 He further wrote that ‘I do hope that, by 
now, you have put my letter and memos before the P.M. I feel convinced that if  he 
saw them, and especially m y letter [he] would want to see m e’.63 In a separate letter, 
he expressed his displeasure at discussing the reform  o f  Irish governm ent ‘at hasty 
interviews, especially at a stage when measures appear to have been decided’.64 Gill 
felt that his position and experience warranted more respect. He continued:
It is not my view as to how one should be consulted, and the fact that this is 
the only w ay in which an adm inistrator o f  my experience, achievement and 
position is being consulted is in itself significant.. .1 cannot stand by on my 
dignity content to be a mere spectator.. .1 endeavoured to thrust upon you 
yesterday a few points o f  valuable advice. I also wrote to you once or twice, 
as you asked me to do at our first interview. I do not propose to continue this 
p ractice ...65
“  T.P. Gill to Philip Kerr, 5 May 1920, T.P. Gill Papers MS. 13517(4). 
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Gill finished by m aking clear two final points: that to start with two executives was a 
fatal flaw; and that the w ay out should be in the creation o f  a Statutory Constituent 
Assembly for all Ireland.
Gary Peatling has noted that ‘Kerr much preferred the counsel o f  Redmondite 
Nationalist Stephen G w ynn’.66 The latter supported the governm ent’s proposals. He 
believed that through establishing Home Rule in the six counties o f  U lster Irish unity
67could eventually be achieved. The Bill’s provision for matters such as the railways, 
agriculture and old age pensions also meant that it would be in the national interest for 
the two sides to find com m on ground and to cooperate with one another. In 
acknowledging Nationalist objections to partition, the northern Catholic minority, and 
the limitation o f  powers, Gwynn argued that it made sense to work with the offer that 
was in place. To wait would be to leave things as they were. This was a message 
welcome in Downing Street and Kerr urged the Irish Secretary Hamar Greenwood to 
meet with Gwynn. In April 1920 Kerr noted that:
Stephen Gwynn is one o f  the few nationalists o f  independence who have taken 
a really sane view o f  things both during the convention and since, and who 
supports the present Bill. He has various suggestions to make about personnel 
in connection with Irish legislation which he would be glad if  you would take 
into consideration.68
There is a considerable amount o f  correspondence between Kerr and Stephen 
Gwynn during 1919-21. Gwynn w rote to Kerr in December 1919 informing him o f  
mixed reactions to the proposed Bill. The form er’s view was that the success o f  the
67 G-K. Peatling, B ritish  O pinion a n d  Ir ish  Self-G overnm ent 1865-1925, p. 154.
68 Stephen Gwynn, Undated M emo, Lothian Papers, G D 40/17/606.
Philip Kerr to Hamar Greenwood, 9 April 1920, Lothian Papers, G D 40/17/79/146.
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scheme depended on bribing Ulster. He advised that ‘the Imperial constitution must 
be fixed so that by accepting H.R. Ireland will be better off, and this should not be by 
a narrow m argin’.69 Interestingly, there is no evidence o f  Kerr talking to other 
Redmondites, such as Tim  Healy, W illiam  O ’Brien, John Dillon or Joseph Devlin. It 
may be that Gwynn was preferred because he was a Protestant. Paul Bew also goes 
some way towards explaining w hy the British leadership trusted him .70 Gwynn had 
made it clear that he thought Redm ond should have accepted Carson’s offer o f  a 
compromise in 1914: an open-ended exclusion o f  the six counties that would leave the 
way open for eventual unity on the basis o f  consent.71 Bew argues that in neglecting 
the constitutional nationalist critique o f  the Anglo-Irish W ar, historians have failed to 
see that from the spring o f  1920 British policy was based on the necessity o f  m aking a 
pragmatic deal w ith Sinn Fein .72
Kerr certainly saw Gwynn as a man with w hom  he could work. In a letter to Sir 
Auckland Geddes in July 1920, he explained that there was no-one else in Ireland 
with whom the British governm ent could deal in representing Irish interests. Ken- 
argued that ‘If  you had a Botha, or even a Parnell, you could settle both with U lster 
and with nationalist Ireland on satisfactory terms. But you have got no such m en’.
He further explained:
Even the nom inal leaders o f  Sinn Fein such as Arthur Griffiths [sic] do not
seem to have any effective control over the m urder gang, and have got
^  Stephen Gwynn to Philip Kerr, 5 D ec 1919, Lothian Papers, G D 40/17/78/4-8.
Paul Bew ‘Moderate Nationalism  and the Irish Revolution, 1916-1923’ in The H istorica l Journa l, 




themselves into such a position that it is practically impossible for them  to 
make any move towards conciliation.73
This observation dem onstrates that Kerr was aware that for much o f  the period Sinn 
Fein was not in control o f  the IRA. Lloyd George echoed K err’s sentiments when he 
declared that he would ‘stand by ’ the bill ‘until someone with real authority in Ireland 
appeared with whom  it was possible to negotiate’.74 Kerr therefore saw Gwynn as a 
useful intermediary betw een the British and the Irish. Furthermore, even though he 
suspected that the situation w ould probably worsen in the following months, he 
believed that, fundamentally, the situation was improving because it was becoming 
apparent that Sinn Fein was holding out for something that England would not give.
He suggested to Geddes that if  they were to drop independence then the gap between 
Sinn Fein and the Bill would not be unbridgeable. M oreover, Kerr insisted that if 
Sinn Fein would not negotiate then the w ar would continue until they were broken.75
Alongside his support for repression in Ireland, Kerr recognised the seriousness o f  
the situation. He reported to Geddes in July 1920 that the state o f  affairs in Ireland 
was as bad as ever due to the frequency o f  the outrages and the Sinn Fein control over 
large tracts o f  the country. He believed, however, that the events were somewhat 
exaggerated in the press, and that both the police and the new administration, under 
Hamar Greenwood, were becoming stronger and managing to take control.76 Indeed 
Kerr appears to have had some doubts over the former secretary for Ireland, Ian 
MacPherson, in handling Irish affairs. In K err’s view, the administration under 
MacPherson had led to disarray in allowing the arrest o f  Irish civilians under
”  Philip Kerr to Auckland Geddes, 5 July 1920, Lothian Papers, G D 40/17/1397.
M Conference o f  Ministers, 13 Oct 1920, CAB 23/23, Quoted in Sheila Lawlor, B rita in  a n d  Ire la n d  
1914-23 (Dublin, 1983) p. 65.
Philip Kerr to Auckland Geddes, 5 July 1920, Lothian Papers, G D 40/17/1397.
6 Ibid.
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suspicion o f  IRA activity. Gwynn was also relieved by G reenw ood’s replacement o f  
MacPherson in 1920.77 Frank Owen has explained that M acPherson’s nerve had gone 
by April 1920 and he lived in continual terror o f  assassination. In sharp contrast, 
Greenwood was a determined character, who did not know what nerves meant, and 
had the determination to tackle the problem  without conceding on the point o f  an Irish 
republic.78 Indeed Kerr was acutely aware o f  the geo-strategic issues:
You have only got to look at the map o f  German submarine sinkings to see 
that Irish independence would be the death blow o f Great Britain, either if 
foreign subm arines were able to base themselves in Irish ports, or even if 
British anti-subm arine operations were not allowed to base themselves on the
• i 79Irish coast.
He referred Geddes to Lloyd G eorge’s belief that ‘Great Britain could never concede 
independence, and would fight it to the end’.80
Kerr was at the height o f  his involvement in Irish affairs between 1919 and 1921.
He enjoyed the Prime M inister’s confidence, representing him at the Paris peace talks 
and supporting his Irish policy. Although his federal beliefs provided a context for 
his involvement in designing a settlement for Ireland, they were not the chief factor 
that determined his role. Kerr moved away from his Round Table colleagues during 
this period and instead viewed the Irish problem  from  the perspective o f  Downing 
Street. He worked closely on the 1920 Government o f  Ireland Bill and witnessed 
first-hand the difficulties the governm ent faced in trying to appease all parties. Lloyd
77 Stephen Gwynn to Philip Kerr, 5 April [1920?], Lothian Papers G D 40/17/78/1.
79 Frank Owen, Tem pestuous Journey , p. 564.
Philip Kerr to Auckland Geddes, 5 July 1920, Lothian Papers, G D 40/17/1397.
80 Ibid.
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George was the key influence on K err’s views during these years and, as a result, he 
defended the governm ent’s policy o f  repression in Ireland. Although he was aware o f  
the criticisms in the press, he m aintained his belief that the government was right in 
its approach. To give in to the extreme nationalists would be to allow m urder and 
assassination to drive policy. K err’s reliance on individual contacts, such as Stephen 
Gwynn, suggests that the governm ent was not using a wide range o f  advisors in 1919- 
21. He ignored such figures as Plunkett and Gill, and argued that the Government o f  
Ireland Bill, rather than dom inion status, provided a workable solution to the problem. 
Kerr hoped that the partition o f  U lster would be a tem porary measure that would lead 
to eventual unity, and structured the Bill accordingly. He always maintained 
confidence in it and sought to drive the legislation forward.
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Chapter 6
Kerr, the United States and the Irish Question
American opinion was an im portant context for the making o f  the Government o f  
Ireland Bill and there were distinct American elements to Anglo-Irish politics 
between 1919 and 1921. The United States has always played a significant part in the 
history o f  Irish resistance to British rule, largely due to the level o f  Irish immigration 
to America from  the mid eighteenth century onwards. This became a more serious 
threat to the British governm ent from  1916 as Am erican assistance was sought in the 
First World W ar and the Irish problem  threatened transatlantic relations. The level o f  
Irish nationalist lobbying for Am erican support became particularly threatening 
between 1919 and 1921 as the British governm ent attempted to put a settlement in 
place and (from  the British perspective) the illegal Irish government, Dail Eireann, 
came into being on 7 January 1919. Kerr was closely involved in the American 
aspects o f  the Irish question during this period yet to date he has not been linked with 
this in any significant way. This chapter aims to address this through exploration o f  
specific areas, including Irish attempts to influence the peace conference, the 
management o f  press opinion in the United States, intelligence relating to Irish- 
American activity, and Am erican intervention in the Irish question.
Historians have produced a great deal o f  work on Am erican involvement in the 
Irish question during the period concerned, notably Ireland and Anglo-American 
Relations 1899-1921 by Alan J. W ard, and Francis M. Carroll’s American Opinion
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and the Irish Question 1910-23} Both W ard and Carroll describe the difficulties 
faced by both the British and Am erican governments in trying to maintain relations 
while Irish revolutionaries attempted to gain Am erican support for their cause. Some 
work has also been produced on K err’s connection with the United States during his 
life and career. The area o f ‘Anglo-Am erican relations’ is in fact a key theme for 
historians writing about him. Kerr was a British imperialist who greatly admired the 
United States and was interested in promoting stronger relations between the two 
nations. Both biographers, Butler and Billington, have referred to this in then- 
respective works. In describing K err’s appointment as Am bassador to the United 
States, Butler states that ‘from  the first he had liked America and Americans -  he 
always felt fifteen years younger when he landed in New York, he said’.2 In John 
Turner’s volume The Larger Idea, Lord Lothian and the Problem o f National 
Sovereignty, three o f  the chapters are dedicated to this theme in K err’s life. These 
include pieces on the connection between the Am erican federal system o f  government 
and Kerr’s Imperial federation views, his role in paving the w ay to ‘Lend-Lease’ 
during the Second W orld War, and his time as Ambassador to the United States. One 
of the contributors, Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones, has also written numerous articles on 
Kerr’s American connections.3 Yet there has been no study exploring the Irish 
dimension to K err’s Am erican interests and involvement.
Kerr has been described as belonging to a diverse group o f ‘A tlanticists’ within 
public life who supported close Anglo-Am erican diplomatic collaboration. B.J.C.
Alan J. Ward, Ire land  a n d  A nglo-A m erican  R elations 1899-1921  (London, 1969); Francis M. Carroll, 
American Opinion a n d  the Irish Q uestion 1910-23  (Dublin, 1978).
3 J.R.M. Butler, L o rd  Loth ian  (Philip K err) 1882-1940  (London, 1960) p. 257.
These include ‘The Inestimable Advantage o f  Not Being English: Lord Lothian’s American 
Ambassadorship, 1939-1940’ in Sco tland  a n d  A m erica; S tudies Illustrative o f  the Scots in the U nited  
States and Canada, The Sco ttish  H istorica l R eview  No. 63 (April, 1984) pp. 105-110; ‘Lord Lothian 
and American Democracy: An Illusion in Pursuit o f  an Illusion’ in The C anadian R eview  o f  A m erican  
Studies No. 17 (Winter, 1986) pp. 411-422.
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McKercher described this group as ‘ranging from decided pro-Americans like Kerr 
and Cecil to more cautious ones such as Balfour and Lloyd G eorge’.4 Kerr was 
certainly pro-American. Early in his career he had been inspired by F.S. O liver’s 
Alexander Hamilton and admired the federal system o f  government in the United 
States.5 As we have seen, his closest friend and confidante was Nancy Astor, and he 
converted to Christian Science, an A m erican-based religion. During his time at 
Downing Street, however, Kerr did not have the level o f  experience or understanding 
of America and Am erican politics that he would gain later, first as Secretary to the 
Rhodes Trust, and subsequently as the British Am bassador to the United States. One 
of Kerr’s associates, Horace Plunkett, had spent time in America during the 1880s and 
his co-operation m ovem ent was greatly influenced by his Am erican experience. But 
as the previous chapter demonstrated, Kerr was dismissive o f  Plunkett in 1919-21.
Prior to entering Lloyd G eorge’s secretariat Kerr had some limited experience o f  
the American dim ension to the Irish question. Chapter 3 o f  this thesis explored some 
of the ways in which Kerr used Am erican contacts to address the Irish question as a 
member o f ‘The Round Table’ in 1910. He recognised that contacts such as Bourke 
Cochran and M oreton Frewen were valuable in publicising the idea o f  a federal 
system o f government for Ireland. Yet by 1916 Kerr was more concerned with the 
implications o f  Am erican involvement in the war and the organisation o f  the peace 
that followed. He assisted H orace Plunkett at this time when the latter travelled to the 
United States with a view to speaking with President W oodrow Wilson and his 
foreign advisor, Colonel E.M. House, about Anglo-Am erican relations. Plunkett had 
asked Kerr to put down on paper his views regarding the United States and peace­
making, based on a conversation they had had, so that Plunkett could communicate
s B.J.C. McKercher, E sm e H oward, A D ip lom atic  B iography  (Cambridge, 1989) p. 274.
F.S. Oliver, A lexander H am ilton: A n  E ssay on A m erican  Union (London, 1906).
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these thoughts to W ilson and H ouse.6 Kerr disliked the idea that the United States 
might propose a ‘draw n w ar’:
For the fact that she [America] has failed to recognise officially that there is a 
moral issue in the W ar, makes it possible that she will be driven to suggest 
peace terms which would in effect involve the partial triumph o f  the militarist 
evil, on the hum anitarian plea o f  saving human life.7
Although this letter demonstrates K err’s concerns regarding British interests in the 
war, it also reveals his use o f  a prom inent Irish figure in furthering links w ith the 
United States. Ireland was one o f  the most dangerous sources o f  Anglo-Am erican 
disagreement and it was fortunate that Colonel House was on good terms with 
Plunkett as the latter could explain the issues to President W ilson.8 According to 
Seymour, as a result o f  P lunkett’s information, W ilson was able to resist pressure to 
sponsor protests against British policy in Ireland, which would have endangered 
Anglo-American cooperation.9
As the previous chapter explained, the peace negotiations that took place after the 
war provided an im portant context to the governm ent’s subsequent Irish policy. The 
same was true o f  the Am erican dimension to the Irish problem  between 1919 and 
1921. Kerr experienced his first serious dealings with Ireland and the United States at 
the Paris peace conference. The newly formed Dail Eireann wasted no time in seizing 
the opportunity o f  the conference to present its case for independence. Eamon de 
Valera sought Am erican assistance. As a result o f  President W ilson’s declaration o f
* Philip Kerr to A.J. Balfour, 14 D ec 1916, A.J. Balfour Papers A dd.49797/14. 
g Philip Kerr to Horace Plunkett, 5 Dec 1916, A.J. Balfour Papers A dd.49797/20-21.
Charles Seymour (ed.), The In tim ate  P apers o f  C olonel House, Vol. Ill, In to  the W orld War A pril
1917-June 1918  (London, 1928) p.79.
Ibid., p p .  79-82.
159
support for the rights o f  small nations, and the principle o f  self-determination, there 
appeared to be some hope o f  the Irish gaining a sympathetic hearing. At the first 
public session o f  the Dail, three delegates to the conference were appointed: de 
Valera, Arthur Griffith, and George Noble, Count Plunkett. As two o f  the appointed 
delegates, de Valera and Griffith were in jail at the time, Sean T. O ’Kelly, chairman 
of the Dail, was chosen to go to Paris as ‘Envoy o f  the Irish Republic’ to try and 
secure their admission to the conference.10 Following O ’K elly’s unsuccessful 
attempt, the Dail looked to Irish-Americans to support their efforts. At the 
Philadelphia Irish Race Convention in February 1919, three Irish-American delegates 
were selected to take up the Irish cause. The three men, Frank P. Walsh, M ichael J. 
Ryan and Edward F. Dunne, took the title o f  the ‘Am erican Commission on Irish 
Independence’ and sought to lobby the British and American delegations in order to 
help them gain entry for the Irish delegates. I f  they were unsuccessful in their mission 
they were to present the Irish case themselves.
The Commission requested that W ilson use his influence to obtain passports for 
the Irish delegates to attend the conference. The President, however, refused to see 
them on the grounds that he was too occupied with the business o f  the talks. Instead, 
the British tried to alleviate the situation by providing the Commission with passports 
to visit Ireland. Although Frank Owen states that Lloyd George readily provided the 
Irish-American delegates with the passports in order to relieve the prejudice against 
Britain in the United States, it was in fact Kerr who was influential in arranging th is .11 
According to the diary and correspondence o f  the Commission, Kerr was contacted by 
William C. Bullit, who was in charge o f  the Intelligence department for the American
Frank Owen, Tem pestuous Journey  (London, 1954) p. 557.
Ibid., p .  558.
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section of the peace conference.12 Although Kerr replied confidentially that it was 
possible that the Irish would gain passports, the Americans would surely understand 
that the British could never allow them to appear before the peace conference. He 
did, however, agree to meet Walsh and Bullit to discuss matters further. The 
Commission recorded in its diary that Kerr was known to have a very great influence 
over Lloyd George, especially with regards to the Irish question.13 Indeed he sought 
to arrange a meeting between the American Commission and the Prime Minister. In 
the mean time the Commission would visit Ireland to meet with their Irish 
counterparts.
Kerr’s behind-the-scenes influence appeared to be proving successful for the 
Commission, yet it proved to be disastrous for the British when the delegation arrived 
in Ireland. The members were greeted by huge crowds and parades. They made 
controversial speeches in support o f Irish self-government, met with Sinn Fein 
leaders, and visited prisons to inspect conditions. The British press covered the visit 
in detail and there are numerous clippings and reports in Kerr’s papers charting the 
Commission’s activities.14 This was highly embarrassing for both the Americans and 
the British, and Lloyd George was no longer prepared to meet the Commission or to 
grant passports to the Irish delegates. President Wilson would have no more 
involvement in their efforts, such was the potential damage that may have been done 
to transatlantic relations. In his article, ‘The Versailles Treaty and the Irish 
Americans’, John B. Duff has discussed the exasperation felt by Wilson as a result of
12
F.M. Carroll (ed.) The American Commission on Irish Independence 1919; The Diary, 
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the Irish-American agitation.15 The President was relying on British support for his 
League o f Nations scheme and did not wish to put this in jeopardy.
‘The Irish League o f Nations Society’ also communicated with Kerr in order to 
appeal to Lloyd George on the basis that it had a legitimate case for appearing before 
the League o f Nations, an organisation set up in the wake o f the peace conference on 
President Wilson’s recommendation. In November 1919 Lord Robert Cecil 
forwarded an appeal to Kerr from the Society, asking him to draw it to the Prime 
Minister’s attention if he felt it was worthwhile.16 The appeal quoted President 
Wilson’s statement that a ‘forum should be created to which all people could bring 
any matter which was likely to affect the peace and freedom o f the world’ and made 
reference to self-determination for Ireland, arguing that if dominion status was 
granted to Ireland then she would be entitled to representation at the League o f 
Nations.17 Ultimately, the plea was for the recognition o f the Irish question as an 
international one. Kerr replied to Cecil, explaining that he had been in touch with the 
Irish League o f Nations Society for some time (although there appears to be no 
surviving correspondence between the Society and Kerr). He noted that he would 
draw Lloyd George’s attention to the appeal if he felt that it served any useful purpose 
and explained that ‘The League o f Nations has hitherto pursued, except in America,
[a] fairly uncontroversial course, but I am afraid this could not be said to be true o f the 
view which the Irish Society takes o f its functions’.18 Kerr was clearly irritated by 
Irish attempts to use the League in order to further their case for independence.
15 John B. Duff, ‘The Versailles Treaty and the Irish-Americans’ The Journal o f  American History, 
Vol. 55, No. 3, (December, 1968), pp. 582-598.
|7 Robert Cecil to Philip Kerr, 7 Nov 1919, Lothian Papers GD40/17/207/140.
Irish League of Nations Society to Lord Robert Cecil, [c. 7 November 1919], Lothian Papers 
GD40/17/207/141.
18 Philip Kerr to Robert Cecil, 10 Nov 1919, Lothian Papers GD40/17/207/145.
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The attempts by the Irish to address the peace conference, and the actions o f the 
American Commission on Irish Independence, were likely to have been contributing 
factors to Lloyd George’s recognition o f the immediate need to address the Irish 
question. Just as the Irish Convention o f 1917 had been held in part to appease 
American opinion o f Irish affairs, the Government o f Ireland Act was in part designed 
to this end. It seems likely that the Irish lobbying at the peace conference had played 
its part in highlighting the necessity o f pushing ahead with an Irish settlement and 
American opinion was an important consideration in this. The papers o f the ‘Cabinet 
Committee on Ireland’ reveal just how important the American context was. A 
memorandum from Viscount Grey in Washington expressed concerns over the effect 
that Irish affairs had on policy in the United States.19 He believed that the absence o f 
an announcement about self-government for Ireland was doing great harm and urged 
that ‘Irish hostility is at present an active and might become a critically unfavourable
influence in American politics, that a statement o f Irish policy on self-government
20lines is now very desirable and might at any time become very urgent’. He 
recommended that the Committee inform him o f the outlines o f the new Irish policy 
in case he had observations to make in relation to how it may influence American 
opinion.
The American context was therefore a pressing consideration and the members of 
the Committee were kept updated on American opinion during their deliberations. In 
a report by the joint-secretary to the Committee, Lawrence Burgis, it was explained 
that the behaviour o f the Irish had rendered the agitation unpopular with the United 
States government. This was assumed to be as a result o f ‘Irish co-operation with the
Grey was in Washington as a special ambassador from September 1919 to try and persuade the 
Senate to join the League of Nations.
' Memo by Viscount Grey, ‘SECRET. C .I.L ’ 4 Oct 1919, Cabinet Papers CAB/27/69/1.
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enemy’.21 But the report acknowledged that the change in attitude in America had 
been as a result o f the actions o f the extreme Irish, rather than approval o f British 
policy. It stated that ‘The impression that a small nationality is not “getting a fair 
show” at British hands is easily implemented’.22 The Committee therefore attempted 
to weigh up the exact nature o f  American opinion. In a resumé of American press 
opinion on the Irish Question it was reported that:
The opinions and views taken by nearly every newspaper in the United States 
are distinctly hostile to England on the Irish question. There appears to be 
little doubt that the Sinn Fein campaign organised by De Valera has by its 
methods o f  propaganda captured nearly every newspaper and has produced a 
strong anti-English and pro-Irish tone throughout them. The only notable 
exception appears to be the ‘Boston Christian Science Monitor’ which is a 
paper with an international reputation and well-informed independent news 
services. It remains warmly pro-English and this is possibly due to the fact
23that it is an anti-Catholic organ.
The point regarding The Christian Science M onitor is fascinating given Kerr’s beliefs 
and later connection with the paper. He would write regularly for the Monitor in the 
years after he left Downing Street. It is not clear whether Kerr wrote this particular 
press resumé, although it is certainly possible. It seems unlikely, however, that he 
would claim that the M onitor was ‘pro-English’ due to it being an ‘anti-Catholic 
organ’. The next chapter will deal with Kerr’s faith in more detail, but it is worth
21 Report by Lawrence Burgis, ‘SECRET C .I.l’ 13 Oct 1919, Cabinet Papers CAB/27/69/1.
22 Ibid.
‘Resume of the American Press Opinion on the Irish Question’ [c. Oct 1919], Cabinet Papers 
CAB/27/69/1.
noting that English Catholics did not associate their brand o f Catholicism with that of 
the Irish.
Kerr’s position as one o f the secretaries o f the Committee meant that he dealt with 
most of the material relating to American opinion. This included the question o f the 
American press. He was already fully aware o f the damage that been done with 
regards to American public opinion as a result o f Irish propaganda in the United 
States. In his 1919 Round Table article, entitled ‘The Harvest o f Victory’, he wrote 
that ‘America in her self-concentration has allowed herself to be deceived by Irish 
propagandists’.24 Kerr seems to have been suggesting that American public opinion 
would not be Anglophobic without Irish propaganda. He had been advised by ‘One 
of the best American newspaper organizers, Waldo’ that publicity would be an 
effective cure for many United States misconceptions on Irish matters.25 Before the 
Government o f Ireland Bill was formally introduced in Parliament, some 
consideration would thus have to be given to its presentation in the United States.
In Kerr’s papers relating to the Government o f Ireland Bill there is a document 
from the publicity department outlining an estimate o f the propaganda expenditure for 
the United States, along with an overview o f the scheme.26 A plan was drawn up to 
carry out an intensive publicity campaign there for a period o f six months, based on 
the settlement that was reached and the various parties’ reactions to it. The scheme 
was extensive and J. Tilley noted that:
We may look for a plan o f  some duration, during which every sort of 
misstatement will be made and every opportunity utilised to prejudice the 
issue. To counter-act this it will not suffice merely to present the true facts in
[Philip Kerr], ‘The Harvest of Victory’ in The Round Table No. 36 (September, 1919) p. 670.
“ Lord Northcliffe to Philip Kerr, 30 Sept 1918, Lothian Papers GD40/17/216.
6 J. Tilley to Philip Kerr, 7 Nov 1919, Lothian Papers GD40/17/585.
165
the form o f categorical statements. They will require to be constantly and 
skilfully reiterated in such a way as to appeal to the interest and sympathy o f 
different classes in America.27
The campaign was to involve ordinary news, signed and unsigned articles, interviews, 
pamphlets and lectures. The estimated expenditure for the operation, and the extra 
staff involved, came to £9,500 for a period o f six months.
It is unclear how serious this scheme really was. It may well have been merely a 
superficial exercise which did not actively target the key groups in American society 
or try to determine the true nature o f American attitudes towards the British 
government’s Irish policy. Nevertheless, following the introduction of the 
government’s proposals in December 1919, Kerr sent a memorandum to Lloyd 
George attaching a report by the publicity department on the reaction o f the American 
press. Kerr wrote that:
I gather that your speech and the Irish proposals have had a good press in 
America.. .Your speech is being reprinted in America and circulated to all
newspapers. I am arranging for the same to be done in the Dominions and for
28it to be circulated to all Embassies abroad.
The report that he attached stated that three important points had been picked up by 
the American papers. Firstly, the proposals were prominently printed so that they 
were not left open to misrepresentation. Secondly, the parallel had been drawn 
between Ireland and a constituent state in America, and it was explained that
J  J. Tilley to Philip Kerr, 7 Nov 1919, Lothian Papers GD40/17/585.
Philip Kerr to Lloyd George, 2 Jan 1920, Lloyd George Papers F/90/1/1.
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‘“secession” cannot be contemplated by Great Britain’.29 Finally, the report observed 
‘A keener realisation o f  the difficulties o f the problem especially in view o f the 
position o f U lster’. There was, however, not a wide sample o f newspapers and their 
reactions; rather the report focused on New York based papers and correspondents, 
presumably due to the large numbers o f Irish-Americans there. Papers such as the 
isolationist D aily News and New York World, which supported Woodrow Wilson, 
were bound to take a positive view o f the government’s Irish proposals. The author o f 
the press report, C.J. Phillips, wrote that criticism and opposition was ‘almost 
confined to Irish elements in America’. In pointing to ‘our future line o f action’ he 
recorded the intention to refrain from ‘anything like an aggressive propaganda 
campaign in favour o f the Irish proposals’.31
This in fact puts forward a rather misleading view o f the actual state o f Anglo- 
American relations during the period concerned. In the run up to the 1920 
presidential election the Irish question was exploited as an issue by Democrats in 
general, and also by Republican isolationist candidates, such as Senator Hiram 
Johnson o f California. Thomas A. Bailey noted that the Irish in America were 
generally Democratic and for every Irishman that the Republicans could turn against 
Wilson ‘represented a gain o f more than one vote’.32 Wilson’s failure to secure self- 
determination for Ireland in Paris had angered Irish-Americans and there was 
widespread opposition to his League o f Nations scheme. Presidential candidates were 
quick to exploit this in appealing to Irish-American voters. The British government 
may have been keen to secure support for its Irish policy in 1919-20, but there is 
reason to suggest that any publicity campaign was ineffective. American journalist
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and satirist H.L. Mencken actually argued in February 1920 that British pressure on 
American journalism increased bad feeling between the two countries. He wrote that:
The English, usually so skilful at leading the Yankee by the nose, now show a 
distressing lack o f form. Their papers begin to go on at a furious rate, 
denouncing everything as dishonest and disgusting. The doctrine that 
Americans won the war -  a very tender point -  is laughed at.33
American Anglophobia was not by any means confined to Irish-American 
elements o f society. The Versailles Treaty had been widely unpopular for a variety of 
reasons which Bailey sets forth in his classic work, Woodrow Wilson and the Great 
Betrayal. He says o f 1919: ‘Seldom have times been more out o f joint for great 
masses of Americans’.34 An army o f four million men had been demobilised and 
industrial demobilisation was also a colossal undertaking. The fear o f Bolshevism 
meant that socialists were unusually active, while the railroads were in a confused 
state following the government take-over during the war. Bailey notes that more 
dangerous than any o f  these was the opposition o f large numbers o f the public, 
including immigrant groups, the Irish-Americans foremost among these, but also 
German and Italian-Americans. Aside from immigrant groups there were liberals, 
isolationists and ‘professional British-haters’ who opposed the treaty and feared 
American cooperation with Britain. Chief among these ‘British-haters’ was 
newspaper magnate William Randolph Hearst, whose five million readers were 
becoming more Anglophobic by the day as his papers denounced the leading
H.L. Mencken ‘A Carnival of Buncombe, February 9, 1920’ in Malcolm Moos (ed), H.L. Mencken,
A Carnival o f  Buncombe (Baltimore, 1965) p. 7.
Thomas A. Bailey, Woodrow Wilson and the Great Betrayal, p. 18.
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Anglophile candidate, Herbert Hoover, for courting British diplomats and ministers. 
Mencken wrote in February 1920 that:
Hoover, it appears by these Hearstian blasts, is actually no more than a 
pussyfoot sent out by Lloyd George, Sir George Paish and company to 
insinuate him self into the confidence o f innocent Americans, seduce them into 
voting for him. So hoist himself into the White House -  and then hand over 
the country to the unholy English.35
In his report from the publicity department, C.J. Phillips most certainly did not 
comment on the reception o f  the government’s Irish proposals by any o f Hearst’s 
publications.
Kerr does not appear to have been frilly aware o f the strength o f American 
Anglophobia and it is possible that, as a direct result, Lloyd George remained ill 
informed. His ignorance was perhaps further due to his personal contact with both 
Wilson and House in Paris, both strong Anglophiles. Kerr was also in regular contact 
with John S. Steele in 1919-20. Steele had been the managing editor o f the Edward 
Marshall Newspaper Syndicate before leaving to take charge o f the London Bureau o f 
the isolationist C hicago Tribune in September 1919. Steele appears to have been pro- 
British and told Kerr that he wanted ‘to help in maintaining and promoting those good 
relations between our countries which are being jeopardized by this wretched Irish 
mess’.36 In January 1920 he sent Kerr cuttings from the Tribune in which was 
reported the Friends o f Irish Freedom resolution to condemn the Chicago Tribune for
H.L. Mencken ‘A Carnival of Buncombe, February 9, 1920’ in Malcolm Moos (ed), H.L. Mencken,
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its anti-Irish bias; he thought this would amuse Kerr.37 This might have added to 
Kerr’s impression o f the pro-British tone o f American public opinion.
Kerr however recognised the distinction between Irish-American support for Irish 
nationalism and the position o f the American government. A statement he made to 
Lloyd George in 1920 confirms this. In 1920 there had been considerable agitation by 
Irish-American nationalists for the recognition o f Ireland’s right to independence by 
the American government. Following the failure o f this Congress did take some 
unofficial action in the form o f a letter to Lloyd George, protesting against the 
imprisonment o f Irishmen without trial.38 In response, Kerr argued that ‘everybody 
knows that every politician in America has to play up to the Irish game, and that all 
this agitation is merely window dressing with a view to meeting the presidential 
election.’39 Kerr did not think that the transatlantic relationship was seriously 
threatened by the Irish agitation; rather he saw Ireland as a thorn in the relationship’s 
side. Having advised Lloyd George merely to acknowledge the message from the 
congressmen, he admitted ‘I should rather like to send an insulting reply but I don’t 
think the Prime Minister o f Great Britain can do that’.40 Indeed, the following July 
Kerr informed the British Ambassador in Washington, Auckland Geddes, that the 
Irish situation was beginning to improve. He believed that:
Sinn Fein is gradually finding out that it is not all beer and skittles challenging
the existence o f the British Empire, especially when it finds that the United
^ John S. Steele to Philip Kerr, 8 Jan 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/219/782.
M Francis M. Carroll, American Opinion and the Irish Question 1910-23, p. 154.
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States has definitely made up its mind not to quarrel with Great Britain for the 
sake o f the Irish politician.41
Although Kerr admitted that the situation in Ireland was as bad as ever, he seemed 
confident that the American government was not prepared to damage relations with 
Great Britain on account o f Irish-American lobbying and extreme Irish nationalist 
activity. Kerr continued to believe this following the Republican electoral victory in 
November 1920 and the succession o f Warren G. Harding to the presidency. In 
December 1920 Henry Wickham Steed, editor o f The Times, informed Kerr that ‘If 
there is nothing in the nature o f at least an embryonic settlement before March, we 
shall find the new American administration goaded into doing something unpleasant 
which the Government may not be able to ignore.’42 Kerr however was not concerned 
by this information:
My information about the Republican Administration does not entirely 
confirm yours. I have no doubt that strong pressure will be exerted by another 
campaign, but I gather that they are determined to be extremely cautious about 
all their moves in foreign affairs and I do not think there is any likelihood of 
their being stampeded into rash action.43
In the long-term Kerr would remain much more concerned about the potential damage 
that Irish-American support for Irish aspirations could do to the British Empire.
Between June 1919 and December 1920 the president o f Dail Eireann, Eamon de 
Valera, embarked on an eighteen-month publicity trip to the United States following
Philip Kerr to Sir Auckland Geddes, 5 July 1920, The Lothian Papers GD40/17/1397.
Henry Wickham Steed to Philip Kerr, 30 December 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/80/213.
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his escape from Lincoln jail. This has been well documented by historians, film 
makers and by de Valera’s biographers. His stage-managed surprise appearance at 
the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York, shortly after his arrival, was highly 
embarrassing for both governments. Historians have differed in their accounts o f how 
successful the American trip was for de Valera. In the most recent in-depth 
assessment o f de Valera’s career Diarmaid Ferriter writes that, on paper at least, the 
trip appeared to be a big success as a fundraiser. It was ‘a considerable propaganda 
triumph, but it also created conflict and rows and failed to achieve the recognition o f 
the Irish Republic’.44 Without the benefit o f hindsight, however, the campaign was 
worrying for the British government as it was eighteen months long and threatening in 
terms of the financial assistance that Sinn Fein acquired. Although literature exists on 
British intelligence on Irish nationalists during this period, the intelligence that Kerr 
received from American, or American based, sources has remained relatively 
unexplored by historians.45 There has been a lack o f focus on informants that 
government aides, such as Kerr, had access to. Letters to Lloyd George from Louis 
Tracy of the British Bureau o f Information in New York are particularly intriguing.46 
The letters are in the Lothian collection, suggesting that Kerr dealt with this 
correspondence on behalf o f  the Prime Minister. The ‘British Bureau o f Information’ 
in New York had been closed down at the end o f the war, yet Tracy continued to send 
detailed correspondence regarding Sinn Fein activity in the United States.
Writing in February 1920 he warned that:
44 Diarmaid Ferriter, Judging Dev (Dublin, 2007) p. 34.
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De Valera and associates have almost perfected a scheme possibly far more 
dangerous to Britain than anything yet attempted, as it connotes nothing less 
than a revolution in Ireland coinciding with serious out-breaks in Egypt and 
India and with a determined effort to so control public opinion in this country 
that the Senate and Congress may actually be moved to recognise the Irish 
Republic.47
The Senate had previously rejected the Versailles Treaty with Ireland one o f the 
issues that led to the rejection. Tracy urged that it would be a mistake to treat the 
threat too lightly as the Sinn Fein movement in America was widespread and had 
enthusiastic financial supporters such as Henry Ford o f Detroit, founder o f the Ford 
Motor Company. He claimed that the movement was ‘widespread, well organised, 
and malignant in purpose’.48 He also expressed particular concern over the role o f the 
Catholic Church in assisting the Irish cause in financing and sheltering members o f 
the movement (this will be dealt with further in the following chapter). His concerns 
over the movements o f Sean Nunan, who he describes as ‘The man who has charge of 
the Assassination Department’ and ‘a very dangerous person’, reveal the level o f 
concern that Tracy expressed in his letters.49
Very little has been written about Nunan, although historians have made passing 
references to him in their work, nearly always in relation to the American campaign. 
David Fitzpatrick describes Nunan as a ‘puny Londoner with Limerick origins’.50 His 
parents lived in the capital and C. Desmond Greaves wrote that ‘The father was an old 
I.R.B. man, and Labour supporter. He and his wife kept open house to members o f
47 Louis Tracy to Philip Kerr, 24 Feb 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/78/75.
48 Louis Tracy to Philip Kerr, 24 Feb 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/78/75-79.
49 Louis Tracy to Philip Kerr, 26 Feb 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/78/82.
David Fitzpatrick, Harry Boland’s Irish Revolution (Cork, 2003) p. 127.
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the Irish movement in London’.51 Nunan was a comrade o f both Michael Collins and 
Harry Boland, having become intimate with Collins during their internment at 
Frongoch in 1916, and later became one o f four clerks at the first meeting o f the Dail 
in January 1919.52 A letter written to Collins from New York in September 1919 
suggests that Nunan went to the United States to assist with de Valera’s campaign 
there.53 Greaves described Nunan as de Valera’s secretary during the American trip. 
He wrote that the suite at the W aldorf Astoria in New York, where de Valera based 
himself, was the scene o f constant activity and from there Nunan helped with the 
campaign, along with Mellows and Boland.54
Tracy’s intelligence presented Nunan as a considerable threat. He reported that 
Nunan had ‘at times been known to wear the clothes o f a Roman Catholic Priest, 
though he is not one’ and linked him with ‘Mellowes, Lajpat Rai, and the Egyptian 
Nationalist Section’.55 Yet Nunan does not appear to have been any more ‘dangerous’ 
than Harry Boland or Liam Mellows, although Tracy was correct in linking the Irish 
campaigners with Lajpat Rai. The Indian politician and reformer, Lala Lajpat Rai, 
had popularised the Indian nationalist struggle in America through his publication 
Young India and his foundation o f  the Indian Home Rule League o f America in 
1915.56 Greaves indicates that Lajpat Rai had attended the Philadelphia Race 
Convention and probably met Mellows there.57 They later addressed a meeting 
together on 24 April 1919 at St. John’s Hall in Newark, New Jersey. Greaves writes:
51 C. Desmond Greaves, Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution ’ (Belfast, 2004) p. 220 (first ed. 
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Thereafter Indians contributed regularly to the ‘Irish Press’. The two 
movements grew closer together. Not only did Irish speakers support the 
campaign against the deportation o f Indian militants, but the Irish Republican 
seamen provided the safest line o f  communication between the national 
movement in India and the Indian exiles throughout the world.58
Although we have no sense o f his immediate reaction to Tracy’s observations in 
1920, a letter that Kerr wrote to Lloyd George in 1921 seems to be partly based on 
information from this source the previous year. Kerr was managing director o f  Lloyd 
George’s newspaper, The D aily Chronicle, at that point and wrote to the Prime 
Minister from Fleet Street describing ‘disquieting’ information about ‘American Sinn 
Fein’.59 He was worried by the fact that the American agitation was linked with 
groups such as Indians and Egyptians, and ‘haters o f England’ in France and 
Germany. He explained that such groups saw a real chance o f ‘smashing the British 
Empire’ as they believed that if they could secure an Irish republic then the same 
could be achieved in India and Egypt.60 It is possible to make a link here between 
Lajpat Rai’s connection with the Irish movement and Kerr’s involvement with Indian 
affairs in the 1930s. He did not want to see the government repeat the same mistakes 
in India that had been made in Ireland.
De Valera’s prolonged campaign in the United States, along with the escalating 
Anglo-Irish War at home (under the management o f Michael Collins for Sinn Fein in 
de Valera’s absence), probably helped to persuade Kerr o f the potential benefit o f the 
mediation attempt by Colonel House in 1920. Kerr’s confidence in the American 
officials was no doubt aided by his acquaintance with President Wilson and Colonel
59 I b ' d -
Philip Kerr to Lloyd George, 14 Sept 1921, Lloyd George Papers F/34/2/7.
60 Ibid.
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House at the Paris peace conference. In his recent biography o f House, Godfrey 
Hodgson has commented that ‘both House and Wilson were conservative in their 
instincts. Neither had much sympathy for European socialism, for Russian 
revolutionists, or even in practice for Irish nationalism’. 61 He adds that ‘Both were
instinctively Anglophile, House more so than Wilson. House found the British
62
annoyingly cautious’. House had sailed to England immediately after the 
conference in June 1919 and, with his wife, ‘launched on a summer o f furious social 
activity. Every aristocratic door was open to them now’.63 Although Hodgson does 
not say so, this was quite possibly down to Kerr. House met the Astors during his 
visit and, in later years, visited Kerr (he was then Lord Lothian) at his home, Blickling 
Hall. It was perhaps through this connection with Kerr that House offered to mediate 
between the government and Sinn Fein in July 1920.
Turner and Dockrill have described the interviews that Kerr held with House on 
Lloyd George’s behalf.64 House was not representing Wilson in this initiative and 
was almost certainly acting independently. The relationship between House and 
Wilson had deteriorated in early 1919 and, by March, Wilson no longer used House as 
a confidential advisor. By the time the latter held conversations with Kerr in July 
1920, Wilson’s wife, Edith Bolling Galt Wilson, was dealing with important matters 
of state on behalf o fh er husband due to Wilson’s debilitating stoke o f October 1919. 
Edith Wilson famously disliked House and his position was weakened as a result. It 
is therefore convincing to suggest that as a mediator between the Irish and the British 
House was an independent agent.
1 Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson's Right Hand, The Life o f  Colonel Edward M. House (Yale, 
2006) p. 106.
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David P. Billington has claimed that Kerr welcomed the offer by Colonel House to 
mediate.65 In order to win over the British public to the use o f force, Kerr believed it 
would be necessary to exhaust the options o f diplomacy.66 In a letter to Lloyd George 
regarding his conversation with House, he explained that ‘I think you will have to be 
able to prove that you have exhausted every expedient to arrive at an agreed solution, 
before you settle down to force’.67 Yet, at the same time, he stated: ‘I doubt if the 
House move, even if it comes off, will be enough, for it won’t be public’.68 Kerr did 
not believe that a settlement was possible in July 1920. In a letter to Lloyd George he 
wrote:
My own opinion for what it is worth is this. I am not hopeful for a settlement 
at present. The chasm to be bridged is still terribly wide. I doubt if Ireland is 
yet prepared to accept as a final settlement the only terms which it is possible 
for the British Empire to concede.69
Although he held out no hope for the ‘House move’, Kerr presumably thought that it 
would do no harm and at least the government could demonstrate that diplomacy had 
been attempted.
Kerr apparently made it very clear to House what, in his view, the British 
government’s position was in relation to the Sinn Fein leaders. The report o f their 
conversation suggests that Kerr left him in no doubt o f the British position and spoke
David P. Billington, Jr., Lothian, Philip Kerr and the Quest for World Order (Westport, 2006) p. 68.
6 John Turner and Michael Dockrill in John Turner (ed.) The Larger Idea, Lord Lothian and the 
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‘purely personally and without authorisation’.70 In explaining the Prime Minister’s 
view, Kerr emphasised a number o f points that the British side would not be moved 
on. He made it clear that there was no room for compromise in any settlement over 
the British control o f  foreign affairs or defence because the issue involved Britain and 
her Empire. In addition, Ulster was to be dealt with as a separate entity. Furthermore 
Kerr emphatically stated that:
Anything like independence was utterly out o f the question. The effective 
authority o f  the United Kingdom Parliament in foreign affairs and defence 
would be maintained at any cost.71
It was unclear at that point whether or not the Sinn Fein leaders would allow House to 
speak with them and, in the end, his attempt was fruitless. Nevertheless, before this 
became apparent Kerr told House that the Prime Minister thought it would be useful if 
he (House) got in touch with Sinn Fein in order to test the position and bring home to 
them what they were up against. In Kerr’s words, ‘His task would not be to negotiate, 
but to get them onto the other end o f the bridge’.72 He further made it clear to House 
that the British people would not tolerate Irish independence:
Up to the present the Government had not attempted to mobilise public 
opinion against Ireland, but that if it was going to be war, in order to prevent 
Ireland from becoming an independent republic, there could be only one issue
70 Kerr to Lloyd George 31 July 1920, ‘Note of an interview with Colonel House, Thursday, 29th July 




to it. Once Great Britain realised that its own safety was at stake, it would not 
hesitate to find the means necessary to overcome Irish resistance.73
House was not the only American mediator that Kerr had dealings with in 1920- 
21. As previously noted, he was in regular contact with John S. Steele o f the Chicago  
Tribune in 1919-21. American journalists, such as Steele, claimed to have greater 
success in approaching the leading figures o f the Irish resistance movement. In turn, 
Steele made no secret o f the fact that he wanted to make use o f Kerr in securing an 
interview with Lloyd George about the Irish situation. Following his move to the 
Chicago Tribune in September 1919, he wrote to Kerr noting ‘I am losing no time in 
trying to make use o f my friends, among whom I hope, I may continue to regard 
you’.74 It is unlikely Steele got his interview with Lloyd George at this time. Rather, 
he continued to lobby Kerr into 1920, referring in January to ‘my campaign for an 
interview’ and was disappointed at a conversation printed in The New York Times 
between Lloyd George and journalist Charles H. Grasty. He wrote a note to Kerr, 
enclosing the clipping, and commenting ‘I wish I could have got this. Is there any 
chance o f that interview?’75 Kerr may have been using the promise o f an interview 
that never materialised as the carrot leading the donkey, as Steele was prepared to 
supply the former with information. Following a trip to Ireland he wrote to Kerr 
describing its success and observing ‘Now about what you wanted to know’. He then 
described Labour opinion o f the 1920 Home Rule Bill in Ireland, reporting that the
73 Ibid.
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main concern was with imperial expenditure. Steele hoped that ‘through your good 
offices I will be able to crown the whole trip with an interview with the P.M.’76 
It appears that Kerr was using Steele, as much as Steele was using Kerr, and it 
should be noted that Steele was still asking for his interview with Lloyd George in 
July 1920.77 But Kerr was more dismissive when Steele went further in trying to 
mediate with Sinn Fein. After speaking to Arthur Griffith’s envoy, Patrick Moylett, 
in October 1920, Steele asked Kerr to meet with the latter before Moylett’s return to 
Dublin as ‘Moylett feels that the situation over there is becoming very critical and 
fears that the situation may get beyond Griffith’s control, in which case it would be 
useless for him to come back’.78 The previous chapter discussed Kerr’s attitude to 
Moylett, following C.J. Phillip’s discussions with him. Kerr dismissed Steele’s 
intervention, arguing ‘I have seen Phillips and I think that on the whole I won’t take 
any steps in the matter for the present. I have no doubt that your friend will see Mr. 
Phillips when he returns’.79 Although Kerr tolerated American mediation attempts 
with Sinn Fein, he did not want to show any willingness on the government’s part to 
meet their demands.
The most interesting case o f American mediation involved another journalist. The 
involvement o f Carl W. Ackerman o f the Philadelphia Public L edger  provides a new 
perspective on the advice that the British government was receiving during the period 
concerned. Ackerman was the director o f the Ledger's  foreign news service in 1919- 
21. In April 1921 he interviewed Michael Collins at his secret IRA headquarters in 
Ireland and reported back to Kerr.80 Kerr trusted the Ledger  and those associated with 
it. As he told Lloyd George, the former president William Howard Taft was a
76 John S. Steele to Philip Kerr, 9 April 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/219/793.
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member o f staff as an editorial contributor, and Colonel House had also contracted a 
deal to serve as an advisor to the L edger ,81 Ackerman was one o f House’s journalist 
friends although Godfrey Hodgson notes that ‘House did not necessarily believe their 
sometimes excited analyses o f European politics’.82 It is possible that it was House 
who put Ackerman in touch with Kerr.
In 1917 Ackerman came to public notice through his book, Germany, The Next 
Republic?. This explored the potential for democracy in post-war Germany. At the 
time it was considered quite radical. Ackerman then worked as a correspondent for 
the New York Times with the allied armies in Siberia in 1918-19. He is more widely 
known, however, for publishing The Protocols o f  the E lders o f  Zion in the L edger  in
1919. The original text was a hoax document, presented as a series o f twenty-four 
protocols, said to have been created by a secret conclave o f Jewish leaders. They 
were put forward by their sponsors as the authentic blueprint o f an age-old Jewish 
conspiracy to achieve world domination over non-Jews.83 In Ackerman’s version, he 
replaced all o f  the references to Jews with references to Bolsheviks and Bolshevism. 
Before publishing the Protocols  the latter had contacted the State Department to 
determine their authenticity. He then decided to publish portions o f the first twelve 
Protocols, describing them as being ‘written by one of the leaders o f the Bolshevist 
movement for the guidance o f the secret council o f the soviet’84 Ackerman 
introduced the infamous work to the American public for the first time while the 
country was in the grip o f the ‘Red Scare’. Robert Singerman defines this as ‘a near-
81 Godfrey Hodgson, Woodrow Wilson ’s Right Hand, The Life o f  Colonel Edward M. House (Yale, 
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hysterical nativist fear o f  radicalism, anarchism, foreign espionage and subversion, 
and most o f all, the specter [sic] o f Bolshevism’.85
Ackerman was therefore a somewhat controversial character. Kerr, however, 
probably did not see him this way. As previously noted, he was an acquaintance o f 
Colonel House and was, by all appearances, the foreign correspondent for a reputable 
paper in the United States. Above all, it seems that Ackerman was in fact employed 
by the British intelligence services. Papers in the Lothian archive reveal that he was
in contact with Basil H. Thomson, who directed British intelligence in Ireland
86between 1919 and 1921. Thomson recognised the potential value o f using an 
American informant such as Ackerman, rather than English agents. Peter Hart refers 
to Ackerman as ‘the American journalist (and British spy)’ and Paul Bew writes that 
the latter was employed by the ‘Anderson Group’, a group o f Irish and English 
officials who worked with closely with Kerr in the Prime Minister’s office to find out 
if Sinn Fein would stop at anything short o f a Republic.87
Bew’s arguments are convincing. He argues that although historians, such as 
Sheila Lawlor and Charles Townshend, have acknowledged the significance o f the 
‘Anderson group’ they have not grasped the way in which it drove policy, refusing to 
get knocked off course by the government’s hard-line policy. Instead, the group 
concentrated on bringing about a negotiated outcome that would culminate in the 
1921 treaty. He argues that the group had a clear picture o f the settlement from the 
outset and a confidence in their ability to deliver, in the end, the Prime Minister.88
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Ackerman first interviewed Collins in the summer of 1920. He then interviewed 
him again in the spring o f 1921. Ackerman’s published account o f the interviews 
claimed that Collins had not changed from his earlier stance that Sinn Fein would 
hold out for a Republic. But according to Ackerman’s private report to Basil 
Thomson about the 1920 interview, Collins had been much more accommodating than 
the published version suggested.89 Kerr knew this, as he was in contact with both 
Ackerman and Thomson. Then, in a memorandum to Lloyd George concerning the 
1921 interview, Kerr told the Prime Minister that whereas the previous autumn Sinn 
Fein had been ‘ready to talk some kind o f business; now, he said, they were not.’90 In 
this latter interview Ackerman had asked Collins if he thought that any purpose could 
be served if de Valera met Sir James Craig, the leader o f the Ulster Unionists, later the 
first Prime Minister o f Northern Ireland. Collins had replied ‘I am sure President 
Devalera [sic.] will meet any Irishman’. Ackerman then added: ‘but Collins doubted 
whether anything could be accomplished so long as Ulster was to be played off 
against the south o f Ireland by the British Cabinet’.91 Kerr’s report to Lloyd George 
was quite different in tone:
Ackerman asked Collins whether De Valera would meet James Craig with a 
view to discussing a possible settlement. Michael Collins replied that he did 
not think there would be any advantage in this and that neither he nor De
92
Valera would meet Craig to discuss a compromise. "
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This says a great a deal about the advice that Kerr was giving Lloyd George in 
1921. He first emphasised Ackerman’s credibility and then gave the impression that 
his interview with Collins suggested that Sinn Fein would not negotiate. Kerr told 
Lloyd George that it was Ackerman’s personal view that ‘the present situation could 
not go on; the British Government would either have to capitulate on terms, or fight 
much harder than at present’.93 It appears that Kerr was using Ackerman to push for 
repression. It is possible that it was not until Kerr’s departure from Downing Street in 
late May 1921 that more moderate forces were able to influence Lloyd George to 
negotiate with Sinn Fein.
There is further evidence to support this argument about Kerr’s manipulations.
Mark Sturgis at Dublin Castle recorded in his diary on 6 April 1921 that:
After breakfast went over to the CS Lodge on a summons from the Lady. I 
found her and the CS convinced by a letter from Philip Kerr that all chance of 
settlement is at the moment dead -  that all attempts at negotiation should cease 
as they convince SF that we are beat. The reason for this is that Ackerman has 
gone back to Kerr reporting that Michael Collins whom he interviewed is very 
bobbery [sic.] and has no desire to treat, sure o f victory etc.94
Kerr was therefore not only influencing Lloyd George, but also Hamar Greenwood, 
the Chief Secretary for Ireland. Sturgis continued:
At the castle I found a different estimate o f the situation. I m told that the 
churchmen decided at their meeting yesterday to urge upon SF a visit
93 Ibid.
94 Entry in Vol. IV, Tues 5 April 1921, Mark Sturgis, Last Days o f  Dublin Castle: The Mark Sturgis 
Diaries edited and introduced by Michael Hopkinson (Dublin, 1999) p. 154.
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forthwith to Craig , sent an emissary who returned with the news that after 
certain preliminaries SF would go.95
Sturgis attributed this conflicting information to the fact that ‘Ackerman quarrelled 
with de Valera in America and it is possible they are purposely misleading him’.96 He 
did not consider the possibility that Kerr was possibly misinforming Greenwood. 
Sturgis may have been jealous o f Kerr’s influence as a fellow civil servant. He had 
recorded in his diary 21 December 1920 that:
I met Kerr for the first time the other day at the Irish Office; I was not terribly 
impressed; I seem to have heard so much o f this wonder that I was 
disappointed but a first sight is often deceptive.97
But his diary entries indicate that Kerr had greater direct involvement in Irish policy 
in 1920-21 than historians have previously acknowledged. He was not merely a 
draftsman o f the 1920 Bill.
In relaying his conversation with Ackerman to Lloyd George, Kerr proved once 
more that he was concerned about public opinion in the United States. He ended his 
memorandum to the Prime Minister by noting that ‘He [Ackerman] finally said he 
was very anxious that if possible you should give an interview for American public 
opinion and suggests that you should emphasise 3 points’.98 These included the 
argument that there was no distress in Ireland requiring White Cross relief. In her
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Entry in Vol. Ill, Tues 21 December 1920, Mark Sturgis, Last Days o f  Dublin Castle: The Mark 
Sturgis Diaries edited and introduced by Michael Hopkinson (Dublin, 1999) p. 96.
8 Entry in Vol. IV, Tues 5 April 1921, Michael Hopkinson (ed.), Last Days o f  Dublin Castle: The 
Mark Sturgis Diaries (Dublin, 1999) p. 154.
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work, The Irish Republic, Dorothy Macardle described economic distress as the 
‘deadliest weapon’ inflicted on the Irish people by her enemies." Macardle was a 
life-long supporter o f de Valera, and on the anti-treaty side during the Irish Civil War. 
She blamed the ‘devastation’ in the martial law areas on the military, and the Black 
and Tans, and for this ‘the plundered and starving people were forced to pay’.100 In 
response to accounts such as these, the ‘American Committee for Relief in Ireland’ 
worked to relieve the burden on the White Cross in Ireland (the equivalent to the 
British Red Cross). It is thus not surprising that Kerr encouraged the Prime Minister 
to give an interview to put the record straight. He also told Lloyd George that 
Ackerman suggested he stress that ‘the British Government is fighting, not the Irish 
people, but a gang o f extreme fanatics who are irreconcilable and desperate’ and ‘that 
the fundamental issue in Ireland is not one o f self-government, but a question of 
Union versus Secession’.101 These sound suspiciously like arguments that Kerr would 
have made himself.
Despite Kerr’s increasing reluctance to allow intervention from outsiders he did 
arrange for Lloyd George to meet with the American Governor o f New York, Martin 
H. Glynn, through the efforts o f Ackerman and Basil Thomson. Bew has explained 
that the meeting between Glynn and the Prime Minister was part of the process 
referred to as ‘the American education o f Lloyd George’.102 Ackerman believed that 
for peace initiatives to succeed there were necessary preconditions. First, ‘The 
American education o f Michael Collins’ consisted o f informing Collins that the 
injection o f American support for his cause would never materialise. Second, Lloyd
99 Dorothy Macardle, The Irish Republic, A Documented Chronicle o f  the Anglo-Irish Conflict and the 
Partitioning o f  Ireland, with a Detailed Account o f  the Period 1916-1923 (New York, 1965) 1 
American Edn, 1st published 1937. p. 434.
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01 Philip Kerr to Lloyd George, 4 April 1921, Lloyd George Papers F/90/1/41.
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George s American education . This was more complex as the aim was to persuade 
him that he could deal with Sinn Fein ‘moderates’ rather than its well known 
‘gunmen’. The figure credited with influencing him in this respect was Martin Glynn 
of Albany, a Democratic politician and newspaper editor.103 Glynn’s parents were 
Irish immigrants and he remained extremely proud o f his Irish ancestry. The library 
in the New York State village o f Valatie, where Glynn grew up, hails him as the 
‘Father o f the Irish Free State’ as the result o f his meetings with Lloyd George and 
mediation between the British government and the Sinn Fein leaders in 1921.
Bew writes that although Lloyd George initially refused to see Glynn ‘On 5 May 
[1921] Philip K err.. .set up an “accidental” meeting between the two men at the 
House o f Commons and an intense three hour discussion ensued’.104 One might 
question why Kerr would arrange for Lloyd George to encounter Glynn when he 
seemed to be opposed to the Prime Minister meeting Sinn Fein moderates. The clues 
are in the letters sent to him by both Thomson and Ackerman, asking him to arrange 
the meeting. On 3 May 1921 the former wrote to Kerr asking him to see Ackerman 
on an urgent matter as Glynn was in London. He told Kerr that ‘he is one o f the 4 or 
5 big men who set up the Irish loans in America and he is in a position to cut off the 
supplies that keep Dail Eirean [sic.] going’.105 This would have no doubt persuaded 
Kerr at least to discuss the matter with Ackerman as Kerr was concerned about the 
financing o f Sinn Fein by America. Thomson added:
[Glynn] told Ackerman that if he could be assured that the British Govt is
ready to grant certain terms short o f a Republic, he would undertake to bring
103 Ibid.
|04 Ibid.
05 Basil T hom son to P hilip  Kerr, 3 M ay 1921, Lothian Papers G D 4 0 /1 7 /8 0 /2 6 3 .
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back with him other influential Irish Americans and put pressure on the Sinn 
Feiners to stop all murders and accept the conditions.106
Kerr did meet with Ackerman the next morning but there is reason to suggest that he 
was not fully persuaded. Ackerman wrote to him later that day saying:
There is one point I may not have made clear this morning: Mr. Glynn does 
not intend to go to Ireland. He did not consider an Irish trip at all until I asked 
him to go over with me. I think he would prefer not to go. As to Mr. Glynn 
himself I think you know he is the man who nominated Mr. Wilson for the 
Presidency in 1916 in St. Louis and made the famous speech: ‘he kept us out 
of the w ar’.107
The idea that Glynn could cut off financial assistance to Sinn Fein, and the fact that he 
initially had no intention o f  visiting Ireland directly to intervene, more than likely 
persuaded Kerr that there was no harm in him meeting Lloyd George. Equally, Kerr 
may have felt reassured that Glynn had been a supporter o f Anglophile President 
Wilson. In any event, it was a crucial encounter. Bew writes that:
Glynn impressed upon the prime minister the seriousness and earnestness o f 
the Irish, the power o f the Irish movement in America, and the importance o f 
the Anglo-Irish peace as the basis for an Anglo-American understanding. The
:  ibid.
Carl W. A ckerm an to Philip  Kerr, 4  M ay 1921, Lothian Papers G D 4 0 /17 /80 /265 .
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prime minister responded by asking Glynn to convey an invitation to the Sinn 
Fein leadership to attend a peace conference in London.108
This was likely Kerr’s last official act in relation to the role o f the United States in the 
Irish Question, as he left his position as Lloyd George’s secretary at the end o f May. 
Ironically, in arranging the meeting with Glynn, Kerr opened the door for the 
government’s negotiations with Sinn Fein, something that he had been largely 
opposed to over the previous two years.
The American dimension o f the Irish question is a theme that runs throughout 
modern Anglo-Irish history, just as there was a United States theme in Kerr’s life and 
career. His link with American involvement in Ireland between 1919 and 1921 
throws light on the British government’s position during the period. At the time Kerr 
did not have the experience o f the United States and its people that he would later 
gain as Secretary to the Rhodes Trust, or indeed as Ambassador there in 1940. His 
acquaintance with Anglophiles, such as President Wilson and Colonel House, at the 
Paris peace conference no doubt shaped his perceptions of American attitudes to 
Ireland. Thereafter, Kerr tended to listen to the opinions o f isolationist and pro- 
British Americans, dismissing Irish-American agitation and the appeal o f U.S. 
politicians to the Irish-American voters. He does not appear to have had a wider 
range of informants who could put across the other dimension o f American opinion. 
Although Kerr was concerned by Sinn Fein campaigning in the United States, his 
advice to both the Prime Minister and Chief Secretary for Ireland, Hamar Greenwood, 
was on the basis o f information he received from sources such as Ackerman, whose 
credibility as an informant was questionable. He also seems to have given a partial
108
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view of the intelligence he acquired in order to push his own agenda. Yet his role 
facilitating the Lloyd George -  Glynn meeting led to the position he had adopted 
being undermined.
Chapter 7
The religious theme that runs through this study is the least straightforward and 
therefore adds the most fascinating dimension to Kerr’s involvement with Irish 
affairs. There are two distinct elements to this: Kerr’s own religious background and 
the religious aspects o f the Irish question. As previously discussed, Kerr came from a 
devoutly Catholic (although from recent vintage), aristocratic family. He was 
introduced to Christian Science by Nancy Astor in 1914 although he did not officially 
convert until 1923. In Ireland during this period it was impossible to separate church 
and politics as the vast majority o f the population, being Catholic, looked ultimately 
to the bishops as their religious leaders. Any intervention by the clergy was therefore 
important, whether in relation to negotiating a settlement, or in connection with the 
Anglo-Irish War o f 1919-21. Kerr was directly involved in addressing them. He 
interviewed the Australian prelate, Archbishop Patrick Clune of Perth, during his 
attempt to mediate with the British government in 1920, and drafted replies on behalf 
of Lloyd George in 1921 to the Protestant bishops’ attack on government policy in 
Ireland. This chapter is a thematic one that explores the relationship between Kerr, 
religion and the Irish question.
Kerr was becoming deeply submerged in Christian Science teachings some years 
before he became Lloyd George’s secretary. Although the letters to his parents from 
South Africa between 1905 and 1909 show him trying to remain dedicated to 
Catholicism, deep religious doubts had begun to set in following his return home. He 
leant on Nancy Astor for support during this time and considered seeing a Christian
Kerr, Religion and the Irish Question
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Science practitioner to help him in dealing with his mother’s devastation over his 
doubts. Kerr told Astor that he believed Lady Anne’s reaction was not due to worry 
for her son but to ‘the roots o f her own life’ having been tom up. Indeed, Kerr’s faith 
in the teachings was such that he believed his mother would also one day find ‘the 
truth’ herself.1 During his convalescence from an operation to remove his appendix in 
1914, he became more deeply immersed in his newly found faith as he devoured the 
teachings o f its founder, Mary Baker Eddy. His letters to Astor during this period are 
full o f enthusiasm and a sense o f elation at the material he was reading. Two years 
later Kerr’s commitment to Christian Science teachings had clearly not waned and 
continued to cause his family distress. He acknowledged this in a letter to his mother 
in 1916:
Dearest Mother, don’t think that I don’t know how you are troubled and 
suffering... You know I would do anything to spare you both, except deny the 
teaching o f  our Lord, and fail in the work which God wishes me to do.
He did assure her, however, that he had no plans to join a Christian Science Church, 
only to see where the teachings may lead.
Although it would be very tempting to suggest that the experience of Anglo-Irish 
politics pushed Kerr towards his official conversion to Christian Science in 1923, the 
evidence suggests that he was following these teachings long before he entered Lloyd 
George’s service. John Turner has noted that Kerr’s doubts over the sincerity o f the 
Irish resistance movement were attributed by Horace Plunkett to his ‘dislike o f the
1 Philip Kerr to Nancy Astor, Undated [January 1914], Nancy Astor Papers MS 1416/1/4/47.
' Philip Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 4 May 1916, Lothian Papers GD40/17/465/30.
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Catholic Church arising from his recent conversion to Christian Science’.3 This 
seems unlikely considering the fact that Kerr had not yet officially converted and he 
and his family were longstanding Catholics. Plunkett may have been influenced by 
the fact that Kerr visited a Christian Science church while staying with him at his 
home near Dublin in 1916. Kerr wrote to Nancy Astor soon afterwards, pleading 
‘Don’t talk about Sir H. Plunkett and C.S. for the present: It would only make trouble 
for him’.4 It is possible that ‘C.S.’ may have also been an abbreviation for ‘Chief 
Secretary’, but Kerr often referred to Christian Science as ‘C.S.’ in his letters to her.
Moreover, although Kerr appeared to have been convinced by Christian Science 
teachings in 1914, it did not mean that he distanced himself from his Catholic 
upbringing and Catholic connections. He did not simply cut the cord overnight. In 
October 1914 he had written to Cardinal Gasquet in Rome in relation to the Round 
Table’s statement on the ‘White Book’, produced by Sir Edward Grey, defending 
Britain’s entry into the First World War. Gasquet was an English Benedictine, and 
Archivist o f the Holy Roman Church, who had been made a cardinal in May 1914.5 
Kerr had also told him o f his brother David’s death and Gasquet sent his condolences 
to Kerr’s parents and promised to offer a mass for David’s soul.6 The fascinating 
aspect of Gasquet’s reply is that we have direct evidence here o f Kerr having used 
Catholic contacts in both a spiritual and a political sense. Kerr had most likely met 
Gasquet either through his parents or Wilfrid Ward. The former may have been 
moving away from Catholicism yet Catholic figures that he had known, such as 
Gasquet, were still o f  importance to him.
3 John Turner and Michael Dockrill ‘Philip Kerr in Downing Street’ in John Turner (ed) The Larger 
Idea, Lord Lothian and the Problem o f  National Sovereignty (London, 1988) p. 36.
4 Philip Kerr to Nancy Astor, 27 Nov 1916, Nancy Astor Papers MS 1416/1/4/49.
5 Shane Leslie wrote a biography of Gasquet Cardinal Gasquet, A Memoir (London, 1953).
6 Cardinal Gasquet to Philip Kerr, 27 Oct 1914, Lothian Papers GD40/17/3/244.
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Dermot Keogh has explained that Gasquet was ‘the ecclesiastic “most responsible” 
for organising British diplomatic initiatives against Ireland’ and that he was ‘no 
admirer o f Irish nationalism’.7 Indeed his biographers have noted that he was ‘John- 
Bullish’ in his manner.8 Reference is also made to his love o f ‘Irish’ jokes. Gasquet 
was involved in efforts to persuade the British o f the need for a diplomatic 
representative at the Vatican in 1914, and in reference to Britain’s entry into the war, 
told Kerr ‘what I hope will come out o f the situation is that the English authorities 
will see the folly o f  not having a proper representative at the Vatican’.9 Sir Henry 
Howard, a distant relative o f  Kerr, was subsequently sent to Rome in order to provide 
a more formal British presence, although he was not an official representative o f the 
crown. It would have been advantageous to the government to maintain strong 
relations with the Vatican, particularly in view o f the Irish situation. It was believed 
by nationalist Irish clerics, such as John Hagan and Michael Curran, that the Vatican 
was possessed by ‘an anglophile and anti-Irish spirit’.10 Pope Leo XIII was thought to 
be pro-English because he was impressed by the liberal attitude towards Catholics 
there and he had a long-term desire to achieve the conversion of England. Hagan 
insisted that this attitude continued under Benedict XV when the Pope ‘could not look 
with a very favourable eye on Irish turbulence such as it was sedulously presented to 
him’.11 There was therefore a marked difference between Irish Catholicism at the 
Vatican and Irish nationalism.
It was however impossible to separate religion from politics when it came to the 
Irish question, not only because the matter itself was essentially a religious one, but
7 Dermot Keogh, The Vatican, The Bishops and Irish Politics 1919-39 (Cambridge, 1986) p. 16.
8 Dominic Aidan Bellenger, ‘Gasquet, Francis Neil (1846—1929)’, Oxford Dictionary o f  National 
Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, May 2006.
9 Cardinal Gasquet to Philip Kerr, 27 Oct 1914, Lothian Papers GD40/17/3/244.
10 Dermot Keogh, The Vatican, The Bishops and Irish Politics 1919-39 (Cambridge, 1986) p. 14.
11 Quoted in Dermot Keogh, The Vatican, The Bishops and Irish Politics 1919-39, p. 14.
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also because the Irish bishops were not reluctant to become involved in political 
matters. The war o f 1914-18, and its aftermath, put a new slant on this issue as there 
was the question o f  Irish loyalty to the Empire, and the opinions o f the Irish clergy 
potentially had a greater impact on the government’s handling o f Irish matters. There 
is a considerable literature on this subject, one o f the classics being David Miller’s 
Church, State an d  Nation in Ireland  1898-1921, along with Dermot Keogh’s The 
Vatican, The B ishops an d  Irish Politics 1919-39.12 Keogh in particular has explored 
the role and influence o f  the Catholic hierarchy in Anglo-Irish politics during this 
period. But political involvement by the Irish clergy particularly antagonised Kerr. It 
also annoyed members o f  his family. During the conscription crisis of 1918, Kerr’s 
uncles on both sides, Lord Edmund Talbot and Lord Walter Kerr, joined forces with 
other members o f  the Catholic Union in a resolution condemning the Irish Catholic 
bishops for resisting the introduction o f conscription in Ireland.13 This demonstrates 
some continuity in the family’s stance, as Elenry Fitzalan-Howard and Lord Ralph 
Kerr had opposed Gladstone’s second Home Rule Bill in 1893 as members o f the 
British Catholic Unionists.
Kerr was also frustrated by the Irish bishops’ response to the conscription 
controversy. In his Round Table article, entitled ‘The Irish Crisis’, he described how 
Irish Nationalist leaders took their grievances over conscription immediately to the 
bishops assembled at M aynooth.14 The bishops summoned the politicians and then 
issued a statement declaring that ‘conscription forced in this way upon Ireland is an 
impressive and inhuman law, which the Irish people have a right to resist by all the
12 David W. Miller, Church, State and Nation in Ireland 1898-1921 (Dublin, 1973); Dermot Keogh, 
The Vatican, The Bishops and Irish Politics 1919-39 (Cambridge, 1986).
Mark Bence-Jones, The Catholic Families p. 274.
14 [Philip Kerr], ‘The Irish Crisis’ in The Round Table No. 31 (June 1918) p. 517.
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means that are consonant with the law o f God’.15 Not only did Cardinal Logue and 
the bishops express their opposition to conscription in Ireland, they also took it a step 
further when they issued a declaration pledging their resistance to it. They stated that 
they would resist conscription by the most effective means at their disposal and 
planned collections ‘for the purpose o f supplying means to resist the imposition of 
compulsory military service’.16 Although Kerr acknowledged that the bishops’ 
pledge may have been in order to restrain violence, he believed it ultimately 
demonstrated that they were the most important political power in Ireland. In doing 
so, he suggested that the bishops had played directly into Ulster’s hands, as the 
Protestant minority would certainly refuse to submit to the rule o f a Catholic majority 
which had proved that its political life was mainly controlled by the clergy. 1'
As a result o f the clerical intervention in the conscription crisis, Kerr became more
convinced that the involvement o f religious bodies created a barrier to solving the
Irish problem. A later Round Table article, ‘The Harvest o f Victory’ in 1919,
18explored the future o f the British Commonwealth in the post-war world. Ireland, he 
argued, was the greatest hindrance to the growth o f mutual understanding between 
English-speaking peoples at that time. He contended that the problem could not be 
solved by giving into extreme Irish agitation. In his view, its combination of 
clericalism, Bolshevism, and racialism, made it one o f the most reactionary forces in 
the world. Yet Kerr was greatly disappointed that the editor, Reginald Coupland, had 
chosen to leave out a key sentence in the Irish section that subsequently made the 
passage ‘almost pointless’. Kerr wrote:
15 Ibid., p. 518.
16 Ibid., p. 518-9.
17 Ibid., p. 521.
18 [Philip Kerr], ‘The Harvest of Victory’ in The Round Table No. 36 (Sept 1919).
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The one thing I wanted to point out was that the root o f the trouble in Ireland 
is that the population is under clerical control. Until somebody has the 
courage to say that we shall never settle the problem. We have tried to settle it 
on a purely social and political basis for 30 years and have invariably failed 
because at the last minute religious animosities overpower political reason, as 
they always will wherever they are really strong.19
Kerr’s stance over this issue actually places him in unison with English 
Catholicism rather than being the attitude o f someone who had left the Catholic 
Church. Furthermore, his connection between Irish nationalism and Bolshevism was 
similar to Vatican fears that Bolshevism had influenced the radical nationalists in 
Ireland. Although Kerr was following Christian Science teachings at this time, he 
remained influenced by his elite Catholic upbringing and his early influences. His 
grievances were with the Irish clergy and not the ‘Catholic Church’ in general. He 
believed that church and state in Ireland should be separate. In his letter to Coupland, 
Kerr stated emphatically that:
If  we are ever to settle the Irish problem we must face that central fact, not by 
preaching a religious war, but by insisting as liberalism has always done 
throughout its history in the world, that religion must be kept out o f politics. 
Religion lies at the bottom of politics in Ireland, and at every crisis it is the 
Bishops at Maynooth which fundamentally determine the political action of 
the Irish people. I think to have said this clearly now would have been a real 
help in dealing with the Irish problem. I am perfectly certain it is no use
19 Philip Kerr to R eginald  C oupland, 23 A ug 1919, Lothian Papers G D 4 0 /17/490.
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blethering about constitutions and liberty and closing our eyes to the 
fundamentals o f the situation, and I am sorry that the Round Table has decided 
to camouflage these fundamentals.
Kerr added that he would have had no objection to adding a corresponding sentence 
‘calling upon the Ulstermen to refrain from religious animosity and Carsonism’. He 
explained:
Ulsterism and Carsonism like the violence o f atheism and radicalism in 
France, Spain and Italy are really the consequences of political control 
exercised by a great religious organisation. What matters most of all, 
therefore, to my judgement is pointing out that the situation will never get 
straight in Ireland except as the result of the complete ending o f the
interference o f religious organisations in politics, whether organisations are
20Roman Catholic or Protestant.
In one respect Kerr was right to acknowledge the fundamental issue o f religion in 
Irish politics. On the other hand, however, he was perhaps rather naïve in thinking 
that the two could be kept separate. Kerr seems to have been making the point that 
the situation in Ireland had not been solved politically because of the interference of 
the church and the fact that the people looked to the clergy as their leaders. In reality 
the political issue was in fact a religious one. As the majority o f the population were 
Catholics the issue o f  self-government was the Protestant minority s fear o f Rome
20 Ibid.
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rule . Although it may seem that, as a Catholic, Kerr should have understood this, he 
might not have identified with it in the same way. As a member o f the Catholic 
aristocracy, his Catholicism would have been in a more ‘elevated’ form to that o f its 
Irish counterpart and would not have encroached on political life in the way that the 
Catholic Church did in Ireland. Kerr does not seem to have fully recognised the role 
that religion played in all aspects o f Irish life.21 His early experiences there may have 
cemented this view. Although his parents had actively engaged in religious life in 
Ireland, they maintained their Unionist and imperial political views.
Kerr would face this religious question while acting as secretary to the committee 
that devised the Government o f  Ireland Bill. Religion would come into the Irish 
settlement at every level, whether this concerned the wider implications o f self- 
government or the more precise details such as education under a Home Rule scheme. 
One would assume that with regard to education, for example, no-one would have 
understood the problems more than Kerr. He had, after all, received a Catholic 
education him self in accordance with the wishes o f his family. Stephen Gwynn wrote 
to Kerr in November 1919 concerning the matter of denominational education. The 
former believed that there would be less opposition to a separate Ulster government if 
denominational education was guaranteed.22 Equally, Kerr had been informed by a 
Mr. Hannon that an essential point for the Irish bishops was that they were guaranteed
23control over the education o f their own flock."
The involvement o f the Irish bishops went deeper than this issue, however. It has 
been noted by historians Nicholas Mansergh and Alvin Jackson that the Cabinet 
Committee on Ireland wanted the partition o f the nine counties o f Ulster rather than
Philip Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 11 May 1907, Lothian Papers GD40/17/456/23.
22 Stephen Gwynn to Philip Kerr, 18 Nov 1919, Lothian Papers GD40/17/609/1.
"3 Philip Kerr, Memo, 3 Dec 1919, Lothian Papers GD40/17/591.
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only six.24 Although ultimately they gave in to the pressure of the Ulster Unionists’ 
demand for a six county partition, it was allegedly also the wish o f the Catholic 
hierarchy that only the six counties o f Ulster remained under British control. There 
are documents in Kerr’s papers from James O ’Connor, a Lord Justice who had 
apparently talked with members o f the Irish hierarchy, Cardinal Michael Logue of 
Armagh, Archbishop William Walsh o f Dublin, Patrick O ’Donnell the Bishop of 
Rap hoe and Joseph Cardinal MacRory the Bishop o f Down and Connor, which put 
forward their preference for a six county partition rather than the whole o f Ulster.25 
The bishops were in fact looking after their own interests in this regard. In doing so, 
they could ensure greater control, geographically, over their diocese. They were not 
necessarily considering the long term interests o f the country. As secretary to Lloyd 
George, and in particular the government’s Irish Committee, Kerr had first hand 
access to this information and was therefore fully aware o f the Irish Catholic clergy’s 
stance on the 1920 Bill.
Kerr’s connections with the religious elements of the Irish question were not only 
in relation to the drafting o f the Bill during this period. As events in Ireland became 
more serious throughout 1920 and 1921, there was intervention from religious bodies 
in an attempt to mediate and to protest at the government’s policy in Ireland. In this 
regard, Kerr’s involvement included an interview with the Australian prelate, 
Archbishop Patrick Joseph Clune, and drafting a reply to a letter from the Protestant 
bishops in 1921. As previously discussed, by the spring o f 1920 the Irish situation 
was escalating at an alarming rate and the first ‘Black and Tans’ arrived in order to 
assist police attempts to control the Irish militants. The British forces continued to
' 4 Alvin Jackson, Home Rule, An Irish History 1800-2000 (London, 2004) p. 229-230, Nicholas 
Mansergh, The Unresolved Question: The Anglo-Irish Settlement and its Undoing, 1912-1972 
(London, 1991) p. 128.
25 James O ’Connor to Philip Kerr, 9 Dec 1919, Lothian Papers GD40/17/78/37.
2 0 0
respond to attacks by IRA gunmen, often with brutal reprisals. The Irish secretary,
Ian MacPherson, had been replaced by Sir Hamar Greenwood in April, whose prior 
administrative experience was at the War Office. Miller notes that it was rumoured as 
late as the end o f July that Lloyd George was considering making a deal through the 
Irish Catholic bishops. He argues, however, that this was unlikely to happen, as the 
Prime Minister presided over a Cabinet that included three prominent Conservatives
most deeply implicated in the Ulster Revolt of 1912-14: Andrew Bonar Law, Walter
26Long and Lord Birkenhead. Meanwhile, the situation continued to escalate and the 
reprisals o f  the crown forces caused outrage among the Irish clergy. In October 1920 
the hierarchy rejected the government’s claims that the reprisals were not official 
policy and stated that ‘Outrage has been connived at and encouraged, if not organised, 
not by obscure and irresponsible individuals but by the government o f a mighty 
Empire, professing the highest ideals of truth and justice’.27 The bishops went further 
in denouncing ‘the iniquity o f furnishing a comer o f Ulster with a separate 
government, or its worst instrument, a special police force, to enable it all the more 
rapidly to trample underfoot the victims o f its intolerants’.28 According to Miller, 
although the Catholic clergy had also denounced the crimes committed on the Irish 
side, this would be easily overlooked in the outraged and anti-British rhetoric. He 
argues that it was easy to conclude that the whole hierarchy had been pushed closer to
29full sanction o f the republic as a result o f the violence o f the state.
Kerr had been exasperated by the bishops’ response to the conscription crisis of 
1918; this situation, however was now at a different level altogether. By this stage it 
was evident that it was impossible for the church to remain detached and objective.
76 David W. Miller, Church, State and Nation in Ireland 1898-1921 (Dublin, 1973) p. 454-5.
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As the situation was escalating, Robert Brand wrote to his friend Charles Altschul in 
April 1920:
The Irish question as you know, looks more hopeless than ever. My friend, 
Philip Kerr, who has good opportunities for knowing, as he was bom in a 
Roman Catholic family and knows the Church very well, regards the 
fundamental evil as being its influence on the Irish population. He considers it 
has the same effects as Pmssian militarism, namely it robs the individual o f his 
power or wish to think and act independently and therefore enables an 
oligarchy, whether o f Pmssian Junkers or Sinn Feiners to drive the mass o f the 
people like sheep either to war or in the case o f Ireland to terrorism. There is 
no healthy public opinion at all. It is quite impossible to say what will 
happen.30
Here we gain further insight into Kerr’s thought at the time. His main concern with 
the Catholic Church in Ireland was clearly the hold that it had on the population and 
the influence that came with this. It seems that, having moved away from 
Catholicism, Kerr looked upon the situation as a detached spectator, yet one with 
inside information. He did not look on this as a problem particular to Ireland, rather 
that it was an international issue. Perhaps it can be suggested that he failed to 
recognise the distinctive nature o f Catholicism in Ireland that made it different to its 
counterparts throughout the world.
As noted above, Kerr was directly involved in the mediation attempt by a cleric in
1920. Miller notes that the most promising source o f ecclesiastical mediation
30 R.H. Brand to Charles Altschul, 7 April 1920, Brand Papers, File 48/1. 1 am extremely grateful to 
Professor Priscilla Roberts for this quotation.
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involved Irish churchmen from Australia.31 Both Archbishop Daniel Mannix and 
Archbishop Clune attempted to use their influence to mediate between the British 
government and the Irish Nationalists in 1920. There is a considerable amount of 
literature on the life and work o f Mannix, yet not so much specifically about Clune.32 
This is perhaps due to the fact that the former was a more controversial character. 
Mannix was treated with suspicion by the British government as he was an outspoken 
champion o f Irish national claims. He had led a nationwide campaign against 
conscription in Australia, and when travelling across the United States had 
contributed to American agitation for Irish independence. As previously explored, 
this was something that Kerr was fully aware of.33 Indeed in July o f 1920 the British 
prevented him from landing in Ireland even though Cardinal Gasquet in Rome 
appealed to the Prime Minister to use him as an intermediary. Lloyd George, 
however, was not prepared to take the risk.
Archbishop Clune, on the other hand, was welcomed by Lloyd George as he seems 
to have genuinely believed that Clune was loyal and would only try to promote peace 
between Britain and Ireland. Clune had been the senior chaplain to the Catholic 
members o f the Australian Imperial Force during the First World War, and in 1916 
had visited troops in England and those in the Ypres salient. It is said that he made a 
profound impression during these visits.34 In stark contrast to Mannix and the other 
Irish bishops, Clune had publicly expressed himself to be in favour of conscription.
He would therefore have appeared to be a promising candidate as a mediator. He was 
a supporter o f Home Rule for Ireland and, on his visit to Ireland in 1920, had been
31 David W. Miller, Church, State and Nation in Ireland 1898-1921 (Dublin, 1973) p. 471.
3~ Niall Brennan, Dr. Mannix (London, 1965); Michael Gilchrist, Daniel Mannix, Priest and Patriot 
(Blackburn, 1982); B.A. Santamaria, Daniel Mannix, The Quality o f  Leadership (Carlton, 1984).
33 David W. Miller, Church, State and Nation in Ireland 1898-1921 p. 472.
34 D.F. Bourke, ‘Clune, Patrick Joseph (1864-1935)’, Australian Dictionary o f  National Biography, 
Online Edition (2006).
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horrified by the outrages carried out by the Black and Tans. These experiences led 
him to call for a truce in order to find a solution. During 1920 Clune travelled 
between Dublin and London, negotiating between the Cabinet and the Irish leaders. 
Despite Lloyd George’s willingness to come to terms, the Cabinet and the Irish 
leaders refused to shift over the question of surrendering rebel arms. To surrender 
arms was unthinkable to the Irish leaders. The die-hard Conservatives of the Cabinet, 
however, refused to give in and it seemed that the mediation attempt had failed.
It was Kerr that Lloyd George sent to speak with Clune at the end o f December in 
a final attempt to find common ground. This is significant for two reasons. First of 
all, Kerr was now in contact with the two individuals who Michael Collins had agreed 
to meet: Clune and Ackerman. Their mediation attempts both went through Kerr. 
Secondly, Kerr’s Catholic connections were probably a factor in Lloyd George 
sending him to meet with Clune. We only have Kerr’s own account o f his two 
interviews with Clune to rely on, and in view o f his questionable information to Lloyd 
George following the meeting with Ackerman, we cannot be certain o f their accuracy. 
They are useful, however, in revealing his attitude. According to Kerr, in his 
interview on 29 December Clune proposed a tmce first o f all, and that a meeting of 
the Dail should follow, with the leaders present. He explained that although Mannix 
thought that a truce should include terms of settlement, he himself believed that 
feeling was too high in Ireland at that time. He suggested that a truce would allow 
passions to subside, and then a settlement could be reached. Clune argued that it 
would be necessary for all members o f the Dail to be allowed to meet if it was to be in 
a position to negotiate, and he realised the difficulty o f that from the British point of
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view’.35 He added that he would like the ban on Archbishop Mannix to be lifted so 
that he could visit Ireland and assist in bringing about a settlement.36
Having submitted Clune’s proposals to the government, Kerr met with him again 
on 31 December. Him told him that:
after full discussion the Government did not see its way to go on with the 
suggestion for a truce which he had submitted to me a couple of days before. I 
said that the Government felt that there was no real basis for peace unless the 
Sinn Fein leaders definitely abandoned the campaign of violence by calling for 
the surrender o f all arms to the British Government, or by openly abandoning 
their demand for a republic and accepting membership of the United
37Kingdom.
As in the case with Colonel House, Kerr followed up his statement of the 
government’s position by contributing his own point o f view: ‘speaking purely 
personally’. He explained to Clune that, as the 1920 Home Rule Act was already on 
the statute book, the Irish people should seriously consider its value in bringing about 
reconciliation:
If Ireland would only repudiate the impossible ideals of Sinn Fein and put an 
end to violence and work the Act, they could have a Government o f their own 
in office within a very few months with wider powers than had ever been
38
conceived by the greatest leaders o f Irish opinion.
35 Philip Kerr to Lloyd George, 29 Dec 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/627/1.
36 Ibid.
37 Philip Kerr to Lloyd George, 31 Dec 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/627/2.
38 Ibid.
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He acknowledged that there would be two parliaments instead of one but argued that 
this was merely a recognition o f the facts as the population o f Ulster was just as 
determined to resist the rule o f Dublin as the rest of Ireland was the rule of 
Westminster. Kerr used the example of South Africa in which, following a long and 
bitter struggle:
General Botha had abandoned the Dutch and accepted the British flag, and 
within four years had become Prime Minister of the Transvaal, and within 
seven years Prime Minister o f United South Africa. I thought if Ireland 
accepted and worked the Bill we would reach the same ultimate result in the
i n
case o f Ireland also.
This illustrates two things. Kerr was absolutely convinced that the 1920 Home Rule 
Bill should be given a chance to work. He had drafted it and according to Hankey, 
had been the originator o f the scheme. Kerr did not envisage a scheme that would 
improve on the Bill until it had been tested. Secondly, he continued to be influenced 
by his earlier career and drew parallels between Ireland and other parts o f the Empire. 
Kerr failed to see Ireland as a separate case. Clune had criticised the Bill as 
inadequate on account o f partition and referred to the British government’s 
determination ‘to tyrannise over Ireland’. Yet Kerr insisted that:
this was certainly not the intention but that the Government thought that the 
kindest way out was to settle the fundamental issue beyond question now, and
39 Ibid.
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then through the Bill which was an honest and fair proposal to bring about a 
reconciliation.40
According to Art O ’Brien in a letter to Michael Collins, Kerr had suggested to Clune 
that the Irish hierarchy should step in and effect a settlement.41 This, o f course, would 
have been a settlement to Kerr’s liking, based on the already existent Home Rule Act. 
O’Brien reported Clune’s reply that although the hierarchy would be willing to meet 
Dail Eireann, they would not be prepared to usurp it’s functions as a National 
Assembly. Although Kerr’s contact with figures such as Clune, Ackerman, or indeed 
House, was as an agent and a spokesman for the government, it is entirely possible 
that he may have convinced Collins o f the strength of the government’s resistance to 
extreme nationalist demands through expressing his personal opinion on the situation.
Kerr’s biographers have made references to his interviews with Clune; none, 
however, have gone into much detail in regard to his role in this episode. John Turner 
notes that as these negotiations were o f great delicacy they were entrusted to Kerr 
because Lloyd George and Hamar Greenwood could rely on him to respond in the 
‘right way’ to points made by the other side.42 Turner also points out that, although 
Kerr’s role was that o f  an agent rather than a principal, he was well suited to it due to 
his belief that the government was right to use force in denying the demands of Sinn 
Fein for separate nationhood.43 But we should also not ignore Kerr s religious 
affiliations. It is highly likely that Kerr’s Catholic background was a bonus for the
40 Ibid.
41 Art O’Brien to Michael Collins, 25 Dec 1920, Documents on Irish Foreign Policy, 
www.difp.ie/docs/Volumel/1920/128.htm.
42 John Turner and Michael Dockrill ‘Philip Kerr in Downing Street’ in John Turner (ed) The Larger 
Idea, Lord Lothian and the Problem o f  National Sovereignty (London, 1988) p.3 8.
43 Ibid.
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Prime Minister in sending him to speak with Clune. Kerr’s Catholic background may, 
in turn, have made a difference for Clune, as it did for others.
Indeed, his connections with the Irish Catholic clergy were greater than the record 
suggests. On hearing o f  Kerr’s death in 1940 Bishop Michael Fogarty of Killaloe sent 
a letter o f condolence to his family. The latter had narrowly escaped an assassination 
attempt by Black and Tans during the Anglo-Irish War. He supported Clune’s 
mediation attempt in 1920 and had travelled to Dublin to meet with Clune on the 
night that the raid was carried out on his home. Keogh explains that ‘The incident did 
little to endear the British to the moderate Fogarty. Even the mildest o f Irish bishops 
had been alienated by the lawlessness of the authorities’.44 As a result, he went on to 
become one o f the most politically active o f the Irish bishops during the Treaty 
debates o f 1921-22. Fogarty was firmly pro-Treaty and, in later years, found it 
difficult to forget de Valera’s anti-Treaty campaign. In his condolence letter to 
Dorothy Kerr in 1940 he wrote:
I had.. .with profound regret read of Lord Lothian’s death, nor have I failed to 
commend his soul to the mercy o f God, and that for his own sake and for the 
sake o f his most excellent mother, who I believe is now in heaven, after her 
most edifying life on earth, and what I write of his mother is true also, o f his 
noble father. As I write this, the living figures of both of them come back to 
me, as they looked and walked so many years ago, the admiration o f all in 
Kildare.45
44 Dermot Keogh, The Vatican, The Bishops and Irish Politics 1919-39 (Cambridge, 1986) p. 65.
45 Bishop Michael Fogarty to Mother Dorothy Kerr, 16 Dec 1940, Pnvate Collection, Montevio 
House, Brown Envelope Labelled ‘Philip Lothian, Letters of Condolence, Personal to Family .
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This reveals a link that has not been previously explored. It indicates that members of 
the Irish Catholic hierarchy were fully aware o f Kerr’s role in 1916-21. It is possible 
that Fogarty encouraged Clune’s mediation through Kerr in 1920, or perhaps he 
placed confidence in Clune’s attempt because Fogarty had known Kerr’s family in 
former years.
Although Kerr may have attempted to keep his religious life, and also his religious 
background, separate from his work, there were instances when this must have been 
almost impossible for him. As the previous chapter noted, in February 1920 Louis 
Tracy o f the British Bureau o f Information in New York wrote to Lloyd George about 
the activities o f the Sinn Fein organisation in the United States.46 In particular, Tracy 
was concerned about the assistance provided by the Catholic Church authorities to the 
Sinn Fein activists. He claimed that the Sinn Fein agitation was one of the many 
tentacles that the Roman Church was putting out to ensure a firmer grip on the 
world.47 Tracy informed the Prime Minister that the Carmelite order played a key 
role in assisting the Sinn Feiners, either by sheltering them or by conveying 
information from the United States to the leaders in Ireland. This information was 
accurate as Keogh has commented on the role o f the Carmelite Friary in New York in 
providing temporary accommodation for Sinn Feiners who had recently arrived in the 
United States.48 He describes it as a centre o f political activity, where Liam Mellows, 
Sean Nunan, Harry Boland and Eamon de Valera were frequent visitors. Tracy 
referred to these individuals in his letters. He seemed to be under the impression that 
it was the Church’s belief that, should De Valera and his associates succeed in their 
goal o f an Irish republic, then Roman Catholic doctrine would become more dominant
46 Louis Tracy to Lloyd George, 24 Feb 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/78/75.
47 Louis Tracy to Lloyd George, 24 Feb 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/78/80.
48 Dermot Keogh, The Vatican, T h e  B is h o p s  and Irish Politics 1919-39 (Cambridge, 1986) p. 19.
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as a result. It is difficult to imagine that Tracy s advice to Lloyd George would not 
have impacted on Kerr. Indeed Tracy wrote:
I would urge most strongly that during the present crisis the Government 
should not place too great reliance on public servants who are Irish Catholics, 
or even Catholics. This is a hard thing to say, after the splendid record set up 
by English Catholicism during the war, but the fact remains that, as a religion, 
it is a very close corporation, and that its members may range in sympathy 
from intense loyalty to the British Crown to open disaffection.49
Tracy further counselled the Prime Minister that:
Rome has her agents in every section o f society, and it is not asking too much 
that the predominant partners o f the British Empire should assume the 
responsibilities o f leadership and effort among their own ranks to the 
exclusion o f  members o f a religion which was undoubtedly opposed to us 
during the war in its official and corporate form.50
In view o f the fact that these letters from Tracy went through Kerr as the Prime 
Minister’s secretary, it must have been wounding for him to read advice of this nature. 
Although the evidence shows that Kerr moved away from the Catholic faith long 
before 1920, he had formerly adhered to that church and his family remained devout 
Catholics. There does not appear to be any record of Kerr’s response to Tracy’s 
letter, but one can only assume that opinions o f this nature would make him very
49 Louis Tracy to Lloyd George, 24 Feb 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/78/80.
50 Louis Tracy to Lloyd George, 24 Feb 1920, Lothian Papers GD40/17/78/81.
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conscious o f his Catholic background. It is also just possible that Kerr’s experience 
of the Catholic Church s role in Irish affairs could have pushed him further in the 
direction o f  Christian Science, or indeed confirmed his decision.
By April 1921 the situation in Ireland was not improving and the clergy continued 
in their efforts to speak out against the government’s handling o f it. This was not 
restricted to the Catholic clergy as in early April John Edwin, the Bishop of 
Chelmsford, along with nineteen other leading Protestants wrote to Lloyd George 
about the situation in Ireland. The letter was written following a protest in the House 
of Lords by Randall Thomas Davidson, the Archbishop o f Canterbury, against 
reprisals by the crown forces in Ireland. Other Protestant churches took his lead and 
wrote to the Prime Minister. They argued that the ‘outrages’ that had given rise to the 
British reprisals could not be considered criminal acts in the ordinary sense, as they 
were the result o f long and deep-rooted political grievance.51 Further to this, they 
claimed that the recent Government o f Ireland Act had failed to appease these 
grievances. There is little doubt that the letter expressed sympathy with the Irish 
cause. Ultimately, it called for a change in government policy and a truce with a view 
to finding an agreed solution. Kerr was commissioned to draft a reply to the letter, 
restating and defending the government’s Irish policy to the bishops. He would not 
have approved o f their intervention. To deal with the involvement o f the Catholic 
clergy, Irish or other, was one thing but for the leaders of the Protestant 
denominations to intervene was quite another. Such an intervention was potentially 
disastrous for the government.
Kerr’s reply was printed for wide circulation. The Irish Secretary, Hamar 
Greenwood, was keen that the government’s policy was publicised through this reply
51 Bishop of Chelmsford to Lloyd George, 3 April 1921, Lloyd George Papers F/96/1/17/81-4.
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as such a document would receive a world wide readership.52 The reply, entitled The 
Prime Minister on Reprisals . A Reply to the Bishop o f  Chelmsford, addressed the 
points made by the bishops in their letter to Lloyd George.53 Kerr dealt with the 
bishops’ arguments under various headings, beginning with ‘The Policy o f 
“Reprisals’” . The document stated that there were no ‘irregular forces’ o f the Crown, 
as the bishops had claimed. Rather, it was explained that the Auxiliary Division of 
the Royal Irish Constabulary was a regular force that had been formed following the 
bmtal assassinations o f policemen in July 1920. Kerr (in the Prime Minister’s name) 
argued that any authorisation or condoning o f unchecked violence in response to 
attacks was untrue. Although there was an acknowledgement of the need for further 
discipline o f  the Auxiliaries, it was argued that this was improving as the force 
consolidated. Kerr made particular reference to the bishops’ statement that the 
outrages committed in Ireland were due to a deep-seated sense o f political grievance. 
He pointed out that whilst the bishops were emphatic in condemning the government, 
they went on practically to condone the Sinn Fein adoption of murder as a weapon on 
the ground that the end justified the means. In response Kerr wrote: ‘It seems to me 
that this part o f your resolution is subversive alike of order and good government, 
morality and the Christian religion’.54
In defending the government’s policy, Kerr described the contrasting approaches 
of both Sinn Fein and His Majesty’s government as irreconcilable, and instead 
focused on the merits o f the Home Rule Act. He argued that the establishment o f two 
parliaments was the only practical solution and that:
5" Hamar Greenwood to Philip Kerr, 13 April 1921, Lloyd George Papers F/19/3/12.
53 Matters o f  Moment fo r  the Million ‘The Prime Minister on “Reprisals”. A Reply to the Bishop of 
Chelmsford’, 18 April 1921, Lloyd George Papers F/96/1/25.
54 Ibid., p. 3.
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The present Home Rule Act is a sensible and workmanlike method o f carrying 
this policy into effect. It confers on Ireland wider powers than either 
Gladstone s Bills or the Act o f 1914. It bases the financial relations of the two 
countries on relative taxable capacity, and leaves to Irishmen themselves the 
task o f achieving unity within their own land.55
Kerr referred to the American Civil War, pointing out that the struggle in Ireland was 
not about the Home Rule Act but rather the issue between secession and union. In 
discussing the conditions o f settlement, he was emphatic in stating that the 
government would never give way regarding the fundamental question o f secession. 
He suggested, in conclusion, that the signatories would agree with the position set 
forth in the reply. In view o f the influence that the clergy had, Kerr appealed to them 
to make their position clear to the people o f Ireland by clarifying the fact that they 
could never achieve their ends by resorting to crime, that secession was impossible, 
and that Ulster must be granted the same rights they claimed for themselves.
Kerr’s reply became almost an official statement o f the government’s stance on 
Ireland and was used as the standard reply to any enquiries or protests. At Lloyd 
George’s request, Kerr sent copies to Auckland Geddes in America suggesting that 
‘you should take special steps to communicate this to important people o f the 
administration in Washington and also to the more thoughtful people o f the Journals 
in the United States’.56 In addition to this, he sent a copy to the ‘New Catholic Press’ 
asking that it be printed, presumably with the aim o f targeting its Catholic readership 
in Britain. The response to his request shines new light not only on Kerr s connection 
with the Irish question, but also on the contemporary attitudes towards him in Ireland.
55 Ibid., p. 7.
56 Philip Kerr to Sir Auckland Geddes, 21 April 1921, Lothian Papers GD40/17/79/258.
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The reply that he received from a C. Diamond1 was not only scathing in its attack on 
Lloyd George but ended with a verbal assault on Kerr himself. Diamond referred to 
the Prime M inister’s statement as a ‘defence o f his murder policy in Ireland’ and 
answered Kerr s request to publish it noting ‘we decline to soil our columns with the 
lies and mis-statements o f all kinds with which the proffered contribution reeks’.57 
He went on:
I look upon the Prime Minister as just as much a murderer and assassin, as if 
his hands were dripping with the blood o f the victims who have been 
murdered by minions, by his direct incitement... .To-day we despise him not 
for himself, because he is beneath contempt, but we despise him for the work 
he is doing, for his scoundrelly apostasy from all the causes he formally 
championed, now that he is the pride o f the Tories o f the country, and the 
chief o f  the ‘Black and Tans’ in Ireland. We leave him to that hell which his
58conscience must have created in him, if he really has a conscience.
Diamond concluded his assault by directly condemning Kerr: ‘You are a Catholic or 
you are supposed to be a Catholic. That you should be paid hireling for such dirty 
work, is a disgrace to you and the religion you profess’.59
Charles Diamond was an Irish press baron who produced a number o f popular 
newspapers that supported Irish nationalism.60 It has been said that he was the single
87 Charles Diamond to Philip Kerr, 29 April 1921, Lothian Papers GD40/17/80/259.
58 Charles Diamond to Philip Kerr, 29 April 1921, Lothian Papers GD40/17/80/259.
59 Ibid.
60 Joan Allen ‘Diamond, Charles (1858-1934)’ in Laurel Brake and Marysa Demoor (eds.), Dictionary 
of Nineteenth-Century Journalism (London, 2009) p. 166.
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greatest influence on Scottish Catholic journalism’ in the nineteenth century.6' Bom 
in Maghera, County Derry in 1858, Diamond had moved to England at the age of 
twenty and ran a newspaper in Newcastle-Upon-Tyne. He went on to build an empire 
of which the New Catholic Press Ltd was his controlling company. Diamond’s 
obituary credited him with forty such publications, thirty-seven of which were still in 
existence at the time o f  his death. “ His paper, The Irish Tribune: An Irish Journal f o r  
England an d  Scotland , was intended to be cheap enough for even the poorest of 
readers. Between 1884 and 1885 the paper expanded to target the Irish communities 
in Newcastle, Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester and London. The Tribune claimed to 
reach four million Irish and Catholic people in England and Scotland. Diamond also 
took over the struggling Glasgow Observer, purchasing it outright in 1894 and 
making it the Scottish sister paper to the Tribune.
Having established himself as an ambitious and rising press baron in the 1880s, 
Diamond pursued a political career in the 1890s, winning the parliamentary seat of 
North Monaghan in 1892, a position he held for three years. It was, however, an 
unfortunate time to have done so as Irish politics fragmented following Parnell’s 
death. Diamond had denounced Pamell on Catholic moral grounds during the O ’Shea 
divorce case. In the wake o f the latter’s death, Diamond was then rapidly drawn into 
violent quarrels among the anti-Pamellites and did not stand for the seat again in 
1895. Instead, he used his papers as an outlet to support Irish nationalism. In the 
years following the Easter Rising o f 1916 Diamond had originally been hostile to de 
Valera and to the heirs o f the insurgents. He grew increasingly unhappy with John 
Redmond, however, and moved towards Sinn Fein. Owen Dudley Edwards has 
explained that Diamond must have found Redmond highly conservative in light of his
61 Owen Dudley Edwards ‘The Catholic Press in Scotland Since the Restoration of the Hierarchy in 
David McRoberts (ed.), Modern Scottish Catholicism 1878-1978 (Glasgow, 1979) p. 169.
62 Ibid, p. 173.
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memories o f Davitt.63 Diamond’s extreme views landed him in trouble when, in the 
aftermath o f  the assassination attempt on Field-Marshal French, the Irish Viceroy, he 
wrote an editorial entitled ‘Killing No Murder’ that justified the attempt on account of 
French being the head o f a tyrannical system. It was printed in The Catholic H erald  
on 27 December 1919 and, as a result, Diamond was charged that ‘he did unlawfully 
solicit, encourage, persuade, and propose to divers persons in Ireland to murder divers 
other persons carrying on his Majesty’s Government in Ireland’.64 Diamond served 
six months in prison, a sentence that has been described as severe in view of ‘the age 
and manifest innocence o f the culprit’.65
In April 1921 Kerr would have been fully aware o f Diamond’s trial o f the previous 
year. As the owner o f prominent Catholic newspapers, especially in Scotland, 
Diamond has been hailed as the leading voice o f Scottish Catholicism, a voice that 
had been linked to incitement to murder. Dudley Edwards has commented that ‘while 
it did not spell out the implication that the loyalties of all Scottish Catholics were 
thereby to be regarded as dubious, the meaning was there for any who had eyes to 
see’.66 Kerr would have certainly wanted to distance himself from this view, as would 
his family. But in sending Diamond the Prime Minister’s statement for publication, 
he was acknowledging the influence that he had through his readership, and the 
number o f people that his papers reached. Kerr was trying to target Irish opinion in 
England and Scotland as well as the United States. His mistake was perhaps that he 
merely re-stated the policy that the government was being criticised for.
63 Owen Dudley Edwards ‘The Catholic Press in Scotland Since the Restoration of the Hierarchy’, p. 
169.
63 Ibid., p. 173.
64 ‘Killing No Murder’ article in The Times, Saturday 10 Jan 1920, p. 4, col. F.
65 Owen Dudley Edwards ‘The Catholic Press in Scotland Since the Restoration of the Hierarchy , p. 
174.
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This is probably the only example of Kerr trying to target the mass opinion of 
ordinary people, and Catholic opinion at that. This may have been an attempt to 
counteract the propaganda campaign being run by Erskine Childers and Desmond 
Fitzgerald in London on behalf o f Sinn Fein. Yet Diamond’s reply implies that 
contemporaries were fully aware o f Kerr’s position, not only as Lloyd George’s 
private secretary but as a member o f a prominent Catholic family. Nationalists such 
as Diamond found Kerr’s work on Irish matters disgraceful, not only because they 
disagreed with him but, more importantly, in view o f his Catholic heritage.
When Kerr left Lloyd George’s service in May 1921 it was partly to devote more 
time to Christian Science teachings. Writing to Lionel Curtis in 1922 he explained 
that:
So far as I am concerned Christian Science will have the first claim on my 
time and activities, but it will make me a more valuable rather than a less 
valuable coadjutor in any R.T. work that may be undertaken.. .1 cannot expect 
you or the R.T. to share this point of view, though I don’t think Christian 
Science has had a deleterious effect on me, so far! But you are familiar with 
choice between a religious and political method o f dealing with the same 
human problems, and so will be able to appreciate, even if you don’t share my 
point o f  view.67
It appears that, as time went on, Kerr did allow his religious beliefs to influence his 
political point o f view as his world vision continued to develop. Billington has stated 
that through Christian Science Kerr began feel that he belonged to the Protestant
67 Philip Kerr to L ionel Curtis, 28 M ay 1922, Lothian Papers G D 4 0 /17/18/190.
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stream of Christianity associated with the rise of modem democracy and individual 
freedom. He acknowledges, however, that Kerr deeply opposed separatism in the 
political sphere and envisaged a future with roots in the two Western Christian 
traditions: ‘the Protestant idea o f resting authority with individuals, and the Catholic 
idea o f giving institutional form to a universal human community’.69 Although Kerr 
disagreed with the direct influence o f church bodies in the realm o f politics, he 
recognised the influence o f religion in political thought. Kerr would go on to write 
regularly for the Christian Science Monitor and, by the time he died in 1940, most of 
his staff at the embassy in Washington were Christian Scientists.
Meanwhile Kerr’s uncle, Lord Edmund Talbot, actually became the first Catholic 
Viceroy o f  Ireland in spring 1921.70 It seems that the government decided to make a 
conciliatory gesture towards the Irish and passed a special Act of Parliament so that 
he could be appointed. In order to do so, Talbot was elevated to the peerage and took 
the title Viscount Fitzalan o f Derwent. Unfortunately, there appears to be no 
correspondence between Kerr and his uncle, or indeed any reference to Fitzalan’s 
appointment, in Kerr’s papers. Considering the fact that the latter had been working 
on the Government o f Ireland Bill and its aftermath between 1919 and 1921, it is 
astonishing that there is no reference to his uncle’s appointment. It is possible that 
Kerr took up his position as editor of The Daily Chronicle in May 1921 as Lord 
Fitzalan was taking up his own post in Ireland. Nevertheless, Fitzalan appeared to 
have come as an emissary o f peace, rather than as a symbolic gesture. Having been in 
Ireland a only month he publicly admitted that the Black and Tans had committed
68 David P. Billington, Lothian, Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order (Westport, 2006) p. 78.
69 Ibid.
70 Edmund Bernard Fitzalan-Howard was the third son of the fourteenth Duke of Norfolk and Lady 
Anne Kerr’s brother. He was a major beneficiary in the will of Bertram Arthur Talbot, and in 
accordance with the will assumed the surname Talbot. He was known as Lord Edmund Talbot until 
1921 when he became Viscount Fitzalan of Derwent.
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horrible crimes, and, unlike his predecessor, he took his family to Ireland with him. 
After the Anglo-Irish Treaty o f December 1921 Fitzalan stayed on a year more, 
having reigned ‘over the infant Free State as well as Northern Ireland’.71
Kerr’s personal religious position, and his family’s Catholicism, provides a 
fascinating dimension to his connection with Irish affairs. His imperialist background 
convinced him that religion and politics must be kept completely separate from one 
another; as a result the influence that the Church held over the Irish population 
continued to frustrate him, although in Ireland’s case this showed some naivety. 
Meanwhile, he was involved in attempts by religious leaders to mediate in the Anglo- 
Irish conflict but he continued to staunchly defend the government’s policy. Indeed, 
Kerr was in no sense a spokesperson for Catholicism; rather his religious background 
gave him a certain credibility that could be used to the government’s advantage and 
made him especially useful as a key advisor during this period. It could be argued, 
however, that the Irish situation confirmed his decision to break with the Catholic 
faith. There was undoubtedly a strong religious theme to Kerr’s life, as there was to 
the Irish question, and where the two intersect provides us with fresh insights into the 
attempts to find an answer to the Irish question during this period.
71 Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey, p .  276.
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Chapter 8
Philip Kerr at The Daily Chronicle in 1921
Philip Kerr left Downing Street in May 1921 to take directorial control o f Lloyd 
George s newspaper, The Daily Chronicle. Although he was in this position for only 
six months it was during this time that the Anglo-Irish negotiations took place and the 
subsequent Treaty was signed. The D aily Chronicle was Lloyd George’s mouthpiece, 
and for these crucial six months Kerr was at the helm. This chapter does not attempt 
to explore the role o f the press in the Irish question, or indeed the history o f the Daily 
Chronicle. Rather, it aims to consider Kerr’s role and position on Ireland during his 
six months as the paper’s director. The thesis as a whole has focused on Kerr’s time 
as Lloyd George’s secretary in light o f his background and beliefs. An exploration of 
his time at the Chronicle provides a well rounded ending to the work that he did for 
the Prime Minister in relation to Ireland. Although ultimately Kerr would have taken 
instructions from Lloyd George regarding the paper’s editorial policy and content, it 
will become clear that he still tried to offer the Prime Minister advice on Ireland, even 
though he had left Downing Street. The primary materials for Kerr’s time at the 
Chronicle are largely unexplored. To date, there has been no work connecting Kerr to 
Irish affairs during this short time as it was his Round Table colleague and friend, 
Lionel Curtis, who acted as secretary to the British delegation at the Anglo-Irish 
negotiations. Therefore this section aims to add to our understanding of Kerr s work 
on Ireland in the final months that he served his chief.
There is a rich literature surrounding the Irish question in 1921 and, equally, there 
is a substantial amount o f work relating to the British press at the time and its
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coverage o f  A nglo-Irish relations. The classic work in this respect is D. George 
Boyce’s Englishm en and Irish Troubles which deals with the way in which public 
opinion, as put forward through the British press, influenced the government’s Irish 
policy betw een 1918 and 1922.1 Although Boyce’s contribution is the main work to 
have explored the press in relation to the Irish question, there is a body o f  literature 
documenting the history o f  the press during Lloyd George’s premiership. Stephen 
Koss’s The Rise and  Fall o f  the Political Press in Britain is one such work that 
attempts to chart the history o f  the British press in Britain in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.2 Equally, a great deal o f information can be gained from 
biographies and memoirs o f  newspaper men o f the day. These include works on, or 
by, journalists or newspaper proprietors such as Lord Beaverbrook, Lord Northcliffe, 
J.L. Garvin and C.P. Scott. Aside from witnessing the growth o f the political press 
as we know it today, the period produced some o f the most famous newspaper men in 
history. Kerr h im self was closely acquainted with W aldorf Astor, proprietor o f  The 
Observer, and G eoffrey Dawson, editor o f  The Times.'1'
Where the literature is plentiful in these areas the same cannot be said o f  the Daily  
Chronicle. A lthough it has been discussed in the literature relating to Lloyd George, 
there has been no substantial work carried out on the Chronicle alone. J.M. McEwen 
has, however, written a helpful article on Lloyd George’s acquisition o f  the paper in
1 D.G. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles, British Public Opinion and the Making o f  Irish Policy 
1918-22 (London, 1972).
2 Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall o f  the Political Press in Britain (London, 1990).
3 Lord Beaverbrook, Men and Power 1917-1918 (New York, 1956); G.K. Chesterton, Autobiography 
(London, 1936); David Ayerst, Garvin o f  the Observer (London, 1985); Trevor Wilson (ed.), The 
Political D iaries o f  C.P. Scott 1911-1928 (New York, 1970). There are multiple works on Northcliffe 
including Henry James Greenwall, Northcliffe, Napoleon o f  Fleet Street (London, 1957), J. Lee 
Thompson, Northcliffe : Press Baron in Politics, 1865-1922 (London, 2000), The History o f  the Times, 
The 150th Anniversary and Beyond 1912-1948 (London, 1952).
4 For Dawson see John Evelyn Wrench, Geoffrey Dawson and Our Times (London, 1955). There is no 
single biography of Astor, for information see David Ayerst, Garvin o f  the Observer (London, 1985), 
Virginia Cowles, TheAstors the Story o f  a Transatlantic Family (London, 1979); John Grigg, Nancy 
Astor (Feltham, 1982); Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set, Portrait o f  an Exclusive Fraternity (London, 
2001); John Turner, Lloyd G eorge’s Secretariat (Cambridge 1980).
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1918. He notes that the purchase o f  a modern, popular newspaper by the then Prime 
Minister was unprecedented in Britain at the time.6 Lloyd George had had a 
fascination with the press from an early age and understood the potential o f its power. 
Furthermore he was prepared to use it in order to advance his own interests. For the 
greatest British politician o f  the day to purchase the newspaper at such a momentous 
time in British history would have had an immeasurable impact on the development 
of the press as we know it. This makes K err’s move to the Chronicle in 1921 even 
more intriguing, along with the Chronicle's coverage o f Anglo-Irish politics for the 
six months that he was there.
Kerr’s biographers have also failed to examine his move to the Daily Chronicle 
and the time that he spent there in any great detail, most likely because he was there 
for so short a time. David P. Billington has noted the fact that Kerr’s health was 
suffering once more in late 1920 as a result o f  overwork, the strain o f  the peace 
treaties and imperial management. He suggests that Lloyd George had decided to let 
go o f  Kerr in the autum n o f  that year, arranging for him to become the political 
director o f  the D aily Chronicle. Kerr took up the post in May 1921, resigning after 
only six m onths.7 There are a number o f  reasons usually cited for Kerr leaving 
Downing Street. These include the hypotheses that he was overworked or that he 
wanted to devote more time to Christian Science. If  either o f  these were true then it 
seems absurd that Kerr would have taken on a directorial role o f a national 
newspaper, and with it all o f  the work and extra pressure such a role would bring. It 
is more convincing to argue that Kerr’s move was a calculated one on Lloyd George s 
part. He did, after all, have a remarkable knack o f using people while they suited his
5 J.M. McEwen, ‘Lloyd George’s Acquisition of the Daily Chronicle in 1918’ The Journal o f  British
Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Autumn, 1982), pp. 127-144.
6 Ibid., p. 127.
7 David P. Billington, Lothian, Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order (Westport, 2006) p. 72.
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purpose. This period has been described by Kenneth O. Morgan as ‘Lloyd G eorge’s 
Last Stand and it can be argued that Kerr best served his master elsewhere at this 
stage. M organ has noted that his circle o f advisors was being diluted at this time:
The Garden Suburb o f  private advisers was disappearing, its major figure, 
Philip Kerr, having departed in May 1921 to manage the pro-Government 
D aily Chronicle. His successor, Edward Grigg, a liberal-minded imperialist o f  
humane sympathies, free from Kerr’s brand o f  exotic mysticism, enjoyed less 
scope than had his predecessor. The rest o f Lloyd George’s private 
en tourage.. .were functionaries on a lower level from the body o f advisors 
such as Adams, Kerr, and Astor who had surrounded the leader in 1917-18.8
Stephen Koss has also argued that it suited Lloyd George to have Kerr at the 
Chronicle in 1921. He explains that, despite the success o f  the coalition at 
W estminster, it failed to take root in the constituencies where local newspapers helped 
to maintain the spirit o f  sectional partisanship.9 The press therefore hindered the 
fusion o f  the governm ent by exposing the difficulties o f the parliamentary 
arrangement. The D aily Chronicle was the only devoted advocate o f the 
government’s make up. Apparently Lloyd George was advised by Frederick Guest in 
September 1920 that the Chronicle could be edited by George Herbert Perris, subject 
to supervision ‘by some tactful person with good common sense’. 10 Koss writes that 
within weeks Kerr had left his desk at Downing Street to take over the political 
directorship o f  the Chronicle. In fact, as previously noted, although the arrangements
8 Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-22 
(Oxford, 1979) p. 260.
9 Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall o f  the Political Press in Britain (London, 1990) p. 817.
10 Guest to Lloyd George, 16 Sept 1920, Lloyd George Papers F/22/2/13, quoted in Stephen Koss, The 
Rise and Fall o f  the Political Press in Britain (London, 1990) p. 817-818.
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were made for his transfer in November 1920 Kerr stayed at Downing Street until 
May 1921. Following the death o f  Perris in 1920 his brother, Ernest Alfred Perris, 
took over as the Chronicle"s editor. He remained in the position until the Chronicle 
merged with the D aily News to become the News Chronicle in 1930."
Although the D aily Chronicle presented a new challenge, Kerr did not see it as a 
long-term comm itm ent. He believed that to do the job properly he would need to stay 
for at least ten years during which time he should go into parliament in order to make 
contacts. He told Lloyd George that he was not prepared to do this.12 Moreover, the 
directorship m ay have felt like a demotion following his time at the very centre o f 
affairs at Downing Street. Yet Kerr did agree to take up the post at the Chronicle for
13a transitional period. Koss argues that nothing could have suited Lloyd George 
better, although ‘Lloyd G eorge’s requirements were more easily met than those o f  
Kerr, whose authority went without formal recognition’. 14
It could be argued that Kerr was perfectly suited to his role at the Chronicle. Aside 
from his prior editorial experience o f  The State in South Africa, and later o f  the Round  
Table, he had inside knowledge o f  the workings o f  government like few others. As 
the previous chapters have demonstrated, in over four years as private secretary to 
Lloyd George he had gained a close knowledge o f  the Prime Minister. He had drafted 
legislation, as well as countless speeches, and to some degree handled the government 
‘spin’ on policy as it would be presented to the press. The Daily Chronicle took the 
chief role in presenting the Prime M inister in a positive light before the nation and 
few had better credentials greater than Kerr for such a post.
11 For George Herbert Perris see Robert Gomme, ‘Perris, (George) Herbert (1866-1920) , Oxford 
Dictionary o f  National Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Jan 2008. Very 
little is known of his brother Ernest who edited the Chronicle under Kerr s supervision.
12 Stephen Koss, The Rise and Fall o f  the Political Press in Britain, p. 818.
13 For Dalziel see Marc Brodie, ‘Dalziel, (James) Henry, Baron Dalziel of Kirkcaldy (1868-1935)’ 
Oxford Dictionary o f  N a t i o n a l  Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Jan 2008.
14 Ibid.
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Like other positions he held throughout his career, Kerr threw him self into the role, 
first embarking on a tour o f  major British cities in order to gauge public feeling in the 
different areas o f  the country.15 This was probably an attempt to determine the 
expectations o f  the Chronicle readers. He clearly took the role very seriously and was 
not concerned about upsetting the other members o f the Board. After having lunch 
with Kerr, Lionel Curtis and Edward Grigg, Thomas Jones recorded in his diary: 
‘Philip Kerr complaining that at a meeting o f  the Board o f  his newspaper the Daily 
Chronicle that m orning the directors had been bewailing the falling circulation due to 
the highbrow tone given to the Chronicle by Philip Kerr’.16 Jones also described the 
lunchtime discussion about the press in Britain at this time. The conclusion was 
reached that the M anchester Guardian was the one great newspaper in the country. 
Someone rem arked that it was ‘the one thing between the P.M. and depravity’. 17 
Indeed the G uardian's editor, C.P. Scott, broke off his friendship with Lloyd George 
over his handling o f  Ireland. Kerr, however did, what he could in a six month period 
to counter-act the criticism aimed at the Prime Minister.
It is extrem ely difficult to determine what changes in personnel Kerr may have 
made, if any, at the newspaper or which journalists were reporting on Ireland for the 
Chronicle in 1921. Unfortunately, there appear to be no surviving documents relating 
to the running o f  the Chronicle, but a number o f  the reporters can be identified. 
Between July and December the majority o f  leading articles about Ireland were 
written by Arthur Pole Nicholson, the Daily Chronicle's, political correspondent from 
1920-23. Nicholson hailed from London and had worked on the parliamentary staff 
of the Times from  1895-1905, reporting on Gladstone’s funeral in 1898. He had
15 J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (Philip Kerr) 1882-1940 (London, 1960) p. 82.
16 Keith Middlemass (ed.), Thomas Jones, Whitehall Diary, Volume 1, 1916-1925 (London, 1965) p. 
180.
17 Ibid., p. 181.
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remained there as parliam entary correspondent from 1908 to 1914 when he resigned 
over a difference o f  policy, although it is unclear what this was. Nicholson then went 
on to work for a succession o f  Liberal newspapers, writing for the Daily News before 
joining the D aily Chronicle in 1920. He had a special interest in Indian political 
problems and wrote widely on the subject.18 This may have endeared him to Kerr 
who was also interested in the politics o f  India. In 1928 Nicholson published The 
Real M en in Public Life: Forces and Factors in the State in which he wrote 
‘unbiased’ sketches o f  contemporary public figures, including Lloyd George. He 
made no reference to the Daily Chronicle but, when discussing Lloyd G eorge’s 
replacement o f  Asquith, he rather bluntly stated:
Only one point has been missed, which, I may as well add to the narrative.
The liaison between the mind o f  Mr. Lloyd George and the Times, which 
resulted in the article that finally upset Mr. Asquith’s equilibrium, was Mr. 
Philip K err.19
Nicholson did not elaborate on this point. It seems a slightly odd observation, 
however, as Kerr only joined Lloyd George’s secretariat when the latter was already 
Prime M inister. It is possible that Nicholson did not approve o f Kerr during his time 
as the Chronicle"s director, although we cannot be sure.
The parliam entary correspondent for the Daily Chronicle during this time was 
Frederick James Higginbottom, who did have specialist knowledge o f Ireland. In 
1882 the London-based press agency, the Press Association, had sent him to Dublin
18 These included his volume Scraps o f  Paper. India’s Broken Treaties. Her Princes. And the Problem
(London, 1930). , n
19 A.P. Nicholson (A.P.N.), The Real Men in Public Life: Forces and Factors in the State (Glasgow,
1928) p. 30.
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as their special correspondent where he stayed for almost ten years. Dilwyn Porter 
has written that ‘His reporting during an especially troubled phase o f  Anglo-Irish 
relations established the Press Association as the principal supplier o f  Irish news for 
London and the provincial press’.20 Higginbottom also served briefly as a 
parliamentary correspondent for the National Press, a Dublin daily, on his return to 
London in 1891. He had a great deal o f  experience reporting on Ireland when he re­
joined the D aily Chronicle in 1919 (having also worked there briefly in 1900). 
Higginbottom published his memoirs in 1934 but made no reference to Kerr or the 
Chronicle. In fact they only cover the period up until 1911, when Higginbottom left 
the editorship o f  the Pall M all Gazette. He was an admirer o f  Lloyd George and 
claimed to have been in favour o f  his National Insurance Act and the controversial 
budget o f  1910, even when he was compelled to criticise the measures as editor o f  the 
Gazette'.
To me, the National Insurance Act was a stroke o f  statesmanship that stamped
its author as a real political genius. It compelled in me an appreciation o f Mr.
Lloyd George that was the beginning o f a personal admiration that grew with
21later years, and has endured to this day.
This may explain why he re-joined the Daily Chronicle in 1919, following Lloyd 
George’s purchase o f  the paper in 1918.
R.A. Scott-James was a leader writer for the Chronicle from 1919 to 1930 and 
contributed a num ber o f  articles on Ireland, although not as many as Nicholson. The 
only two reporters that we know o f who were Irish, or o f Irish descent, were Martin
20 Dilwyn Porter, ‘Higginbottom, Frederick James (1859-1943)’, Oxford Dictionary o f  National 
Biography (Sept, 2004).
21 Frederick J. Higginbottom, The Vivid Life, A Journalist s Career (London, 1934).
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Henry D onohoe and John George Hamilton. Donohoe was bom  in Galway and 
appears to have been the longest serving o f  the reporters discussed here. He had been 
a special correspondent for the Boer War in 1899 and went on to report for the 
Chronicle on wars and revolutions across the world.22 Donohoe was the Chronicle's 
Paris correspondent between 1920 and 1927 and contributed very little on Ireland. 
Hamilton was bom  in M anchester and was o f  Irish descent. He moved to the 
Chronicle from  the D aily News in 1921 and may have been appointed by Kerr. O f all 
of those reporting on the Irish situation as it unfolded, Nicholson seems to have 
contributed the m ajority o f  the leading articles. It appears that those journalists who 
were Irish, or had special expertise in Irish matters, contributed fewer articles on the 
Irish question. N icholson’s prominence can be explained by the fact that it was 
necessary for the paper to follow closely the developments between the government 
and the Sinn Fein leaders.
The tim ing o f  K err’s appointment to the Daily Chronicle coincided with the most 
momentous and widely documented six months in the history o f  Anglo-Irish relations. 
The Chronicle was essentially Lloyd George’s mouthpiece during this time.
Historians have covered this period at length so the events will not be explored in 
detail here. Instead, the focus will be Kerr’s reaction to them during his time at the 
newspaper. The Government o f  Ireland Bill became law on 3 M ay 1921. Kerr had 
steered it through its conception, drafting and implementation over the previous two 
years. As discussed in the previous three chapters, the violence in Ireland had 
worsened during the first few months o f 1921. On account o f reprisals by the crown 
forces, public opinion was growing against the government s Irish policy. Frank 
Owen has recorded how the country’s most powerful newspapers, such as The Times,
22 Donohoe wrote With the Persian Expedition (London, 1919).
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The M anchester G uardian , The Westminster Gazette and The Daily News, attacked 
the governm ent s approach. These were all Liberal papers with the exception o f  the 
Times, which was described as ‘independent’ or ‘unclassified’.24 Meanwhile, the 
speech given by King George V at the opening o f  the Belfast Parliament on 22 June 
1921 had been received well in both Britain and Ireland, due to the appeal for peace 
on all sides o f  the conflict. Lloyd George took advantage o f  the public mood and 
contacted de Valera, inviting him to a conference in London with a view to finding 
reconciliation betw een Britain and Ireland. The military truce began on 11 July and 
on 14 July de V alera met with Lloyd George at Downing Street.
Under K err’s direction, the Chronicle supported the government’s line throughout 
June, July and August, with emphasis on phrases such as ‘Cabinet’s Pledge for Irish 
Peace’.25 On the day the truce began, the 11 July, the leading article read: ‘Although 
the agreed truce is tim ed to begin at noon today, the Government began to act up to 
the spirit o f  it on Saturday’.26 In Nicholson’s article o f the 22 July, Kerr’s influence 
was evident in its description o f  the hypothetical offer o f ‘Dominion Government For 
North and South’ and in pointing out that ‘The Home Rule Act has given Ulster her 
safeguards already. No change can be made except under the express machinery o f  
that A ct’.27 The piece also reported that the help o f the bishops was needed and that 
de Valera could not hold all o f  the responsibility.
The discussions however were not straightforward with de Valera refusing to 
budge on the principle o f  Irish unity. The Prime M inister’s offer amounted to full 
dominion status for southern Ireland, with full control over taxation and finance,
"3 Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey (London, 1954) p. 572.
24 See Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles p. 198.
25 The D aily Chronicle, Friday 22 July 1921, p. 1, columns 1-2; The Daily Chronicle, Thursday 28 July 
1921, p. 1, columns 1-2.
26 The D aily Chronicle, Monday 11 July 1921, p. 1, columns 1-2.
"7 The D aily Chronicle, Friday 22 July 1921, p. 1, columns 1-2.
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defence, and home affairs. The conditions o f the deal included safeguards for Ulster, 
British m ilitary control o f  the Irish seas, no tariffs on British goods and Ireland was to 
share in the British national debt. De Valera rejected the offer declaring that the terms 
did not amount to dominion status at all. Following his return to Ireland, a war o f 
words took place betw een the two leaders that lasted until September 1921.
Throughout August the Chronicle ran headlines such as ‘Ireland’s Golden 
Opportunity. W ill Dail Eireann Accept the Peace?’ and ‘De Valera’s “N o” to Peace 
Offer’.28 An editorial 15 August was titled ‘Ireland, Her Choice Between Substance 
and Shadow ’. It observed that ‘Such an offer, so far-reaching in its scope, so 
generous in its details, has never before in history been made to Catholic and 
Nationalist Ireland’. All o f  these placed the responsibility for the peace process on 
de V alera’s shoulders. The Chronicle also, not surprisingly, focused on American 
approval o f  the C abinet’s offer and the ‘Disappointment There if Offer is Rejected’. 30 
An article on 17 August described the ‘advice’ given to de Valera by the New York 
Globe that to reject the Cabinet’s offer would be to ‘alienate the last vestige o f 
sympathy that may have been left for their cause by the conduct o f  their agitators in 
this country and bring sorrow to all disinterested friends o f Ireland’.31 The piece 
announced that this was the ‘practically unanimous view o f American newspapers o f 
all shades o f  opinion’. This is, in fact, reminiscent o f Kerr’s assessment o f  American 
press opinion as presented in Chapter 6 o f this thesis. The sample o f typical 
expressions’ supporting the Cabinet’s offer included those from the New York Times, 
the Liberal Evening Post, the isolationist New York World and the anglophile Tribune.
28 The Daily Chronicle, Tuesday 16 August 1921, p. 1, columns 1 -2; The Daily Chronicle, Thursday 18 
August 1921, p. 1, columns 1-2.
"9 The Daily Chronicle, Monday 15 August 1921, p. 4, column 1.
30 The Daily Chronicle, Tuesday 16 August 1921, p. 1, column 2.
31 The Daily Chronicle, Wednesday 17 August 1921, p. 6, column 3.
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There were no extracts from Irish-American papers. This was hardly a wide-ranging 
sample.
It appears that Kerr was taking the general Cabinet line. But he was also irritated 
by the ‘annoyingly m ild’ nature o f English press opinion with regards to de Valera’s 
procrastination. On 5 September Kerr wrote to the Prime M inister in reference to de 
Valera’s reply to the government printed in the press that day. His reply restated the 
rejection o f  the governm ent’s proposals, on the basis that they did not guarantee 
Ireland freedom  from British control. Acknowledging that force would not solve the 
problem, de V alera ended by declaring that his side was ready to appoint 
plenipotentiaries. Kerr dismissed the reply, observing that ‘It is o f  course the same 
old stuff: “N o” in one line, and “Yes” in the next’.32 He thought that the British press 
were taking a m oderate line because:
they have twice had an apparent ‘never, never’ reply from de Valera, and 
don’t take it seriously. For instance the Daily M ail’s poster: ‘Why does de 
Valera go on banging at an open door’? represents not unfairly the general 
im pression.33
Kerr believed that ‘people are sick o f palavering and want things brought to a head . 
He counselled Lloyd George to send a short reply to de Valera saying:
We have had enough palavering. The issue is quite simple. Do you consent to 
negotiate on the basis o f  Ireland’s acceptance o f  membership o f the British 
Com m onwealth with all that it entails, or do you refuse? The time has gone
32 Philip Kerr to Lloyd George, 5 Sept 1921, Lloyd George Papers F/34/2/6.
33 Ibid.
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past for talking any more about conditions or for further delay. We must have 
a plain yes or no answer by September [date left blank]. I f  it is yes than 
negotiations can proceed, or if it is no or we get no reply, we shall take it as a 
denunciation o f  the truce.34
Kerr explained that in taking such action Sinn Féin would then ‘have the clear 
responsibility before the world, and before Irish opinion, o f choosing between 
acceptance o f  the principle o f  the Government offer and w ar’.35 In view o f  the 
delicacy o f  the situation this was hard-line advice that would in effect, back the Sinn 
Féin leaders into a comer. Yet Lloyd George preferred to follow a more moderate 
line and did not follow K err’s advice. Nevertheless, the evidence shows that Kerr was 
still trying to influence him from Fleet Street.
Later in the m onth Kerr wrote to Lloyd George again, this time with a greater 
sense o f  urgency. He warned o f  a world-wide movement against Britain, directly 
linked with Sinn Féin. He claimed to have received information from two different 
sources, ‘one Am erican and the other clerical’, and described the information as 
‘disquieting’.36 W e do not know exactly how Kerr came by this information, or who 
the sources were, but the description o f  them as American and clerical ties in with the 
themes o f  the previous two chapters. No doubt he maintained his previous contacts 
from Downing Street. According to his information, Kerr identified a section o f  Sinn 
Féin that had no desire to reach a settlement with Britain. Instead, he described the 
activity o f ‘Am erican Sinn Féin’, a separate entity from Irish Sinn Féin, which, he 
argued, were ‘anim ated by a hatred o f Great Britain far more than love o f Ireland . 
Kerr wrote that a large number ofpeople made vast amounts o f  money, millions o f
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
36 Philip Kerr to Lloyd George, 14 Sept 1921, Lloyd George Papers F/34/2/7.
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dollars, based on this hatred, through Irish newspapers, films and propaganda. Far 
more worryingly, he linked the American agitation with other hostile groups abroad, 
such as ‘Indians, Egyptians, Bolshies, and all the haters o f England in France, 
Germany etc . He explained that such groups saw a real chance o f ‘smashing the 
British Em pire . Kerr s intelligence suggested that a section o f Sinn Fein meant to 
prolong the negotiations in order to discredit Britain, and that she was facing an 
international movem ent, not merely her old troublesome neighbour. In his view, an 
ultimatum was necessary in order to persuade Ireland to accept membership o f  the 
British Em pire or become prey to other foreign interests. He stressed the need for 
urgency and believed that time was an important factor in the negotiations.
It is difficult to determine just how serious Lloyd George considered K err’s letter 
to be. The Chronicle however printed a piece based on this information two days 
later. The colum n was written by ‘Politicus’. We cannot be absolutely certain who 
this was. Econom ist John M aynard Keynes occasionally wrote as ‘Politicus’ and J.L. 
Hammond w rote under the same pseudonym for the Manchester Guardian. Yet it is 
highly probable that the ‘Politicus’ in this instance was Kerr as the piece in question 
was alm ost identical in content to the letter written to Lloyd George on 14 September. 
It began by stating that ‘The well informed writer o f the article below, the authority o f 
whose sources o f  information cannot be questioned, is a sincere sympathiser with 
Ireland and her aspirations’.38 The piece argued that public opinion was confused 
about the conduct o f  the Sinn Fein leaders because o f the government s generous 
offer.. .o f  Dom inion status’. This was said to be all the more surprising because 
‘public opinion in America and throughout the world is almost unanimous for 
acceptance. A n d .. .the great mass o f  free Irish opinion is for settlement on these
37 Ibid.
38 The Daily Chronicle, Friday 16 September 1921, p. 4, column 3.
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terms, to o ’.39 The reluctance o f  the Sinn Fein leaders to accept the offer was partly 
explained by the fact that they were ‘elected on the Republican ticket’. ‘Politicus’ 
also made allowances for the fact that Most o f  them are inexperienced in politics and 
have only ju st emerged from prison or internment camps, or from being on the run’.
He argued that as a result it would be unreasonable to expect immediate acceptance or 
complete trust in the sincerity o f  the ‘British attitude’.
Despite this, ‘Politicus’ pointed to the forces ‘hindering this process o f 
reconciliation’ betw een Great Britain and Ireland, describing ‘another movement in 
Sinn Fein o f  a different kind -  a movement resting not on love on Ireland, but on 
hatred o f  Great Britain, and based not on Ireland, but on foreign countries’.40 These 
were supposedly forces that wanted to seize power in Egypt, India and elsewhere’.
He continued that ‘O f all these the irreconcilable Irish in America are the leaders’ and 
their motive was not Irish freedom but the destruction o f  England. The article pointed 
to the business aspect o f  this and the money made through ‘newspapers, in cinemas, 
in countless w ays’. The objective was said to be the failure o f the negotiations and, 
ultimately, a w ar in Ireland that would secure a republic. The theory was that the 
establishment o f  an Irish republic would promote similar movements in ‘Egypt, India 
and every other land under the British flag’.41 ‘Politicus’ warned that ‘these sinister 
forces whispering in the ears o f  sincere but inexperienced and weary men may have a 
fatal influence at the decisive m oment’.4- Whether or not Kerr was in fact ‘Politicus’ 
is not so important. The fact that the piece was printed, based on his information, is 
extremely relevant. It demonstrates that he was still receiving information regarding 
Ireland while at the Daily Chronicle, drawing it to the Prime M inister s attention, and
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 The Daily Chronicle, Friday 16 September 1921, p. 4, column 4.
42 Ibid.
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acting on it through making it public. The well-being o f the Empire still appears to 
have been Kerr s main concern, although this point was emphasised more in his letter 
to Lloyd G eorge than in the article.
Although the D aily Chronicle, as Lloyd George’s mouthpiece, supported the 
government offer o f  dominion status, this was not however Kerr’s view. In a letter to 
the Prime M inister on 28 September 1921, he set out his thoughts on dominion status 
for Ireland. The letter was written just days before de Valera accepted Lloyd 
George’s final invitation to a conference in London, to begin the 11 October. This is 
the clearest example o f  him trying to influence the Prime M inister over Ireland while 
working at the D aily Chronicle. In view o f Kerr’s Round Table membership it would 
be easy to assum e that he would support a dominion solution to the problem. This 
was simply not the case. Kerr still saw Ireland as a disloyal member o f the Empire 
who had not earned the right to become a dominion. He wrote to Lloyd George: ‘The 
essence o f  the Dom inion Solution is a spirit o f  loyal partnership with the British 
Em pire.. .It does not yet exist in Ireland’.43 Kerr further stressed ‘I am all in favour o f 
your doing your utmost to bring them to the Dominion solution if  it is possible, but I 
am becoming increasingly doubtful if  it is possible for you to succeed’. He predicted 
that although it could be attempted, Sinn Fein would not make the necessary 
concessions to Britain, or to Ulster, in order to make a permanent settlement possible.
K err’s alternative was to find a mode o f  peaceful co-existence until such a time as 
a settlement could be agreed. Although he declared that he would be prepared to face 
war in preventing Ireland from becoming an independent republic, he recognised that 
such a conflict would not ‘convert Ireland from her irreconcilability’. Instead, he 
acknowledged that war would only drive the ‘irreconcilable spirit underground , to be
43 Philip Kerr to Lloyd George, 28 Sept 1921, Lothian Papers GD40/17/633/3.
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dealt with later. Kerr proposed an agreement by which Sinn Fein accepted certain 
terms by treaty to undertake to abandon its claim for international status; to 
undertake to import no arms and to invite no foreign representatives or warships to its 
harbours; and to abandon any attempt to coerce Ulster by force.’ In return, Britain 
would withdraw her troops and administration from Southern Ireland and ‘leave 
Ireland absolutely alone’.43 Although she would protect Ireland from foreign 
aggression and would probably have to maintain a naval base on the south-west coast, 
Ireland would thus have none o f  the privileges o f a dominion. In this sense she would 
have no representation at the Imperial Conference or in the League o f  Nations. Kerr 
summarised that, in effect, Ireland would ‘be left entirely alone in a ringed fence 
which she could not get out of, and from which no one outside could rescue her.’46 
Kerr, however, also recognised the weaknesses o f his plan:
O f course this would be no settlement. You can pick holes in it in a thousand 
places. It will break to pieces very rapidly, but it safeguards the two vital 
things, which are that Ireland, even though she does not accept Dominion 
status, is not an international problem; and the safeguarding o f Ulster.
The suggestion may not have seemed so far-fetched had the offer o f dominion status 
not already been on the table. Yet Kerr’s plan appears to have been absurd in view o f  
the delicacy o f  the negotiations and the fact that Ireland had already been offered 
dominion status already. Furthermore, it was partly based on a curious sense o f 





It also gives Ireland an opportunity at the same tune o f learning from bitter 
experience and responsibility o f  her present attitude and the folly o f  her 
leaders attitude, which she will never learn from us or from conquest. The 
question o f  the authority o f the crown might be solved by making Ireland a 
separate kingdom  once more, under George V.47
Clearly Lloyd G eorge did not take this advice and De Valera accepted his invitation to 
a conference w ithin two days o f  Kerr writing this letter. Ultimately, Ireland gained 
dominion status as a result o f  the ensuing negotiations and the Daily Chronicle led the 
national rejoicing. It remarked: ‘When the history o f  our times comes to be written, 
the reconciliation o f  union with Home Rule will be noted as an almost miraculous 
portent’.48 Boyce notes that the rest o f  the British newspapers followed suit, ‘with the 
exception o f  the “die-hard” press which still muttered its blood-curdling threats’.49 
Unsurprisingly, Lloyd G eorge’s role in the making o f the peace was given special 
attention in the Chronicle.
There is little doubt that Kerr was present at the negotiations in 1921. He had been 
a central figure at Downing Street for four years and his close friend and colleague, 
Lionel Curtis, was secretary to the British delegation. Indeed the diaries o f Thomas 
Jones record his presence, although they give no detail o f  any meaningful input on 
Kerr’s part. He simply refers to him having walked with the Prime M inister to the 
House o f  Lords one morning in November during the negotiations. Yet Andrew 
Boyle has alluded to the fact that Kerr was regularly at Downing Street while the
48 Daily Chronicle, Wednesday 7 December 1921 quoted in D.G. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish 
Troubles p. 172.
49 D.G. Boyce, Englishmen and Irish Troubles p. 172. .
50 Keith Middlemass (ed.), Thomas Jones Whitehall Diary, Volume III Ireland 1918-1925 (London,
1971) p. 168.
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negotiations were taking place. In discussing Erskine Childers, the secretary to the 
Irish delegation, he explains:
Left high and dry outside all conference discussions, the Secretary normally 
passed the time debating constitutional niceties with Tom Jones, Edward 
Grigg, Philip Kerr, Geoffrey Shakespeare or Lionel Curtis. He remained 
unaware o f  the extent to which these advisors, as well as the ministers they 
served, had already gauged how deep were the dissensions inside the Irish 
delegation. N or did he surmise how resolutely Lloyd George would play on 
it.51
It is unfortunate that there is no further correspondence to determine Kerr’s views on 
the progress o f  the negotiations, or accounts o f  his conversations with Childers, or 
members o f  the British delegation. His role at the Chronicle, however, remained 
important in ensuring the developments were presented in a positive light for Lloyd 
George. On the signing o f  the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the Daily Chronicle printed a 
historic front page spread with the signatures o f  the Treaty taking the central focus 
and the headline ‘Great Irish Peace Treaty Signed’.52 During the following days 
further articles detailed the rejoicing over the settlement and the support that it 
received, rather than the split within Ireland. Kerr had seen the Irish question through 
to its conclusion, first as the Prime M inister’s secretary and in the last months as 
director o f  his newspaper.
Although Kerr left Downing Street in M ay 1921 he was thus still very much 
involved in the Irish question while at the Daily Chronicle', this connection has not
51 Andrew Boyle, The Riddle o f  Erskine Childers (London, 1977) p. 290.
52 The Daily Chronicle, Wednesday 7 December 1921, p. 1.
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been addressed in the literature before now. He continued to serve his chief in a press 
role in the last six months o f  1921 while the Irish Question reached its conclusion. 
Under his direction, the Daily Chronicle reported on the peace progress between 
Britain and Ireland and on the historic settlement that was agreed in December 1921. 
Kerr also continued informally to advise Lloyd George during this period, revealing 
concerns about Irish support abroad and the granting o f dominion status to Ireland.
He never fully abandoned the view that Ireland was disloyal and the security o f the 
Empire rem ained his main concern. This provides a rounded ending to Kerr’s 
involvement in Irish affairs on behalf o f  Lloyd George, and demonstrates that he 
remained on the fringes o f  the Irish question until the point that the government 
reached a settlement.
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C h ap te r 9
Epilogue -  Kerr and Ireland post-1921
In his later career Kerr would never again be directly involved with the Irish 
question as he had been during his years serving Lloyd George. During the 1920s he 
supported him self through journalism and would continue to write articles for the 
Round Table, the Christian Science Monitor and the Observer. He held various 
positions from  1922 to 1940, the most long-term being Secretary o f the Rhodes Trust 
from 1925 to 1939, with relatively short-term posts as Chancellor o f  the Duchy o f  
Lancaster in 1931 and under-secretary at the India Office 1931-32; both in the 
government o f  Ram say MacDonald. The most important role o f his subsequent 
career was as A m bassador to the United States in 1939 to 1940. Meanwhile, in 1930 
Kerr inherited the Lothian title, bringing not only a change in name and fortune but 
also greater responsibility in terms o f  his estates. Historians have paid a great deal 
more attention to him  in this later period. This is largely due to his views on world 
government, his having supported the appeasement o f  Hitler, and the fact that he was 
a British wartime ambassador in America. The aim o f  this chapter is to survey Kerr’s 
career post 1921 with particular reference to Ireland. As this is beyond the main focal 
point o f  this thesis, the chapter is therefore much broader and contextual than its 
predecessors.
Kerr decided to part from Lloyd George completely at the end o f  1921. It seems 
he was ready for a change and wanted to devote more time to spiritual matters. 
Frances Stevenson wrote that ‘I believe that his chief reason for leaving L.G. after
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five years was because he found that his work at Downing Street encroached too 
much upon the time that he needed for his religion’.1 The parting was amicable and 
Kerr rem ained devoted to Lloyd George. Stevenson maintained that ‘We were sad at 
heart when he went, but in later years he was always ready to help L.G. in any 
particular schem e or plan if required, and we were always in touch with him ’." There 
is thus no reason to suggest that Kerr deliberately decided to distance him self from 
Lloyd G eorge’s administration, which was beginning to deteriorate. After leaving the 
Daily Chronicle  he spent a year in the United States, living on the farms o f  families 
that belonged to the Christian Science Church.3 He was therefore quite detached from 
United Kingdom  affairs in 1922-24. Yet there is evidence that he was following 
developments in Ireland while in America. Lionel Curtis remained at the Colonial 
Office as advisor on Irish affairs until 1924 and Kerr would have received information 
from him. W riting from Boston in 1922, he commented to his mother ‘So Lionel and 
Pat are coming over here, are they? .. .1 wonder if  the Irish situation will interfere. It 
seems to be coming to a fresh crisis’.4 The reference was undoubtedly to the anti­
treaty split and the approach o f civil war in Ireland. Kerr informed his mother a week 
later that Curtis had wired him ‘asking whether I could take a set o f lectures for him 
over here in August at W illiamstown, supposing he cannot get away from the Irish 
negotiations’.5 By 17 June Kerr thought that the situation looked more promising:
The Irish situation seems to be gradually improving, though it will take a long
tim e yet for it to get straight — But agreement between the government[s]
1 Frances Lloyd George, The Years that are Past (London, 1967) p. 106.
3 David P. Billington, Lothian: Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r World Order (Westport, 2006) p. 75.
4 Philip Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 4 June 1922, Lothian Papers 0040/17/467/13.
5 Philip Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 11 June 1922, Lothian Papers GD40/17/467/13.
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about the constitution is a great step forward. Arthur Griffith seems much the 
best man on the Irish side.6
This is unsurprising as Griffith, along with Michael Collins, agreed to the terms o f  the 
Treaty as an im portant first step to complete Irish self-government. Kerr would have 
also likely agreed with Griffith’s earlier preference for a dual-monarchy system, 
whereby Ireland and the United Kingdom had separate governments under a shared 
monarch. In June 1922 he wrote to Nancy Astor: ‘The Irish Constitution looks well, 
though it will probably produce trouble in Ireland’.7
Kerr was appointed secretary to the Rhodes Trust in 1925. Although the position 
did not directly relate to Ireland, it is possible to make some observations regarding 
his connection with Ireland through his work for the Trust. Kerr had not been 
employed since leaving the Daily Chronicle in December 1921, having withdrawn 
from public life. It seems, however, that the secretary-ship o f the Rhodes Trust was 
too great an opportunity to turn down as it would allow him the chance to travel in the 
dominions and the United States for some time each year. The Trust itself was 
established in 1902 according to the will o f  Cecil Rhodes. Its purpose was to fund 
scholars from the then British Empire and the United States to study at Oxford. 
Rhodes was an English businessman and politician in South Africa as well as a 
staunch imperialist who had also studied at Oxford. He intended that the Trust be
g
used to educate the future leaders o f the world.
Philip Kerr to Lady Anne Kerr, 17 June 1922, Lothian Papers GD40/17/467/15.
Philip Kerr to Nancy Astor, 19 June 1922, Nancy Astor Papers MS1416/1/4/51 
For Ae hrstory of the Rhodes Trust see Lord Elton (ed.), The First Fifty Years o f  the Rhodes Trust 
nd the Rhodes Scholarships 1903-1953 (Oxford, 1955); Anthony Kenny (ed.), The History o f  the 
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As General Secretary, Kerr was to be responsible to the trustees for the general 
administration o f  the scholarships and other aspects o f the foundation.9 Butler notes 
that for the next fourteen years Kerr’s official headquarters were at Seymour House, 
W aterloo Place, which he would refer to as ‘the centre o f the empire’. 10 It was a role 
that he clearly loved and it was not until he became the British Ambassador to 
W ashington in 1939 that he resigned. Kerr was also a great admirer o f Rhodes.
Butler states that the former ‘was a very different man from Cecil Rhodes, as he was 
from Lloyd George, but he admired the genius and shared the ideals o f  each. 
Especially was this so in the case o f  Rhodes’.11 There has been some historical 
controversy surrounding Rhodes and how ruthless, and indeed racist, he was as an 
imperialist. It seems that Kerr recognised these accusations, but he defended him:
To grade him as a mere brutal imperialist is to ignore the fact that he largely 
financed the Irish Home Rule Movement and until after the Raid was 
generally denounced in England by the die-hards o f  the day as an anti­
im perialist!12
It is also w orth noting as a point o f interest that during Kerr s time as secretary to the 
Trust the awards were not extended to Europe as ‘the founder s concern was for the 
British Com m onwealth and Anglo-Saxon world’. Scholarships were only opened to 
citizens o f  Ireland from 1992. Kerr does not appear to have raised the question o f 
Irish applications even though Ireland was a British dominion. It may have been too





Quoted in Butler, Lord Lothian (London, 1960) p. 127-8. . nna.
Philip Ziegler, Legacy, Cecil Rhodes, The Rhodes Trust and Rhodes Scholarships (London, 2008) p.
300.
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controversial a subject and Anglo-Irish relations too delicate for the trustees to 
consider at that time.
There is one final possible connection between Kerr’s involvement in Irish affairs 
and his position within the Trust. When he was appointed as General Secretary, 
Rudyard Kipling, who was a Rhodes trustee, resigned in protest.14 Various reasons 
for this have been put forward by historians. The one most relevant to this thesis is 
the explanation given by Alex M ay who argues that Kipling ‘held Kerr personally 
culpable for the em pire’s retreat in India, and later Ireland and Egypt’.15 I f  this is 
true, it indicates just how influential contemporaries considered Kerr to have been 
over the Irish question.
K ipling’s own comments on his decision to resign were as follows:
The Secretaryship has become increasingly important, and it is my conviction 
that it will add to the efficiency o f  the present holder o f  the office -  and so to 
the advantage to the trust -  if  the only Trustee who questioned his fitness for 
the post, should not continue to be a member o f  the body under which he must 
serve. I am, therefore, asking the Trustees to discharge me from the duties o f  
the tru s t .. .16
He later wrote to his daughter:
14 Works on Kipling include Lord Birkenhead, Rudyard Kipling (London, 1980); David Gilmour, The 
Long Recessional: The Imperial Life o f  Rudyard Kipling (London, 2002); Andrew Lycett, Rudyard 
Kipling (London, 2000); Philip Mallett, Rudyard Kipling: A Literary Life (Basingstoke, 2003).
15 Alex May, ‘Kerr, Philip Henry, Eleventh Marquess of Lothian (1882-1940)’, Oxford Dictionary o f  
National Biography, Oxford University Press, Sept 2004; online edn, Jan 2008.
16 Rudyard Kipling to Sir Otto Beit, 18 June 1925 in Thomas Pinney (ed), The Letters o f  Rudyard 
Kipling Volume 5, 1920-30 (New York, 2004) p. 237.
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I am having rather a stiff time with the R. Trustees who are trying to save 
P[hilip], K[err], s face at my expense: but I hope in time, when they have all 
finished having a turn at me and finding it no good — I hope to get the 
announcem ent which I stipulated to have them make, put in the press. O f 
course it can t be said why I am going but I am not going to pretend to the 
public, it was ill health or press o f  w ork.17
Reasons often cited for Kipling’s objection to Kerr include the argument that he did 
not fight in the war, he was a Liberal, and associated with the policies o f Lloyd 
George and the Round Table (although Kipling happily worked with Edward Grigg o f 
whom the same could be said).18 Another possible reason given is his ‘mixture o f 
Catholicism and Christian Science’.19
M ay’s suggestion that Kipling blamed Kerr for the ‘Empire’s retreat’ in Egypt, 
Ireland and India is however more credible. Kipling was not anti-Irish or anti- 
Catholic; rather he was very fond o f  the people. Having befriended an Irish boy at 
school, G.C. Beresford, he wrote affectionately o f  the Irish and o f Catholicism, most 
notably in Kim 20 He had been strongly opposed to Irish Home Rule, signing the 
Ulster Covenant in 1914. Kipling’s son, John, had joined the Irish Guards and was 
later killed in the battle o f  Loos. Kipling went on to write the history o f the Irish 
Guards, published in 1923.21 Kerr and Kipling were thus both imperialists but with 
different views on Ireland. The former viewed Ireland as a disloyal member o f  the 
Empire whereas the latter saw her as an integral member who had played an active
17 Rudyard Kipling to Elsie Bambridge, 4 July 1925 in Thomas Pinney (ed), The Letters ofRudyard 
Kipling p. 242.
18 Ibid. pp. 25-6.
19 Ibid.
20 Rudyard Kipling, Kim  (London, 1901).
21 Rudyard Kipling, The Irish Guards in the Great War (London, 1923).
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role in the imperial war effort. Ironically, it seems that Kerr believed in Rhodes’s 
view that federalism  would ensure that she would not secede, yet Kipling believed 
that Kerr was at odds with the principles that Rhodes stood for. We cannot be 
absolutely certain o f  Kipling s reasons for objecting to Kerr’s appointment, and there 
does not appear to be any record o f Kerr having commented on this. It does seem 
possible, however, that his role in the Irish question may have played a part.
On the death o f  his cousin, Robert Schomberg Kerr, the Tenth Marquess, in March
1930, Kerr inherited the Lothian title.22 He was almost forty-eight at the time. This 
coincided w ith a new period in his professional life. During the 1930s Kerr would 
serve as a m em ber o f  the national government. In August 1931 the Labour Cabinet 
split over the question o f  reducing unemployment compensation to close the budget 
deficit. On forming a national government, Ramsay MacDonald found him self 
presiding over a strongly Conservative coalition. He wanted to include a prominent 
Liberal peer in the Cabinet but not as the head o f a major department. As a result, 
Kerr was offered the role o f  Chancellor o f the Duchy o f  Lancaster, a Cabinet level 
office that oversaw the estates o f the King.23 Kerr held the position for barely two 
months, stepping down following the election o f  October 1931 when the Liberal and 
Labour parties lost most o f  their seats. He did however accept an appointment as 
under-secretary to Sir Samuel Hoare at the India Office effective from November
1931. Although this was a demotion in ministerial rank, India was a country that had 
interested him throughout his career. He had initiated Round Table discussions o f  
India in 1912, visiting the country that same year as part o f his world tour aimed at 
increasing his understanding o f international affairs. Kerr was also a delegate to the
22 For the sake of consistency he will continue to be referred to as ‘Kerr rather than Lothian .
23 David P. Billington, Lothian: Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r World Order p. 102.
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Round Table Conference on India in 1930. The conference proposed the federation o f 
the whole o f  India as a basis for a new constitution.24
Although Indian federation is not a primary concern o f this study, it nevertheless 
raises the question o f  the wider relevance o f Kerr’s work on Ireland.25 In a number o f 
instances, he denied that there were parallels between the two. In his Round Table 
article, ‘The Crisis in India’, in September 1930 he wrote that:
The comparison often drawn between India and the United States, the 
Dominions, or Ireland is valueless simply because in every case when the 
demand for Dominion status arose, the number o f inhabitants did not exceed 
10,000,000 and in most cases they were more or less homogeneous in race and 
language, and had no external dangers to fear.26
Equally, he appears to have been frustrated by Indian use o f the Irish example. In the 
House o f  Lords he noted that Indian extremists pointed to Ireland as the model that 
they wished to follow but regarded this as inappropriate:
I venture to think that in doing so [aspiring to the Irish example] they misread 
the true meaning o f  that history. The root o f the trouble in Ireland in recent 
times has arisen from the fact that the Irish question was drawn into the Party 
politics o f  Great Britain. One great Party in the State was long reluctant to 
admit the force o f  Irish Nationalism or the necessity for giving it legitimate 
satisfaction. The other Party in the State was just as reluctant to admit the
24 J.R.M. Butler, Lord Lothian (London, 1960) p. 177.
25 For details of Kerr’s involvement with Indian affairs see Gerard Douds ‘Lothian and the Indian 
Federation’ in John Turner (ed), The Larger Idea (London, 1988); David P. Billington, Lothian: Philip 
Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order p. 103-112.
26 [Philip Kerr] ‘The Crisis in India’ in The Round Table, vol. xx (Sept, 1930) p. 694.
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force o f  what, in the parlance o f Indian politics, is called Communalism in 
Northern Ireland, or the necessity for giving it also legitimate satisfaction. As 
the result today both the United Kingdom and Ireland are divided, though not, 
I hope, for ever.27
He continued that In India we have so far avoided these pitfalls’ because the issue 
had been kept out o f  party politics and he maintained that the Indian problem had a 
sense o f  ‘un-exam pled difficulty’.28
Despite this, Ireland did provide an important frame o f reference for the Indian 
case. In the same speech in the House o f Lords he expressed his belief that:
There is a peculiar alchemy in this old Empire, perhaps because we have been 
so often willing to place responsibility on our own rebels, and in doing so win 
them  after a time to loyal and enthusiastic acceptance o f  the British 
Com m onwealth system. We have experience o f  that kind in this country, in 
Ireland, in Canada, in South Africa.29
Kerr rem ained as under-secretary at the India Office until September 1932 when 
he left the government in protest at the Ottawa agreements. Yet he remained closely 
involved in Indian affairs and contributed to the discussions surrounding the 1935 
Government o f  India Act. Billington writes that Kerr favoured gradual change but 
looked forward to a iully self-governing India. He saw the 1935 India Act as a step 
towards dominion status. It is probable that Ireland was very much present in his




thoughts. In an article written for The Observer in 1938 he wrote that ‘In essence the 
position o f  the M uslims in India is not unlike that o f Ulster in Ireland. Difference in 
religion is the real basis o f  their organisation as a political minority’.30 Ireland thus 
provided an important frame o f  reference for him in the years post-1921.
K err’s world view was developing in the 1930s. In articles for the Christian 
Science M onitor  and for The Observer he would occasionally refer to Ireland when 
discussing the Commonwealth or his vision o f  imperial federation. In the face o f 
growing international instability, Kerr increasingly came to believe in a World 
Com m onwealth o f  Nations. This meant that the world would be divided into great 
blocs and federation would overcome the problem o f national sovereignty, which in 
his view led inevitably to war. His writings during this period reflect these beliefs and 
set out his argum ents for an international system to govern where he believed the 
League o f  Nations had failed.31 On numerous occasions he referred to the ‘British 
Com m onwealth o f  N ations’ and its self-governing dominions, including Ireland.32
In an article entitled ‘British Crown Democratic in its Present Day U sage’ in 1936, 
he wrote about how the British monarchy provided the Tink-pin’ o f  the British 
Empire while exercising no political power, yet at the same time loyalty to the crown 
was necessary for the system to work.33 After referring to Canada, Australia, South 
Africa, New Zealand, and the Irish Free State, Kerr argued that ‘all these people 
recognise the comm on obligation which finds its outward and visible sign in loyalty
30 Lord Lothian ‘The New India IT in The Observer 24 April 1938, p. 16.
31 These included his articles in The Observer entitled ‘New League or No League’ 16, 23 and 30 Aug
1936. t .
32 Lord Lothian, ‘Rock in a Quaking World’ in The Christian Science Monitor 28 July 1937; ‘Kingship 
in Britain Likened to United States Constitution’ in The Christian Science Monitor 17 May 1939.
33 Lord Lothian ‘British Crown Democratic in its Present-Day Usage in The Christian Science 
Monitor 12 Dec 1936.
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to the throne . However, in an article on the Commonwealth Conference in The 
Observer he wrote that:
Ireland is in a peculiar position. Her long struggle for national sovereignty is 
too recent not to colour deeply her attitude to Great Britain. On the other 
hand, as the mother country o f  a large section o f the Commonwealth peoples, 
and because her defence is inseparable from that o f Great Britain, she is 
rapidly m oving to loyal acceptance o f  membership in the Commonwealth, 
though she asks as a condition that Ulster should agree to put an end to 
partition.35
This view seems absurd considering the fact that Kerr had first hand experience o f  the 
strength o f  Irish resistance to partition and would not necessarily enter into a willing 
membership o f  the British Commonwealth after a long struggle for independence.
Yet he was not so out o f  touch as may first appear when his comments are placed 
within the context o f  the negotiations between de Valera and Malcolm M acDonald in 
1937, when the dispute over the Irish ‘treaty ports’ was resolved, much to the alarm o f  
Ulster U nionists.36 K err’s vision in the 1930s was moving beyond federation to a 
World Com m onwealth, and Ireland was included in this vision.
One o f  the most valuable pieces o f  evidence we have for determining Kerr’s 
opinion on the Irish situation during this period is a letter he wrote in 1935, albeit in 
reference to the 1921 Anglo-Irish negotiations more than a decade earlier. In 1935 
Frank Pakenham  published his work on the Anglo-Irish Treaty, entitled Peace By
34 Ibid.
35 Lord Lothian, ‘The Commonwealth in Conference’ in The Observer 13 Nov 1938, p. 16.
36 See Deirdre McMahon, Republicans a n d  Imperialists: Anglo-Irish Relations in the 1930s (London, 
1984).
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Ordeal, an Account, fro m  First H and Sources o f  the Negotiation and Signature o f  the 
Anglo-Irish Tteaty 1921 . Pakenham was an interesting character in his own right 
and would remain a very public, and somewhat controversial figure, until his death in 
2001. It is all the more interesting therefore that he sought Kerr’s opinion o f  his 
work. Although from an Anglo-Irish ascendancy family on his father’s side, 
Pakenham  (later Lord Longford) would often refer to him self as Irish rather than 
English. He was a supporter o f  Irish nationalist politics, maintained a long friendship 
with Eam on de Valera, and in 1940 converted to Roman Catholicism, the church that 
Kerr had left in 1923. He was later credited with writing a biography o f de Valera 
published in 1970 along with T.P. O ’Neill.38 Prior to the publication o f  Peace By  
Ordeal Pakenham  sent a copy to Kerr, presumably because o f his earlier involvement 
in Irish affairs. K err’s reply to Pakenham in February 1935 is an invaluable source 
for this study.
Overall, K err’s reaction to the work was a positive one, noting that (in proof) it 
was already ‘a really great book’ and that it would help towards healing and 
understanding between England and Ireland.39 Yet he wrote lengthy criticism, 
reasoning that ‘it would be an even greater book, if  certain interpretations were 
m odified’.40 He began by correcting Pakenham’s statement that England conquered 
Ireland in 1172, asserting that England and Ireland were conquered by the Normans at 
the same time. He argued:
The m odem  Anglo-Irish problem only arose with nationalism, democracy and 
the Reformation. Before that it was mixed up with feudalism and the divine
37 Frank Pakenham, Peace by Ordeal, An Account, from first-hand sources, o f  the Negotiation and 
Signature o f  the Anglo-Irish Treaty 1921 (London, 1935).
38 Frank Pakenham, The Earl of Longford and T.P. O’Neill, Eamon de Valera (London, 1970,.
39 Lothian to Pakenham, 19 Feb 1935, Lothian Papers GD40/17/294/562.
40 Ibid.
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right o f  Kings. The same change is going on in India today: e.g. reproducing 
Indian nationalism  and an Indian Ulster.41
As discussed above, Kerr was closely involved with the Indian question and therefore 
it is not surprising that he drew a comparison with the Irish situation. This lends 
further weight to the idea that he likened world problems to a single principle. He 
became increasingly concerned by what he perceived as the problem o f  ‘national 
sovereignty in these later years and his early experience with Ireland was something 
that he could draw on.
He informed Pakenham that he disagreed with some o f his interpretations o f  the 
1921 negotiations. He argued that the element o f  tragedy that the author presented 
did not arise from  anything that happened during the course o f  the negotiations but in 
the fundam entals o f  the issue. He explained that while ‘a settlement must leave 
Ireland independent in fact but within the Commonwealth on the symbolic side’, there 
was disagreem ent in Ireland as to whether she would accept only a republic or settle 
for dom inion status.42 Kerr argued that the Ulster issue was ‘always secondary 
because some form o f  partition was inevitable under any system ’.43 This is 
unsurprising as Kerr drafted the Bill that partitioned the country prior to the Treaty.
Furthermore, although Kerr had left Lloyd George’s service in 1921 he never lost 
the sense that he was the latter’s ‘m an’ and defended the part that the Prime M inister 
played in the negotiations. He suggested to Pakenham that:
Lloyd George, I think, despite his skill in manoeuvre and showmanship, 
played a simpler part than that o f  the super astute negotiator and tempter you
41 Ibid.
42 Lothian to Pakenham, 19 Feb 1935, Lothian Papers GD40/17/294/563.
43 Ibid.
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paint almost the Machiavelli — who knew where he was going and how he 
was going to get there from the start.44
This goes against the widely accepted view o f historians, such as Peter Hart in his 
account o f  the negotiations, that Lloyd George had an ‘extraordinary genius for 
m anipulation and m anoevre’ and displayed this from the outset to the grand finale he 
orchestrated.45
Equally, Kerr played down the notion o f the ‘ultimatum’ put forward by Lloyd 
George, suggesting that Pakenham misread the significance o f this incident. He 
argued that even if it was an ultimatum under threat o f  war (he refused to discuss 
whether or not it was) it was not the decisive factor. Instead, he credited Griffith and 
Collins w ith recognising that the moment had come when a decision had to be made 
one w ay or another. He insisted that they recognised that the Treaty gave Ireland the 
essence o f  freedom  and therefore they did not consult their colleagues in Dublin and 
risk inevitable rejection. Kerr reinforced this idea claiming that ‘They must have 
known that no British Government could have re-started the war “in three days” if 
they had asked for time to take the decision o f  the Dail’.46 For this reason, Ken- 
referred to both Griffith and Collins as heroes. But he seems to have recognised that 
they did not have the same attitude, as he referred to Griffith s pledge that he would 
sign alone, if  necessary, had Collins not agreed.
Despite the fact that Kerr had initially been opposed to dominion status for Ireland 
in 1921, he w rote at length regarding the idea that ‘the symbolism o f  the Republic is 
definitely a lower thing than the symbolism o f  independence within a commonwealth
44 Lothian to Pakenham, 19 Feb 1935, Lothian Papers GD40/17/294/565.
45 Peter Hart, Mick, The Real Michael Collins (London, 2005) p. 294.
46 Lothian to Pakenham, 19 Feb 1935, Lothian Papers GD40/17/294/567.
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o f  equal nations — Dom inion status . In his view, complete national independence 
was the root evil o f  our time — the primary cause o f war, armaments, poverty and 
unem ploym ent and therefore a commonwealth with a duty to all was a much greater 
thing. He argued that ‘in standing for the Commonwealth Great Britain is not 
standing for anything imperialist or ignoble’. He told Pakenham that he believed 
Collins, and possibly Griffith, saw something o f this whereas ‘De Valera does not -  
nor, I think, do you’. 8 He did not acknowledge that in signing the Treaty Collins saw 
it as a stepping stone to achieving a republic.
K err’s rationale here is fascinating and draws on the points raised in Chapter 7 
regarding his views on religion and politics. He explained to Pakenham that ‘the final 
issue lay betw een what I may call the statesmen and the saints in politics’.49 He 
suggested that:
The British attitude was that o f the statesmen. So fundamentally was that o f 
Griffith and Collins. But de Valera’s from the start was that o f  religion in 
politics who, if  need be, will endure the last horrors o f martyrdom for the faith 
that is in him .50
Kerr discussed this at length, contending that ‘I attribute in full measure all the 
religious virtues to de V alera’ which he put down to ‘the inevitable differences 
between a training in obedience to dogma and a training in freedom o f thought about 
religion’.51 Despite, or perhaps due to his own Catholic upbringing Kerr was 
prejudiced by de V alera’s religious stance and also that o f Pakenham. He argued that
47 Lothian to Pakenham, 19 Feb 1935, Lothian Papers GD40/17/294/569.
48 Ibid.
49 Lothian to Pakenham, 19 Feb 1935, Lothian Papers GD40/17/294/564.
50 Ibid.
Lothian to Pakenham, 19 Feb 1935, Lothian Papers GD40/17/294/572.
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the religious virtues displayed by de Valera were those ‘which have made the great 
Churches -  not religious -  and the great wars over the creeds’. He told Pakenham: 
You accept these as the highest virtues and put those o f the statesmen lower. 
Personally I reverse the process’. 52
Kerr clearly saw the influence o f  Catholicism within Irish politics as a problem.
Yet his letter to Pakenham reveals that by 1935 his thoughts on this issue had 
developed further. He argued that:
this difference [between the religious men and the statesmen] largely coincides 
w ith the difference between Protestantism and Catholicism. I have been in 
both churches and therefore speak with some experience. It involves such 
trem endous questions as why Jesus thought that the harlots and publicans (the 
politicians) were nearer the Kingdom o f  Heaven than the Pharisees 
(p riests).. .and whether he would have picked Griffith or de Valera as the 
nobler disciple. I will not try to answer these questions.53
There is a sense o f  irony here in that both Kerr and de Valera had, in former years,
considered the priesthood.
During the 1930s Kerr gained notoriety for his membership o f  the ‘Cliveden Set’ 
and the appeasem ent o f  Germany. The Cliveden Set as a group (centred around the 
Astors, Kerr and Lionel Curtis) were linked with this policy.' Although Round Table 
member, Robert Brand, denied the existence o f an actual ‘set’, Robert Boothby 
recorded in his memoirs that there was a “ ‘Cliveden Set”, which did exercise a
52 Lothian to Pakenham, 19 Feb 1935, Lothian Papers GD40/17/294/571.
53 ibid. . _ , .
54 For a detailed study of the Cliveden Set see Norman Rose, The Cliveden Set, Portrait o f  an Exclusive
Fraternity (London, 2001).
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considerable influence over the course o f political events’.55 As Chapter 4 
highlighted, the group was influential in the sense that the Astors hosted grand 
weekend social events at Cliveden, to which influential politicians, journalists and 
high ranking civil servants o f  the day would be invited. Political issues would be 
widely debated and discussed at these gatherings. Boothby wrote that the group’s 
influence was initially beneficial. He argued, however, that ‘At a later stage, under 
the com m anding and almost irresistible influence o f Lord Lothian, the “Cliveden Set” 
became the intellectual background for what I shall never cease to believe was the 
fatal policy o f  appeasem ent’.56
Kerr did feel some sympathy with German aspirations. Having personally drafted 
the ‘war guilt clause’ in the Treaty o f  Versailles he felt that Germany had been treated 
harshly under its terms. He personally interviewed Hitler on two separate occasions 
and was convinced that Germany did not want war with Europe. It was a left-wing 
journalist, Claud Cockburn, who coined the term the ‘Cliveden Set’ and accused Lady 
Astor, Geoffrey Dawson and Kerr o f  trying to negotiate with Germany behind the 
back o f  the Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. This was without substance as Eden 
was the guest o f  honour at Cliveden on the weekend when the supposed gathering to 
plot the venture took place. The group was later accused o f plotting to remove Eden 
in January 1938 when the Astors were actually in America and Kerr was in India. 
Despite the inaccuracy o f  these claims Billington argues that ‘the charges o f  a 
Cliveden Set struck a popular chord and pointed to a convergence o f political, 
intellectual, and social influence that did help keep the policy o f appeasement 
going’.57
55 Robert Boothby, I Fight to Live (London, 1942) p. 52.
56 Ibid.
57 David P. Billington, Lothian: Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order p. 129.
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Billington s research points to Kerr’s knowledge o f  Ireland influencing his attitude 
towards the Sudeten Crisis. Sir Nevile Henderson, the British Ambassador to Berlin, 
wrote to Kerr in 1938 comparing Czechoslovakia’s attempts to control the 
Sudetenland to British efforts to control Catholic Ireland. He explained his view, 
noting that 7 million Czechs cannot go on compelling 3 14 million Germans to work 
with them  — we couldn t do it in Ireland where there was no big neighbour and the 
Czechs cannot hope to do it where there is one’.58 Yet Billington argues that Kerr 
saw a better analogy between the Sudeten Germans and Irish Protestants. He 
describes an anonymous memorandum that Kerr sent to J.L. Garvin arguing that if 
Britain had lost the First World War, and Germany had forced Protestant Ulster into a 
unified Ireland, then Britain would have later pressed a claim to the Protestant north 
as soon as she had gathered her strength. Kerr reportedly described the analogy as 
one o f  the best things he had read on the Czech situation.59 In view o f  the analysis 
presented in this thesis his reaction is hardly surprising. He had been closely involved 
with the problem  o f  Ulster and drafted the bill that sought a short-term solution 
through partition o f  the predominantly Protestant six counties. His experience 
therefore led him to sympathise with the issue o f  German speakers in the Sudeten area 
o f  Czechoslovakia. Despite this, Kerr’s support for appeasement should not be over­
exaggerated. He believed that Hitler’s aspirations were not unreasonable but was 
deeply concerned by his methods o f  attaining them. As the darker side o f  Nazism 
became increasingly apparent, he withdrew his support from the appeasement policy 
altogether and, albeit belatedly, turned his support to Churchill s proposal o f  a Grand 
A lliance’ o f  nations against aggression.
58 Sir Nevile Henderson to Lord Lothian, 22 April 1930, Lothian Papers GD40/17/362/397.
59 David P. Billington, Lothian: Philip Kerr and the Quest fo r  World Order p. 134.
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In 1939 Kerr replaced Sir Ronald Lindsay as the British Ambassador to the United 
States. He had been in his new role only a few short days before Britain was at war. 
Hence the literature surrounding Kerr is more plentiful for this last year o f  his life.
The war, and its implications for the transatlantic relationship, obviously dominated 
Kerr s short time as Ambassador and his premature death in December 1940 meant 
that he did not live to see some o f  his efforts come to fruition. Yet even during this 
period there is some evidence to suggest that Kerr did address the Anglo-Irish 
relationship. This must be observed in view o f de Valera’s policy o f  Irish neutrality. 
He used this neutrality to further establish Ireland’s place on the world stage as a 
nation in her own right.
K err’s prim ary concern throughout 1940 was naturally to try and secure American 
support for the British war effort. As previous chapters have demonstrated he was in 
a position to recognise the importance o f  Irish-American opinion. John Colville, 
Churchill’s secretary, wrote in his diary 5 February 1940 that:
There is trouble about two I.R.A. terrorists who are to be executed. Their 
death will make them martyrs in Ireland (where martyrdom is very coveted 
and very effective in its results) and will sway Irish opinion in the U.S.A. 
against this country. The Cabinet have discussed the matter, but seem 
disposed not to give way, despite the warning o f  Lord Lothian and a personal 
letter from De Valera to the P.M .60
This reference was to the hanging o f  two men in connection with a bombing in 
Coventry in August 1939. Neither had planted the device but were involved in the
60 Diary entry Monday 5 February in John Colville, The Fringes o f  Power: Downing Street Diaries 
1939-1955 (London, 1985) p. 81.
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preparation and assem bling o f  the bomb.61 That Kerr warned the government against 
the executions is convincing. He had always maintained that the drawn out way in 
which the governm ent carried out the executions following the Easter Rising o f  1916, 
with daily reports in the press, had turned both Irish and American opinion in favour 
o f  the rebels. Kerr believed that this had effectively enabled Sinn Fein to gain power. 
He would not have wanted to see history repeat itself in 1940 when he was working 
so hard to gain Am erican assistance.
In his speech at the ‘Pilgrim s’ Farewell Dinner to Lord Lothian’, following his 
ambassadorial appointment, Kerr further demonstrated his awareness o f the link 
betw een the Irish question and Anglo-American relations:
Even the Irish question is not easy to put into perspective, for, while the 
powerful and talented Irish community in the United States has been 
politically opposed to Great Britain, it also derives from these islands, and 
Ireland itself is a mother country o f  the whole English-speaking world. I 
conceive it, therefore, to be my task, not merely to represent the policy o f  the 
British Government to the administration in W ashington and vice versa, but to
increase the mutual comprehension between the two peoples, which is much
62
better than it used to be, but which is still by no means achieved.
Interestingly, his early speeches as Ambassador seem to suggest that Ireland 
supported the British war effort. In October 1939 Kerr declared that:
61 See Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History o f  the IRA (Oxford, 2003) p. 61-62.
62 Lord Lothian’s speech at ‘the Pilgrims’ Farewell Dinner to Lord Lothian’, Victona Hotel, London. 
13 July 1939, published in The American Speeches o f Lord Lothian, July 1939 to December 1940 
(London, 1941) p. xli.
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The attitude o f  the independent nations o f the Commonwealth — Canada, 
Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and Ireland — has been made clear by 
their own Prime M inisters and Parliaments, free from all interference with 
Great Britain. The record is their decision and what they propose to do about 
sending troops or airplanes to the continent.63
This however may have been tactical in speaking before the American public. By 
giving the impression that Ireland was loyal to Britain it may have gained sympathy 
with the British if  the neutrality issue became increasingly strained.
During 1940 Kerr did try to use his contacts to assist in addressing the problem o f  
Irish neutrality. In M arch 1940 he wrote to Nancy Astor telling her:
Gray, the new U.S. M inister to Ireland is sailing for London in few days. He 
is a cousin o f  Mrs. Roosevelt’s. He is a very nice fellow. Get in touch with 
him. He may be quite useful in Ireland -  very pro. ally.64
Kerr was not necessarily going out o f  his way to help the situation by writing to 
Astor, but he was clearly keen to encourage Gray as he wrote to her again within a 
few weeks asking if  she could arrange a meeting between him and Churchill, as Gray 
was ‘anxious to discuss naval m atters’.65 Kerr had indeed been correct in saying that 
he was ‘very pro-ally’: Gray was highly critical o f  Irish policy towards the war and o f 
de Valera in particular. De Valera, in turn, tried on numerous occasions to have Gray 
replaced as Ambassador. In his introduction to William A. Carson s Ulster and the
63 Lord Lothian’s speech to ‘the Pilgrims of the United States’ 25 October 1939, published in The 
American Speeches o f  Lord Lothian, July 1939 to December 1940 (London, 1941) p. 17.
64 Philip Kerr to Nancy Astor 27 Feb 1940, Nancy Astor Papers MS1416/1/4/59.
65 Philip Kerr to Nancy Astor 20 March 1940, Lothian Papers GD40/17/398/221.
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Irish Republic  in 1956, Gray wrote a scathing account o f Ireland during the war, 
declaring that W hile Eire was thus exercising her neutral “rights” at the expense o f 
her neighbours, she was almost daily asking and receiving favours from them ’.66 This 
was in reference to Gray’s allegation that de Valera permitted Axis espionage from 
Ireland and kept Dublin lighted, hence guiding German bombers on their flight north 
to attack Belfast. He went on to write that all the while Britain and the Allies risked 
sailors’ lives to transport essential supplies to Eire. Kerr could not have foreseen this 
uneasy relationship between Gray and de Valera. He hoped, however, that Gray’s 
pro-ally stance would strengthen the British appeal for the use o f  Irish naval bases.
Kerr seems to have relied on the Astors as political contacts. In June 1940 
W aldorf Astor encouraged him to bring further pressure on the Americans over 
Ireland:
Can you bring any influence to bear on Ulster to come to terms with D ev ... 
Dev is doing his best but a united Ireland would strengthen his hand and 
enable him to deal with the IR A ... a few American soldiers or airmen in S.
67Ireland and in France would have a most steadying effect.
It remains unclear what the outcome o f  this request was. Kerr does not seem to have 
sought out Irish-Americans for assistance in the way that Cecil Spring-Rice did in the 
First W orld War. This is perhaps more surprising as he had a direct link to Joseph P . 
Kennedy, the Am erican Ambassador to Britain who was a close acquaintance o f 
Nancy Astor. As a friend o f Neville Chamberlain, Kennedy had supported 
appeasement o f  Hitler and thereafter was notoriously linked to the so-called ‘Cliveden
66 William A. Carson, Ulster and the Irish Republic, With an Introduction by David Gray, United
States Minister to Eire, 1940-47 (Belfast, 1957) p. ii.
67 Waldorf Astor to Lothian 1 June 1940, Lothian Papers GD40/17/398/228.
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Set . As ambassadors for their respective nations, one would have expected them to 
be in regular contact under normal circumstances, yet, due to Kennedy’s uneasy 
relationship with the American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the two had little 
comm unication. Kerr had praised Kennedy in one o f  his early speeches, saying that 
he had done a great deal to increase understanding between the American and British 
people.68 In reality, however, he appears to have been dismissive o f  Kennedy’s 
political credibility due to his Irish heritage. Sir Henry Channon recorded in his diary 
o f  4 Novem ber 1940:
Lothian presided over a small meeting o f  journalists held in the Ambassadors 
room  at the FO and spoke with astonishing frankness for an hour. He is 
confident o f  Roosevelt’s victory, and was rather scathing about Joe Kennedy, 
w hom  he dismisses as an Irish American, much concerned with the 
preservation o f  his property, his own in particular, since he has ‘nine hostages 
to the future.’69
Channon was a notorious society gossip and some caution should be exercised, yet it 
is quite likely that Kerr would have taken this attitude. Chapter 6 demonstrated that, 
as Lloyd G eorge’s secretary, he had been dismissive o f the political motives o f  Irish- 
Americans.
Following K err’s death in December 1940, it was suggested to Roosevelt that 
Kennedy m ight be the perfect man to help Britain ease her troubles with neutral
68 Lord Lothian’s speech at ‘the Pilgrims’ Farewell Dinner to Lord L o th ia n ’ Victoria Hotel, London, 
13 July 1939, published in T h e  A m e r i c a n  Speeches o f  Lord Lothian, July 1939 to December 1940
(London, 1941) p. xli. ™ ■ s o -  u
69 Diary entry 4 November 1940 in Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Chips: The Dianes o f  Sir Henry
Channon (London, 1996) p. 272.
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Ireland. It was thought that, as an Irish-American, he may have been able to 
persuade Eam on de Valera to open Irish ports to British warships.71 It is therefore 
surprising that Kerr did not cultivate a stronger relationship with Kennedy when he 
was alive. In the meantime, he was trying to assist Churchill in enlisting Roosevelt’s 
help to obtain Irish naval bases, as well as buying munitions and aircraft. In 
Novem ber Colville recorded in his diary that Kerr prepared a message for Roosevelt:
Lord Lothian has drafted a telegram for the P.M. to send to Roosevelt. It 
stresses very frankly our need for American support in obtaining the Irish 
naval bases.. .the P.M. thinks it so admirably written that he could not improve
7 ?a w ord o f  it.
This chapter has aimed to provide an epilogue to this study by surveying K err’s 
career beyond 1921, with particular reference to Ireland. In doing so, it becomes clear 
that his earlier w ork on Ireland had a wider relevance and impacted on his later years. 
In presenting a broader survey o f Kerr’s connection to the Irish question post-1921 it 
becomes apparent that his earlier Irish work influenced him and he could draw on his 
experience in dealing with Indian federation and in developing his views on a world 
commonwealth. In the 1930s Kerr was able to view the 1921 settlement with greater 
perspective, although it remained an imperialist viewpoint. As the Ambassador to the 
United States in 1939-40 he attempted to assist the British government in enlisting 
Am erican help over Irish wartime neutrality. Although Kerr s earlier experiences 
meant that in one sense he recognised the importance o f  American opinion regarding
70 Michael R. Beschloss, K e n n e d y  and Roosevelt, The Uneasy Alliance (New York, 1980) p. 235.
71 Ibid' r. •72 Diary entry 12 November 1940 in John Colville, The Fringes o f  Power: Downing Street D ianes 
1939-1955 (London, 1985) p. 291-2.
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Ireland, he never however went to great lengths to cultivate Irish-Americans for the 
British cause. This was perhaps his greatest error.
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Conclusion
Philip Kerr played a significant role in Anglo-Irish politics between 1917 and 
1921. He acted as an advisor, draftsman, and the Prime M inister’s representative in 
defending Irish policy. To date, Kerr’s membership o f  the Round Table has tended to 
define his connection with the Irish question. This thesis has built upon and modified 
this view. This work challenges conventional wisdom that Lloyd George’s chief 
W elsh aide, Thomas Jones, was the most important influence in Irish affairs. 
A lthough Jones was influential during the 1921 Treaty negotiations, Kerr was the key 
figure who helped develop a settlement and advised Lloyd George in Irish matters. 
This effectively fills a gap in the existing literature as historians exploring the Irish 
settlem ent o f  1920, and the role o f the coalition government, have failed to 
acknowledge the importance o f Kerr’s presence. He had a valuable background that 
made him  an asset to Lloyd George in addressing the Irish question.
Through exploring K err’s connection to the Irish question we also gain greater 
knowledge o f  his own role in British and Irish history. This thesis has demonstrated 
the extent to which Ireland influenced his career. Kerr’s childhood experiences 
influenced his impression o f  the country and its people in the sense that he would 
never view Ireland as a separate nation, but always as part o f  the British Empire. 
K err’s residence in Ireland was also his first experience o f  a predominantly Catholic 
country, and he would have met powerful Catholic figures who were politically 
influential. K err’s parents were a visible presence in the Catholic community during 
their years based at the Curragh and Lord Ralph Kerr held a high-ranking position in 
charge o f  the Imperial forces in Ireland.
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As the main draftsm an o f  the 1920 Government o f Ireland Bill, Kerr helped to 
shape the settlement that was enacted. His correspondence with moderate Irish 
nationalists, his support for partition, repression o f the extremists, and disapproval o f  
a dom inion solution all portray the complexity o f  his position as one o f  the Prime 
M inister s closest aides. There was no other member o f Lloyd George’s staff that 
filled the role that he did. Above all, Kerr enjoyed Lloyd G eorge’s confidence in Irish 
matters. The two men tended to be in unison in their views and the Prime M inister 
relied increasingly on Kerr, sending him to liaise with key figures, such as Colonel 
House and Archbishop Clune. Lloyd George’s decision to use Kerr was possibly to 
appease them  w ith his pro-American beliefs and Catholic background. While these 
interviews did not directly achieve anything, Kerr was able to lay down the 
governm ent’s principles. These included a refusal to back down over the question o f 
an Irish republic and the necessity o f  partitioning the six Ulster counties.
The thematic chapters concerning Kerr’s involvement with Ireland provide greater 
insight into the multi-layered aspects o f  the problem. K err’s dealings with the 
Am erican aspects suggest that the British were poorly informed regarding U.S. 
opinion during this period. He was the key conduit for intelligence on public opinion 
there. In acting as m ediator between the American journalist, Carl Ackerman, Lloyd 
George and C hief Secretary for Ireland, Hamar Greenwood in 1920-21, he was able to 
put his own slant on Ackerman’s interviews with Michael Collins. In doing so, he 
may have delayed the possibility o f negotiations between the British government and 
Sinn Fein. K err’s Catholic heritage also gave him special insight into Irish affairs, 
although this was complicated somewhat by his interest in Christian Science. It 
appears to have given him a certain prejudice regarding clerical intervention in 
politics and certainly his religious position mattered to those he was dealing with in
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relation to Ireland. Kerr s interest in the United States, and his Catholic heritage, 
were both useful attributes for Lloyd George in delegating Irish matters to him.
Historians have so far failed to recognise that Kerr continued to address the Irish 
question as director o f  the Daily Chronicle. He defended the governm ent’s offer o f 
dom inion status to Ireland, while privately advising Lloyd George against it. Kerr 
believed that Ireland had to prove her loyalty to the Empire before such a solution 
could be attempted. Through exploring Kerr’s work on the Irish question we also 
gain greater knowledge o f  Lloyd George’s performance as a principal player. He was 
able to use every possible source to his greatest advantage, long before the Anglo- 
Irish negotiations o f  1921. K err’s qualities made him a valuable asset. The Prime 
M inister m ay have been able to push him in certain directions, whether through 
drafting legislation or his move to the Daily Chronicle. Yet despite this, Kerr was 
still able to exert his own influence. Kerr was not a statesman or minister in charge o f  
dealing with Irish matters in 1917-21. However, he was an important presence in 
Downing Street and Fleet Street.
As a historical actor Philip Kerr has enduring relevance. Writing in 1960, J.R.M. 
Butler suggested that the problems that interested Kerr were still confronting the 
world at that time. Robert Brand, also writing in 1960, predicted that time would 
prove Kerr a visionary claiming that ‘Philip’s philosophy o f  international relations, 
and o f  world union, however difficult this may have seemed to some o f  us, may be 
shown in the future to have great relevance to the world o f  today’. The world 
landscape has changed dramatically since 1960. Yet Butler and Brand s comments 
still hold some truth. Hotly debated topics, such as the transatlantic relationship, 
United Kingdom federation, and not least Ireland, were all major themes o f Tony
1 R.H. Brand ‘Philip Kerr: Some Personal Memories’ in The Round Table Vol. 50 (June, 1960) p. 243.
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B lair’s prem iership from 1997 to 2007. The contemporary relevance o f  the Irish 
question means that an in-depth study o f Kerr’s connection with it has been long 
overdue. The 1920 Government o f  Ireland Bill that he drafted remained as the basis 
for the governm ent o f  Northern Ireland until 1972, and was not finally repealed until 
1998.
As an interesting link to the story, Kerr’s cousin, the Conservative M.P. Michael 
Ancram, the Thirteenth M arquess o f  Lothian, played an important role in the Peace 
Process o f  the 1990s.2 As M inister o f  State at the Northern Ireland Office from 
January 1994-96 he was involved in the beginning o f the negotiations that would 
eventually lead to the 1998 Good Friday Agreement under the Labour government o f  
Tony Blair. Furthermore, the after-shock o f  the 1920 Bill is still occasionally felt. In 
M arch 2009 two British soldiers were shot by dissident republican terrorists in 
Northern Ireland and a police constable two days later. As this thesis was being 
drafted in early 2010, the parties that share power in Northern Ireland, both Sinn Fein 
and the Democratic Unionist Party, went into crisis negotiations to strike a deal on 
policing in the province. The Bill that Kerr worked on envisaged eventual unity and 
was not designed to be a permanent solution.
There remains a sense o f mystery surrounding Philip Kerr, perhaps largely due to 
his unconventional political beliefs, personal life and religious conversion. It is 
ironic, for example, that Michael Ancram is much that his cousin was expected to be: 
a practising Catholic, Unionist, and Member o f  Parliament. There is no doubt that 
Kerr was unconventional. Frances Lloyd George (nee Stevenson) wrote o f  him. He 
was the most unworldly person I have ever know n...H is clothes were always shabby
2 Ancram’s lull title is Michael Andrew Foster Jude Kerr, 13,h Marquess of Lothian. As the son and 
heir of the 12th Marquess of Lothian he was known for many years by the courtesy title ‘Earl of 
Ancram’. Due to the 1999 House of Lords Act hereditary peers no longer have the automatic right to 
sit in the Lords, therefore Ancram does not use the Lothian title in his public life.
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and not too well fitting and his hats were a disgrace’. She also recalled that ‘It was a 
terrible experience for him when at his mother’s funeral the priest denounced him as a 
renegade Rom an Catholic . Kerr was an enigma to his contemporaries as much as he 
has been to historians. As a final note it seems appropriate to record that little more 
than a year after his death, the diplomatist and politician, Harold Nicolson, recorded a 
m eeting with Eam on de Valera in his diary. He wrote that:
He is a very simple man, like all great men. He does not look like a strong 
man, nor or there any signs in his face o f suffering and endurance. Rather 
reminds me o f  Lothian in his last years. Deep spiritual certainty underneath it 
all, giving to his features a mask o f  repose.4
In view o f  his comments to Frank Pakenham described in the previous chapter, Kerr 
would alm ost certainly have disapproved o f being compared to de Valera. But 
N icolson probably did not realise just how apt the analogy was. De Valera has also 
rem ained something o f  an enigma and, as a historical character, remains open to 
constant reinterpretation. In his work Chairman or Chief? The Role o f  Taoiseach in 
Irish Government, Brian Farrell has suggested that de Valera was more important 
sym bolically than he was politically.5 De Valera never achieved his own personal 
vision o f  a Gaelic-speaking rural Ireland. Equally, Kerr failed to achieve his ultimate 
goal o f  a federated Empire. Like de Valera, Kerr was important symbolically too.
His background and interests served a very useful purpose for Lloyd George in 
dealing with Ireland, representing a connection with Unionist, American and Catholic 
opinion. For better or worse Kerr was closely linked to the forces shaping an Anglo-
3 Frances Lloyd George, The Years that are Past (London, 1967) p. 105.
4 Nigel Nicolson (ed.), The H a r o l d  Nicolson Diaries 1907-1964 (London, 2005) pp. 290-291.
5 Brian Farrell, Chairman or Chief? The Role o f  Taoiseach in Irish Government (Dublin, 1971).
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